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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION & PROBLEM STATEMENT 
  
Background 
One of the core difficulties confronting higher education policy is determining 
whether the outputs of higher education are public or private in nature.  Proponents of the 
private good viewpoint stress human capital development as the primary outcome of 
higher education and subsequently propose the use of tuition as the preferred funding 
mechanism.  Alternatively, those with a public good viewpoint highlight the positive 
economic benefits that accrue from an educated workforce and recommend using state 
and federal subsidies to offset out-of-pocket expenses.  In practice, higher education is 
both public and private, requiring policymakers to determine the proper mix of public 
support with private investment.   
 This instability over who should pay for college leads to policymakers and 
taxpayers asking what returns they are getting on their investment in higher education.  
This includes three components of financing higher education.  First, how much should 
be contributed by the state and how much should students pay themselves?  These 
questions regarding the sources of funding are directly connected to the public-private 
discussion on the nature of higher education.  Second, how do institutions spend the 
money they receive from their various funders?  This looks at the question of 
accountability and ensuring that public and private funds are being spent on items that 
promote institutional and statewide goals.  Finally, the accountability concerns turn into 
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questions of economic efficiency and whether institutions are using the funds effectively 
and producing high quality returns on investment.  These questions of efficiency have 
become commonplace, measuring outputs in relation to the various sources of inputs and 
increasingly using these performance measures to evaluate institutions and allocate future 
funds.   
However, a major concern of these efficiency measures is that they are frequently 
difficult to calculate and understand since the outputs of higher education are so 
intangible, diverse, and often ill-defined in relation to institutional goals (Gove & Floyd, 
1975; Harvey, 1973; Kershaw & Mood, 1970).  For example, the core missions of higher 
education are primarily split between instruction, research, and service.  While measures 
of one output could show tremendous promise, another could be lacking, complicating 
the interpretation of whether an institution is acting efficiently.  Additionally, measures 
are of varying importance to different constituents.  Students, parents, administrators, 
legislators, and other stakeholders all have different perceptions of value and success.  
Each group is invested in a different way, financially and otherwise.  This mix of 
interests results in differing viewpoints on where the institution should be focusing its 
attention.  In this way, the public-private balancing act extends not only to the sources of 
inputs, but also to the outputs of institutions and institutional focus. 
 In addition to the questions of funding and the public and private returns on 
investment, higher education has long been subject to scrutiny over high costs 
(Alexander, 2011; Dumont, 1980; Ehrenberg, 2002a; Fincher, 1975; Franklin, 1952; 
Glenny & Schmidtlein, 1983; Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Westfall, & Irish, 1997; Levin, 
1991; Massy & Wilger, 1992; McPherson, Schapiro, & Winston, 1989).  One of the 
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drivers of these cost increases has been attributed to unbridled aspirations.  Institutions 
compete for the best and brightest students in order to raise their prestige (Massy & 
Wilger, 1992).  In order to recruit these students, institutions must build new dormitories, 
classrooms, and sporting arenas to stay competitive and attractive.  Similarly, institutions 
frequently seek to move to higher Carnegie classifications (Morphew & Baker, 2004).  
Again, the push for prestige involves an investment in research facilities and faculty to 
win grants and private funding.  Finally, institutions compete with the private business 
sector, requiring high salaries and benefits in order to prevent the loss of talent to private 
enterprise.  These competitive forces consume large amounts of inputs, driving costs up 
and diminishing per unit output ratios of productivity.   
 Given the multitude of interests by the various stakeholders in higher education, 
institutions must prioritize their competing foci and create processes that maximize 
returns.  Yet herein lies the problem.  Unlike the private business sector, higher education 
has no profits or monetary outputs to create financial ratios of success.  Unlike 
government, higher education is unable to levy taxes.  Instead, the higher education 
sector is situated at a crossroads between private and public sectors, operating as a non-
profit organization (Geiger, 1985).  To further complicate the situation is the fact that 
public institutions are not only non-profit institutions, but arguably state agencies or, at 
the very least, public corporations, receiving large amounts of revenue through state 
legislatures (Lane, 2007; Thackrey, 1971).  This organizational makeup means that 
institutions set prices through tuition – like private business – yet they also have the 
potential to receive large amounts of taxpayer funding through government 
appropriations.  However, they find difficulty in measuring non-monetary outputs.  
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Instead, institutions measure intangible outputs and attach intrinsic value to these results.  
This means that traditional evaluation methodologies used in business or government are 
insufficient for measuring performance in higher education. 
 Traditional models of economic performance promote operating at a level where 
supply equals demand or where marginal benefits equal marginal costs (Rosen & Gayer, 
2010).  However, these models operate on maximization functions based on per unit 
measures of price and quantity.  While these values can loosely be attributed to tuition 
and enrollments in higher education, they fail to fully incorporate the non-monetary 
intangibles of higher education, namely, quality (Atkinson & Massy, 1996; Baumol, 
Blackman, & Wolff, 1989; Bowen, 1977; Enarson, 1960; Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 
1992).  Furthermore, they fail to account for the positive externalities that accrue to 
society through an educated workforce.  Finally, they operate on the assumption of 
people acting rationally in their higher education enrollment decisions, which is likely not 
the case.  These shortcomings necessitate the development of a production function 
where mission, funding source, processes, outputs, and outcomes are tailored to the 
intricacies of higher education.  This need to develop a model for higher education 
motivates the conceptual framework that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3. 
  
Public Colleges & Universities (PCUs) 
As illustrated, the higher education environment is a complex mix of public and 
private stakeholders frequently in competition over how best to manage institutions.  For 
public colleges and universities (PCUs), this debate has been exacerbated by 
unprecedented financial challenges in the modern era of higher education.  State   
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Figure 1.1 
Educational Appropriations as a Percent of Total Educational Revenue per FTE 
 
Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012 
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appropriations, as a percent of total revenues, have declined rapidly (Lowry, 2007).  
Figure 1.1 illustrates this decline.  The percent of total educational revenues per full time 
equivalent student (FTE) that is supported by appropriations has fallen from 76.82% in 
1986 to 56.85% in fiscal year 2011.  This shows a shift in educational revenues away 
from public sources.  There are two primary explanations for this change.  State 
appropriations per student could have fallen or tuition could have risen.  The figures that 
follow show that both explanations are taking place simultaneously.  Tuition, as seen in 
Figure 1.2, has increased dramatically and consistently while the state appropriations in 
Figure 1.3 fluctuate cyclically with a general negative trend.  In the context of these 
figures, support for education has shifted from being financed by the state to consisting of 
an increasing responsibility of the student.   
From an institutional perspective, this has changed the makeup of revenues, 
resulting in institutions relying more heavily on tuition as a funding source.  At many 
institutions, tuition has surpassed appropriations as the primary revenue source.  As of 
2009, 44% of public four-year institutions reported tuition revenues that exceeded state 
allocation revenues (IPEDS, 2013). 
At the state level, public higher education has been further challenged by recent 
changes in the economy and growing enrollments. The poor economic climate during the 
early 2000s has stiffened the competition over state resources. As tax revenues decline, 
entitlement programs crowd out discretionary spending (Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003; 
Okunade, 2004; Tandberg, 2010).  Policymakers, acknowledging that higher education, 
unlike most public services, has an alternate revenue source in tuition, have cut funding 
for PCUs (Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; Hovey, 1999).  In turn, tuition has risen, both   
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Figure 1.2 
CPI Adjusted Tuition and Fees 
 
Source: College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2012, Table 2A 
Note: Adjusted to 2012 dollars 
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as a percent of institutional budgets and in terms of prices for students.  Figure 1.2 depicts 
inflation adjusted tuition over time; showing 2012 tuition and fees nearly four times that 
in 1972.   
It might be expected that tuition would have a temporary and fixed relationship 
with state appropriations as a short-term mechanism to smooth fluctuations in state 
funding.  As state appropriations decline, tuition would be expected to increase while a 
rebound in state funding could lead to a decline in tuition.  Instead, this graph depicts a 
constant increase in tuition over time, illustrating that tuition operates in one direction.  It 
freely ratchets up, but it never falls back down. 
 However, another stress on public higher education is growing enrollment.  While 
the Grapevine Project (2013) shows that overall state appropriations have remained 
relatively stable over time, increasing slightly and only falling in recent years, the per 
student spending has fluctuated much more dramatically.  Figure 1.3 illustrates these 
peaks and valleys over time as states reduce per student allocations during times of 
economic struggles and increase spending as more resources come available.  As can be 
seen, appropriations per FTE are now at a low of roughly $6600 per student after 
tumbling from over $9000 per FTE in 2007.  This conforms to the earlier idea that state 
funding is a function of the economic climate, showing a large slide in 2007 as a result of 
the Great Recession.  The fluctuations in per student funding from this graph is also 
related to growing enrollments.  Even if total state appropriations remain stable, growing 
enrollments cause the per student appropriations to fall.  This declining per student 
funding from the state can further motivate institutions to use tuition as a funding source.    
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Figure 1.3 
CPI Adjusted State Appropriations per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
Source: College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2012, Table 12B 
Note: Adjusted to 2011 dollars   
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High demand with high costs and falling state funding per unit can result in the increase 
in tuition seen in Figure 1.2. 
While issues of tuition and appropriations are of concern for institutions from a 
revenue standpoint, financial aid
1
 could be used to offset the sticker price for students.  
However, loans have replaced grants as the primary form of personal financial aid, 
minority and low-income students are reluctant to take out loans for higher education, 
and loan defaults have increased (Tuby, 2012).  These state, institutional, and personal 
shifts in paying for higher education are resulting in students and families becoming 
increasingly burdened with the cost of financing their own postsecondary education. 
 Accompanying these changes in paying for higher education are concerns about 
access, affordability, efficiency, equity, and the very definition of what it means to offer 
state public higher education.  The public has a multitude of interests, discussed in 
Chapter 2, in ensuring that the opportunity to go to college is available for all students, 
regardless of race or economic background.  Furthermore, there is an interest in ensuring 
that everyone who is prepared to go to college can afford to do so.  Therefore, the public 
higher education sector is designed to offer students the ability to attend some sort of 
postsecondary institution at an affordable price.  However, these two goals are being 
threatened by declining public financial support. 
 As illustrated, public higher education is a competitive environment.  There is 
competition between higher education and other state functions, between institutions 
within a state for funds, and between institutions for students.  Additionally, there are 
questions about how to support public higher education, what the institutional focus 
                                                          
1
 Institutional aid is commonly budgeted as negative revenues or miscellaneous expenses. 
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should be, how institutions should be evaluated, and how to balance access, affordability, 
efficiency, and equity.  While many of these topics are value laden, subjective, and often 
political in nature, a problem remains that many of these questions are only discussed at 
the state level.  This has left many questions unanswered as to how institutions operate 
within state contexts, within the higher education sector, and internally using established 
business practices.  In essence, the field is lacking an understanding of the modern higher 
education production function in turning inputs into outcomes in a time of economic 
decline.  This production function involves tracking inputs as they move through 
institutional processes that result in outputs and their associated outcomes
2
 (Baumol, 
Blackman, & Wolff, 1989; Burke, 1997; Craven, 1975; Harvey, 1973; Hopkins, 1990; 
Kershaw & Mood, 1970; Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992; Titus, 2009; Zumeta, 
2001). 
 
Problem Statement, Research Questions, & Goals 
The problem with previous research in higher education finance and production 
functions is fourfold.  First, much of the research is dated, stemming back to 
organizational and financial studies of the 1970s (Adams, 1977; Bowen, 1970; Bowen, 
1977; Cogan, 1980; Dumont, 1980; Kershaw & Mood, 1970).  Second, there is no 
conceptual framework or comprehensive theory of finance in higher education, 
particularly one that applies to the current economic and technical climate of higher 
education in the new millennium.  The closest proxy has been Bowen’s (1980) The Cost 
                                                          
2
 Outputs are frequently defined as numeric counts of production while outcomes depict 
larger societal benefits.  Because societal benefits are difficult to quantify, measures of 
efficiency or productivity through the creation of ratios of outputs to inputs and the 
relationship with institutional goals are frequently used as proxies for outcomes. 
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of Higher Education or Massy’s (1996) often cited Resource Allocation in Higher 
Education, both written well before the Great Recession.  Third, most research focuses on 
revenues, neglecting institutional expenditures and outputs (De Groot, McMahon, & 
Volkwein, 1991; McPherson & Schapiro, 1994).  This has entailed examining 
appropriations and tuition, or using states as the unit of analysis, without looking at 
institutional behaviors or mechanisms involved in producing outputs.  Only recently have 
studies begun to look at the expense side of institutional ledgers in relation to sources of 
revenues (e.g., Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, & Zhang, 2012), however relating revenues, 
expenses, and outputs throughout the entire production function has received scant 
attention.  Finally, much of the institutional research that does exist draws from the U.S. 
Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics and their Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), an aggregated look at institutional 
finances which contains no information on what happens in budget offices and academic 
departments within the institution. 
To address these limitations in existing research, this study focuses on 
institutional accountability and production processes by looking at the relationships 
between institutional revenues, expenses, and outputs.  While others have thoroughly 
researched the tradeoffs in funding between tuition and state support (Delaney & Doyle, 
2007, 2011; Hovey, 1999; Hossler et al., 1997; Kane & Orszag, 2003; Massy, 1996; 
McPherson, Schapiro, & Winston, 1989; Santos, 2007), this study looks at institutional 
budgeting and the efficiency involved in the production of student outcomes.  In addition, 
policymakers tend to take a business-like approach to higher education.  Their focus is on 
efficiency, return on investment, and the relationship between inputs and outputs.  State 
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legislators are especially interested in institutional performance, particularly when it 
comes to state resources and the rising costs of higher education (Alexander, 2000; Hearn 
& Griswold, 1994; Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002; Hines, 1988).  This high level of scrutiny 
for higher education manifests in the form of efficiency evaluation, examining the 
linkages between state funding and institutional performance and using this performance 
to determine future levels of state support.  More specifically, the term “efficiency 
evaluation perspective” in this study focuses on the manifest policies of state 
policymakers
3
 in measuring and evaluating institutional level outputs and using these 
measures of performance in making decisions regarding state appropriations.  This 
perspective makes the assumption that these policymakers are most interested in ensuring 
maximum efficiency
4
 at the institutional level in educating students and achieving the 
highest levels of performance on indicators such as graduation rates, retention rates, and 
degree completions.  Indeed, even other stakeholders such as the Lumina Foundation, 
National Council of State Legislators, and National Association of State Budget Officers, 
have expressed a recent interest in improving the productivity of higher education as can 
be seen in their call to design new business and financial models in order to improve 
efficiency (Eckl & Pattison, 2011; Lumina Foundation, 2013).  Utilizing this efficiency 
evaluation approach, I use a classic input-output production function (Burke, 1997; 
Craven, 1975; Kershaw & Mood, 1970) to examine the processes involved in turning 
inputs into outputs and, ultimately, outcomes.  While such a business model may not be 
                                                          
3
 Particularly state legislators and statewide consolidated, coordinating, and governing 
boards. 
4
 What Labaree (1997) terms social efficiency. 
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the ideal framework to evaluate higher education, its widespread use by state officials in 
evaluating, funding, and overseeing institutions makes it an appropriate model to test. 
Using this framework, I seek to evaluate the higher education production function 
for public, four-year universities.  The focus on public, four-year institutions is for two 
primary reasons.  First, there are likely different production models between four-year 
and two-year institutions, particularly with two-year institutions having separate focuses 
on vocational studies and transfers to four-year institutions.  Therefore, two-year 
institutions are not included.  Second, the public nature is particularly important in this 
analysis because it uses a framework that recognizes the importance of the state and 
federal government in using higher education as a public policy tool and the associated 
accountability that accompanies this public investment in higher education.  Furthermore, 
I examine the production function across three levels of analysis: the institutional level, 
the school and college level, and the departmental level.  While institutional level data is 
available through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), I 
incorporate data from the University of Texas System (U.T. System) and Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board (THECB) to conduct an empirical case study of the nine 
member system at these more detailed levels.  This analysis leads to four primary 
research questions. 
 
RQ1: What is the relationship between institutional revenues and institutional expenses? 
This question seeks to explore descriptively and correlationally where institutions 
allocate their funds once they are received from their various funders. To do so, I use 
IPEDS data to look across different institutions to see how they are funded in comparison 
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to each other and examine differences in funding categories such as instruction, research, 
and public service.  Using longitudinal data, I develop regression models with 
institutional fixed effects to explore how institutional spending changes in relation to 
changes in revenues over time.  This approach is very similar to that taken by Leslie and 
colleagues (2012), but extends the analysis beyond just looking at research institutions 
and instead includes all types of public four-year institutions and uses updated data to 
examine the potential changes to the relationships between revenues and expenses that 
have emerged as a result of the Great Recession. 
 
RQ2: What is the relationship between institutional expenses and student outcomes? 
With this second research question, the concepts of decision making and 
efficiency are introduced.  This research question looks at the relationship between the 
budget items and the student outcomes for which institutions are increasingly evaluated.  
Again, I employ regression models with institutional fixed effects to explore how student 
outcomes are affected by changes in institutional spending.  The data from the U.T. 
System and THECB includes information at the school and departmental level on both 
institutional budgets and student outcomes.  This level of detail allows me to conduct 
these analyses at all three levels of analysis: at the institutional level, school level, and 
departmental level.  Furthermore, I also look at the relationship between revenues and 
outputs to see if there is an indirect relationship in the production of outputs that exists 
beyond that of direct expenses. 
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RQ3: What is the relative efficiency of the various units in the analysis in producing 
outputs in relation to inputs? 
With the third research question, I directly address the higher education 
production function by using data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis 
to develop measures of efficiency.  These methods examine technical efficiencies, 
whether outputs are being maximized given their inputs, in relation to peer units to see 
which units are operating most effectively and which units can use improvement.  In 
addition, the model provides recommendations for units to emulate.  Much like the 
previous research question, I am able to incorporate multiple levels of analysis to 
examine not only institutional performance nationwide, but also school and departmental 
performance across the University of Texas System. 
 
RQ4: How do these relationships change based on type of institution and over time? 
Finally, the longitudinal nature of the various data sources, the nationwide reach 
of IPEDS, and the detail provided in the Texas datasets allows for comparisons across 
Carnegie classification and time.  This will allow for examining effects that might be 
attributable to differences in institutional mission, type, or size.  This longitudinal 
approach is especially important in examining whether institutions are becoming more 
efficient over time or whether they are becoming less efficient as a result of the Great 
Recession. 
These research questions, and the associated production function approach, 
introduce four main techniques that are conducted at the three levels of analysis.  First, 
descriptive analyses will be presented to describe the data and provide insight into 
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institutional revenues and expenses
5
.  In addition, this will highlight changes that occur 
over time and the differences that appear based on Carnegie classification.  Second, 
regression models will be employed to determine the relationship between funding and 
expense items.  Fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2009) will be used to control for time effects 
and help to look for differences that appear based on institutional type.  In the first model, 
expense categories act as the dependent variable with various revenue streams acting as 
regressors.  The second model is structurally similar to the previous model but looks at 
the relationship between expense items and performance.  Again, it uses fixed effects to 
control for time trends and compare based on institutional type.  The final model uses 
data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis (Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005) to look at measures of efficiency. This model develops a production 
possibility frontier based on the variation in the performance of the units and measures 
each unit’s performance in relation to the frontier.  
 
Dissertation Plan 
The plan of the dissertation is as follows.  The subsequent chapter is a review of 
literature providing background and context regarding the purpose of higher education.  
This chapter sets up the argument that higher education is a blend of public and private 
purposes and therefore accountable to multiple audiences.  This draws on concepts such 
as human capital theory, social mobility, and externalities.  Institutions are discussed in 
terms of their competition for funds and prestige through the lenses of institutional 
                                                          
5
 Instruction, research, public service, academic support, student services, institutional 
support, plant maintenance, scholarships, auxiliary expenses, hospital services, 
independent operations, and other. 
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isomorphism.  This background information is introduced to set up the use of the higher 
education production function from the standpoint of policymakers utilizing the 
framework of efficiency evaluation in their financing and management of public higher 
education.  Namely, higher education provides both private and public benefits; therefore 
both students and the public are responsible for funding institutions.  Given this split 
responsibility and the partial funding provided by taxpayers, institutions are accountable 
to the state and the public for how they spend their money and the outcomes they 
produce.  This discussion of the sources of funding, how funding is used, and what 
outcomes institutions produce is therefore the preferred framework for this analysis.  This 
necessitates the modification of the traditional business production function for higher 
education in the third chapter. 
The third chapter presents the conceptual framework for the analysis.  The 
framework draws on theory from political science, public management, finance, 
economics, and organizational theory.  The full model incorporates an organizational 
theory based production function of inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes.  External 
actors are incorporated through principal-agent theory.  Theories of budgeting, public 
administration, and non-profit management outline the connection between financial 
resources, planning, and performance.  In addition, these theories discuss the inherent 
difficulty in measuring outcomes in institutions lacking financial outputs.  Definitions of 
efficiency, utility maximization, and satisficing bring concepts from economics.  Finally, 
organizational theory and management are used to detail the processes involved in 
institutional decision making and turning inputs into outputs.  These concepts are all 
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applied to the production function and tailored to the higher education environment in the 
production of teaching, research, and service outputs. 
The fourth chapter reviews empirical literature most closely related to the context 
and production function of higher education.  In particular, this looks at studies related to 
the revenues in higher education, with a particular focus on state appropriations and 
tuition.  In this section, literature on politics and governance is presented in respect to 
state allocations while the section on tuition includes an examination of literature related 
to tuition, financial aid, and out-of-pocket expenses.  The second section looks at studies 
addressing expenses.  These studies look at the relationships between revenues and 
expenditures as well as the relationships between expenses and student outcomes.  The 
limitations with these studies are that they are dated, frequently focus only on research 
institutions, or define inputs and outputs in ways counter to what policymakers might be 
interested.  This section is especially important because it forms the foundation of the 
present study and the questions raised in producing outputs through expenditures and 
their funding sources.  The final section reviews the literature in higher education on data 
envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis.  A majority of these studies 
emanate from institutional analyses in the United Kingdom and Australia, but the focus 
of this dissertation is in applying these methods to American higher education across 
different levels.  Again, this section is especially important because it motivates the work 
I present using these methods in the U.S. 
In the chapter on data and methods, the chapter begins with the research questions 
that arise given the literature and theory found in the preceding chapters.  The sources of 
data are then outlined along with information relating to the variables collected.  This 
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includes a description of the selection mechanism, the data collection process, and the 
resulting datasets.  I then describe the variables across the different datasets.  The section 
on methodology follows, focusing on describing why each model was chosen and how 
the associated tables and graphs are meant to directly address the research questions. 
In Chapter 6, the descriptive statistics and the results of the various analyses are 
presented.  This focuses on identifying statistically significant results from the analyses 
and the interpretation of the various coefficients and the key relationships.  First, this 
looks at whether the source of funding is associated with how money is spent.  The 
second set of analyses examines the impact expenditures have on institutional outputs.  I 
then look at the indirect relationships between revenues and outputs.  Finally, I conclude 
with models of technical efficiency to determine if units are operating efficiently when 
compared to peers.  
In the chapter following, Chapter 7, these results are broken down to create a 
discussion of the results, the importance of the findings, and implications for policy and 
research.  Finally, I conclude with a chapter summarizing the contribution to the field, the 
limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
The Purpose of Higher Education 
 Higher education originated from a need to educate clergy, followed thereafter by 
professional training in medicine and legal studies (Perkins, 1984).  These practical 
training programs founded what eventually grew into postsecondary education.  Training 
focused around a profession, teaching future clergy, doctors, and lawyers the intricacies 
demanded in their field of work.  Higher education was centered around creating 
knowledge and sharing this knowledge with students (Corson, 1971).  This demonstrates 
a private purpose of higher education in the form of job training.  Yet this apprenticeship 
model
6
 was only for students willing and able to devote the time and resources to this 
type of an education.  Most of the populace was filtered out of higher education, unable 
to support the requirements of undertaking such study (Perkins, 1984). 
 Through the ages, higher education became criticized for living in an ivory tower, 
isolating itself from the world (Alexander, 2000; Corson, 1971).  The original 
protectionist policies were meant to protect faculty and students by giving them academic 
freedom from politics and society at-large.  Eventually, the walls came down as 
institutions became more involved in their communities, the demand for higher education 
increased, and public financial support increased following World War II (Corson, 1971).  
                                                          
6
 Others (Pasque, 2010) have argued that the apprenticeship model is actually a public 
good wherein the elite students were trained to be leaders that contribute to the rest of 
society. 
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Moving into the civil rights era, higher education was at the forefront of national policy 
attention as debates raged surrounding minority enrollments, women on campus, 
affirmative action, access, and affordability.  Rather than being simply a means of job 
training, higher education had turned into a public good and right.  It had transformed 
from a collection of scholars and apprentices into the main mechanism for economic and 
social mobility. 
 These two arguments, economic and social, formed the foundation of the debate 
between the public and private purposes of higher education.  Rather than looking at how 
an individual institution was supported financially or legally, this debate was a question 
about the field: whether the entire sector is for the benefit of society or the personal 
benefits of those who attend. 
 
The Private Purpose 
 Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) argues that higher education is a private 
investment by those attending an institution.  Students enroll at an institution with the 
knowledge that they are foregoing current salaries in exchange for a college degree.  This 
degree is meant to raise future salaries above and beyond what they would have received 
if they had not gone to college.  If the returns to the degree exceed the loss of current 
salary and the price of tuition, then the investment is thought to be worthwhile (Hoenack, 
1982; Paulsen, 2001).  Indeed, much research on this subject has revealed that obtaining a 
college degree is financially sound advice.  In one study looking between 1971 and 1997, 
the wage difference of those with a college degree and those with only a high school 
education was roughly $20,000 per year in 1997 and showed that the gap had been 
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increasing (Heller, 2001b).  More recently, the 2011 American Community Survey by the 
U. S. Census Bureau revealed an average lifetime earnings differential of over $1 million 
between those with a high school degree and those with a bachelor’s degree.   
 The premium paid to those with a college degree is attributable to two main 
mechanisms: human capital development and the sheepskin effect.  Going to college is 
meant to help individuals develop their skills.  The years spent in postsecondary 
education tells employers that those individuals have received additional training, 
improving their knowledge and thereby producing more effective workers.  This 
knowledge makes up skills for an individual, holding value and creating the individual’s 
resource pool known as human capital.  However, if this were truly the case, human 
capital could be measured by credits, semesters, or years of education.  The more an 
individual invests, the more they would be likely to receive in terms of their 
compensation.  While this is somewhat true, much of the salary premium has been 
attributed to a sheepskin effect (Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005; Turner, 2004).  This 
means that there is only marginal monetary value to any sort of postsecondary education 
until a degree is obtained.  Employers do not reward based on a strong linear function of 
the time spent at college.  Rather, the compensation tends to come in a large premium 
after passing the threshold of obtaining a degree. 
 The sheepskin effect is closely tied to cultural
7
 and social capital
8
, concepts 
popular in sociology.  Much like human capital in the field of economics, cultural capital 
                                                          
7
 See the work of Pierre Bourdieu: Bourdieu, P. (1977). Cultural Reproduction and Social 
Reproduction. In J. Karabel & A. H. Halsey (Eds.), Power and Ideology, Oxford Press, 
Chap 29. 
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involves an individual’s worldview as established by their background, values, and 
beliefs.  In terms of the sheepskin effect, the hiring managers are likely to have a college 
degree.  Therefore, they are looking for employees who come from a similar background, 
have similar values, similar connections, and similar experiences.  This simplifies to 
finding someone who shares having a college degree.  Therefore, employers may not be 
interested in finding someone with the greatest number of credits, or possibly even the 
best skillset, but more so in seeing credentialing through a document declaring a person 
as qualified and possessing high cultural capital, a college degree. 
 Given this argument, higher education can not only be viewed as providing 
knowledge and skills, but also credentialing and social capital.  In this case, social capital 
involves an individual’s network and connections.  It is very much a collection of “who 
you know” and the associated connections available to that individual.  This gives greater 
incentive for individual investment in higher education.  If an individual can move from 
one social strata to another through higher education, then the social mobility, in and of 
itself, holds value beyond even that of financial compensation.  This social mobility can 
involve connections made while attending college, those made in the workplace, or those 
made outside the workplace as a result of increased income.  In each of these cases, the 
choice to attend college offers an individual intangible benefits that boosts societal 
standing.  In most situations, societal standing rarely changes.  The process of social 
reproduction from one generation to the next keeps families rooted in a fixed place in 
society.  A college education is the hope of many of these families to break out of a cycle 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 See the work of James Coleman: Coleman, J. S., Campbell, E. Q., Hobson, C. J., 
McPartland, F., Mood, A. M., Weinfeld, F. D., et al. (1966). Equality of educational 
opportunity. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.  
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of poverty and move into a more middle-class lifestyle.  For those already in the middle 
class, college is a way to maintain their status while simultaneously giving them the 
education and resources to pursue even greater benefits. 
 These ideas of human capital, the sheepskin effect, cultural capital, social capital, 
and social mobility all blend together resulting in economic mobility.  This plays to the 
very origins of higher education, preparing individuals for careers in the workforce and 
improving their economic and social standing.  As travel and technology have improved 
over the years, higher education has become important not only in moving into the 
American middle class, but internationally as well.  The universities in the United States 
are a shining example of higher education excellence, drawing thousands of international 
students to American campuses each year.  These international students not only receive 
knowledge and a highly valued American degree, but also produce “ambassadorial 
effects” (Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005).  When the students return to their home 
country, they bring back knowledge of their field, of higher education, and of American 
culture.  This knowledge then contributes to their standing in their own society as well as 
improving international relations.  As with social capital, the connections these students 
make while in the United States provides new opportunities for business, economic 
progress, and international collaboration.  Furthermore, their training can then be shared 
with the citizens of their home country, again improving more lives and contributing to 
global economic and social mobility. 
 Similarly, there are more private benefits to higher education beyond classroom 
learning and social connections.  While international students benefit in taking 
knowledge back to their home country, all students benefit from attending an institution 
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hosting individuals from a variety of backgrounds.  The U. S. Supreme Court, in their 
decision on Grutter v Bollinger (2003), affirmed that higher education provides skills in 
dealing with an increasingly global economy.  It is on these campuses that students, 
faculty, and staff engage in sharing experiences, debating, and discussing topics 
regarding culture, religion, politics, and other ideas.  These interactions are not taught, 
but are a substantial byproduct of creating an atmosphere that fosters both academic and 
non-academic learning.  The personal experiences of students contribute to their 
worldview and contribute to their ability to engage in the modern workplace.  The Court 
claims that this personal development can then lead to leadership opportunities as 
individuals are able to utilize their experience interacting with people from all walks of 
life.  Furthermore, higher education can also improve personal satisfaction, leading to an 
improved quality of life that extends beyond economic returns (Hoenack, 1982). 
 The private returns to higher education are many and diverse.  The intangibles 
include knowledge, skills, life experiences, and new viewpoints.  These can then be 
translated into economic and social capital resulting in monetary returns and an elevated 
place in society.  Furthermore, they are transferrable with the individual across 
boundaries and time.  In addition, society benefits from having an educated workforce 
beyond the aggregation of individual returns, leading to a discussion on the public 
purpose of higher education. 
 
The Public Purpose 
 Not only do individuals have a motivation to invest in higher education, but 
society does as well.  Individuals can improve their own lives through going to college, 
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simultaneously raising their own relative position in society as well as the average 
attainment in their community.  However, the benefits of higher education are not simply 
restricted to raising average education levels.  Increasing higher education in society can 
create a multitude of positive externalities that result from improved skills, knowledge, 
and worldviews.  These externalities include democratization, teaching civic 
responsibility (Dee, 2004), and improving diversity, all of which reach well beyond the 
economic benefits of higher education through improved economic development.  It is 
this argument for economic growth, combined with the benefits that accrue to society, 
which forms the main justification for public funding of higher education. 
 Economic Development.  The economic justifications for classifying higher 
education as a public good are just as substantial as the private economic claims.  States 
first invested in public higher education shortly following the American Revolution.  The 
University of Georgia was the first public institution founded in the new American states 
in 1785, and the University of North Carolina was the first public institution to open its 
doors to students in 1795.  While the initial job training for clergy, lawyers, and doctors 
comprised the origins of higher education hundreds of years before, this mission for 
training and educating students soon spread beyond the boundaries of college campuses.  
Rather than having students come to campus for professional training, institutions were 
charged with taking their training out to the fields.  The Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862 
marked the federal government’s entrance into higher education by setting aside 
resources for PCUs to teach to the public.  Following the Civil War, the United States set 
out to rebuild the country and turn from the field of battle and return to the field of crops.  
Higher education was one of these tools for nation-building.  In particular, land grant 
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institutions were meant to reach out through agricultural extension programs and teach 
farmers and ranchers how to produce the best yield (Loss, 2011).  These agricultural 
workers in the south and mid-west were quite different from the upper-class apprentice-
style students that had gone to elite private universities in the northeast.  Indeed, the 
entire mission of these institutions differed from that of the past.  This began the major 
shift in American higher education, building a public infrastructure supported by the 
federal government and the states to bring additional education directly to citizens. 
Following the turn of the century into the 1900s, higher education further 
expanded.  By the end of World War II, the growth turned exponential as the federal 
government passed a series of legislation tying the federal government to higher 
education.  Similar to the Morrill Land-Grant Act following the Civil War, the federal 
government again used higher education as a mechanism of rebuilding and readjustment 
after World War II.  These congressional bills included the Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act of 1944, National Defense Education Act of 1958, and Higher Education Act of 
1965.  Subsequently, states were forced to respond to this federal legislation in their own 
dealings with public higher education.  The federal and state infusion of money to 
support higher education following World War II was born out of a belief by 
policymakers that higher education could be used to produce skilled workers (Kerr, 1994; 
Kezar & Eckel, 2004).  This led researchers to conclude that higher education was 
arguably the primary driver of the economic growth that occurred in America during this 
period in the 1900s (DeLong, Goldin, & Katz, 2003).   
 Additionally, states themselves have long adopted a view that investment in their 
higher education sector will lead to economic growth and development (Hearn & 
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Holdsworth, 2002).  Indeed, previous studies have found that higher education not only 
increases the skills and productivity of those who attend college, but can also raise wages 
for workers without a college degree (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; Moretti, 2004).  These 
workers add to the tax base for states to generate additional revenues and then re-invest in 
the state and higher education.  This has resulted in a number of state policies to assist 
students in attending in-state PCUs, including financial aid and reduced in-state tuition.  
This approach not only helps to pay for students who want to go to college, but also helps 
motivate others to go to college who might not have otherwise.  In essence, the human 
capital model relies on the assumption that the actors are rational in their decision-
making.  However, this is not a realistic assumption for many individuals, resulting in an 
overall underinvestment in higher education.  State support through reduced tuition and 
financial aid lowers the immediate cost of higher education in the hope that these 
individuals will see the increased long term benefits that might be realized through the 
investment of higher education the subsidized price. 
Not only are universities producing educated workers which benefit the economy, 
but they also produce research.  Federal research funding grew from $1.1 billion in 1953 
to $32.6 billion in 2009 (National Science Foundation, 2010).  As research has expanded, 
so has the institutional role in its development.  Federal funds support approximately 60 
percent of research that happens on university campuses (Association of American 
Universities, 2011a; AAU, 2011b).  This funding contributes to an overall output by 
research universities of 31 percent of all research conducted in American and 56 percent 
of the nation’s basic research (AAU, 2011a; AAU, 2011b).  Basic research, in particular, 
plays an important role in the understanding of some of the great mysteries in the world.  
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While not for commercial value, basic research contributes to the field of knowledge and 
is, arguably, one of the major contributions to society (Bowen, 1970). 
Furthermore, PCUs are a large beneficiary of federal research funds with 67.2 
percent of federal money going to public institutions (NSF, 2010).  This large public 
investment in research, especially that undertaken by public research institutions, shows 
the importance placed on higher education in developing and distributing knowledge and 
innovation.  In addition, a number of reports are also quick to point out that universities 
are the training location for researchers who eventually take jobs in government, 
academia, and business, both domestically and internationally (AAU, 2011b; Bowen, 
1977).  This blends both research and education, creating a common goal focused on 
development.  For example, training graduate students contributes to the education of 
these future leaders in society who then use their specialized, advanced training to 
manage government, create innovation in business, generate knew knowledge in 
academia, and contract between the sectors to create new endeavors that benefit society 
as a whole.  Again, this supports the need for public investment in higher education to 
foster economic growth. 
 Benefits to Society.  Moving beyond the economic benefits of public investment 
in higher education, much has been written about the benefits that accrue from having an 
educated citizenry (Bowen, 1977).  Not only do those who attend college benefit from the 
private investment in higher education, but so do those who do not attend college 
(Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; Heller, 2001a; Moretti, 2004).  Knowledgeable leaders, 
economic development, and having an educated citizenry regarding civic duty (Dee, 
2004) and the benefits of diversity all contribute to society, not just to those who went to 
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college.  For this reason, higher education can also be thought of as a public good, 
providing positive externalities to society and benefits to those freeriders who never 
invested in the product itself. 
One of the first movements to acknowledge this public purpose in the modern era 
was the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 – better known as the G.I. Bill.  While 
much of the motivation behind the G.I. Bill was to educate returning veterans and help 
prepare them for making a living as citizens instead of soldiers, a large portion was also 
about democratization, readjustment, and gratitude for their service.  Following the 1944 
State of the Union Address where President Roosevelt declared education a right, 
Congress passed the G.I. Bill to offer returning veterans access to higher education (Loss, 
2011).  This transition program rewarded veterans for their service by offering four years 
of college education and made loans available for homes and business.  More subtly, it 
helped re-acclimate veterans to peacetime occupations and ease the psychological 
burdens they encountered while in battle.  Higher education became about training these 
men and women as citizens and functional members of a democracy.  The idea was to 
help them to think, to form opinions, and to use their talents to improve and defend 
America, this time with their critical thinking and labors rather than with weapons. 
Shortly thereafter, a number of reports and commissions were established, all 
making the same claim that education is a right and democratic in nature.  Conant’s 
(1945) General Education in a Free Society and President Truman’s 1947 reports, 
Higher Education for American Democracy and To Secure These Rights: The Report of 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, all echoed the right of individuals to higher 
education and the need to exercise this right in order to be a functioning member of 
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American democracy.  Indeed, going to college was a patriotic gesture, taking the time to 
better oneself and apply these to improving America as a civically responsible citizen. 
This civic responsibility for higher education further extended into the presidency 
of Eisenhower.  In 1958, the same arguments for democratization were used during the 
passage of the National Defense Education Act.  Rather than focusing on the 
readjustment of veterans, this legislation focused on ensuring American dominance 
during the Cold War.  Psychologists found that education was linked to greater 
knowledge of what was happening in the world (Loss, 2011).  Therefore, policymakers 
argued that education was a national security tool that could help keep citizens informed 
of global politics and events during the Cold War.  This legislation offered federal 
funding for defense related fields including language and what are now commonly known 
as the STEM fields
9
.  The increase in federal funding and subsequent increases in federal 
research money over time, showed a clear commitment by the federal government in 
supporting higher education for macro purposes beyond individual earnings potential. 
By the time of civil rights reform in the 1960s, higher education had come under 
fire for making promises of access to all without demonstrating policies that made these 
promises possible.  The large public support from federal and state governments in the 
name of nation-building and democratization had escaped a large portion of the American 
population: minorities and women.  Truman’s 1947 report on civil rights stated that 
education should be available to all.  It was a right of the people and this right extended 
to higher education as well.  However, only 3 percent of women veterans claimed their 
benefits under the G.I. Bill and African American veteran claims were even worse off, a 
                                                          
9
 Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. 
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result of both overt and veiled racism (Loss, 2011).  In 1965, the Higher Education Act 
was passed by Congress and later extended through the 1972 reauthorization.  These 
measures, coupled with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, legally outlined the right to open 
access to higher education regardless of race or sex.  However, the right to higher 
education has never fully extended to the ability to pay, a frequent topic of discussion in 
debates on open access, affordability, and the public nature of higher education. 
 More recently, the issues of public access to higher education have been taken up 
by the courts.  The four landmark U. S. Supreme Court decisions stemming from Bakke 
(1978), Hopwood (1996), Grutter (2003), and Gratz (2003) have all challenged 
admissions for higher education and the policy implications for PCUs.  In Bakke (1978), 
Justice Powell points out one of the major public benefits of higher education: exposure 
to diverse lifestyles, ideas, and cultures.  Justice Powell declared the state to have a 
“compelling state interest” in diversity, stating that in order to function in American 
society and democracy, individuals will be confronted with dealing with individuals from 
diverse backgrounds and therefore higher education provides a venue for developing 
these skills.  This argument set the foundation for subsequent arguments and while not all 
of the admissions criteria were upheld, diversity has been consistently seen as having 
benefits and merit, not only for individuals but for the state and society as well. 
 Throughout the history of American higher education, arguments have been 
raised that postsecondary education provides substantially more than just a means of 
personal advancement.  In addition, higher education provides much needed research and 
training for state and national economic development.  It prepares individuals for how to 
function in society and democracy, improving their knowledge of the world, sense of 
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civic responsibility, and ability to make decisions.  It improves educational outcomes and 
fosters out-of-class learning through fostering interactions with people from a diverse 
background by race, sex, socioeconomic status, and nation of origin.  In this manner, 
higher education has demonstrated a history of beneficial societal returns, thereby 
justifying public investment in higher education, not only for the betterment of students 
who attend PCUs, but for all, so they may have competent and capable leaders and 
thinkers, enacting economic, political, and social change for the betterment of society. 
 
Background on the Public Funding of Higher Education 
 The previous section outlined the private and public advantages to higher 
education, illustrating that there are a multitude of beneficiaries which include students, 
businesses, and the macro state and national economies.  Given the positive returns for 
non-student stakeholders, the argument can be made that society should contribute to the 
public provision of higher education.  This creates a number of difficulties in determining 
the value of higher education.  To begin, what is the optimal mix of support from private 
and public stakeholders?  In order to determine this mix, stakeholders must be willing to 
disclose the value they place on higher education.  Unfortunately, the benefits to society 
are externalities, resulting indirectly from the processes of educating students.  This 
makes the quantification of their benefits difficult to measure.  Additionally, citizens may 
hold value for living in an educated society, regardless of their own personal investment 
in higher education.  However, they are tempted to hide the utility they place in higher 
education if it means they are likely to be asked to contribute to funding public higher 
education through higher taxes.  Therefore, they become freeriders, taking advantage of 
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living in an educated society without expressing the value they have in public higher 
education, hiding their utility functions instead to protect them from having to pay more 
(Hoenack, 1982).  This creates an economic public good problem because of asymmetric 
information with hidden preferences that makes it virtually impossible to determine the 
optimal mix of financial contributions.  Without a clear indication of how public higher 
education should be supported, debates have raged over how much the state should 
allocate to PCUs and, subsequently, how much tuition these institutions should charge.  
 
State Allocations 
Following World War II, states were the primary benefactor of higher education, 
allocating large amounts of money to keep out-of-pocket expenses low.  These legislative 
appropriations made up the largest part of institutional budgets as states took a low-
tuition, low-aid approach.  This meant that tuition was inexpensive; some institutions 
actually offered free tuition in order to promote access and quality (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2006).  Focusing on access and cheap tuition mirrored the federal aims to 
promote higher education under the G. I. Bill and National Defense Education Act.  The 
various state and federal initiatives to keep costs of attendance low had a direct result in 
the rapid expansion in enrollment.  Modern applications of Say’s Law (Adams, 1977; 
Say, 1803) explain that high levels of federal and state and support result in greater 
demand for higher education.  Had government not invested so heavily in subsidizing the 
price of education, demand would be much lower.  Therefore, this theory posits that 
government intervention drives up demand rather than high demand driving government 
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action.  Indeed, the favorable government policies passed following World War II 
resulted in substantial growth in student enrollment. 
Moving into the 1970s, states and institutions were forced to deal with a declining 
economic climate and the passage of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) (Archibald 
& Feldman, 2006).  TELs restricted states and local governments from raising taxes by 
inordinate amounts and limited their ability to spend money.  This shrank the amount of 
revenue that states were able to raise and thereby restricted the amount they could spend 
on public services.  As the overall pool of resources shrank, states were forced to 
prioritize amongst services, including health care, prisons, and education (Glenny & 
Schmidtlein, 1983; Hossler et al., 1997; Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003).  The limited 
state resources, brought on by TELs, resulted in two forces acting on higher education: 
crowding out and the balance wheel. 
The concept of crowding out explains that higher education receives lower public 
funding during times of economic decline because they are “crowded out” of allocations 
decisions (Kane & Orszag, 2003; Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003; Okunade, 2004).  States 
have a multitude of federal and legal mandates they must fund every year.  Some of these 
are entitlement programs, such as Medicaid, which must provide a service for all of those 
eligible.  Other programs, such as prisons and roadway infrastructure, are required by the 
federal government or encouraged by the federal government through the offer of 
matching funds or federal grants.  Still others are specifically allocated to a certain 
purpose through special taxes and separate funds.  The money that is left over is 
discretionary, money that is not earmarked for any single purpose and can be allocated 
for any purpose the state legislature deems fit.  This pool of money is quite small in 
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proportion to the overall state budget.  Therefore, there is extreme competition from a 
variety of interest groups for this money (Tandberg, 2010; 2013).  This competition, 
along with the restriction of entitlement programs, ends up crowding out higher education 
from state funds.  State resources end up going to programs other than higher education, 
and in particular, Medicaid (Glenny & Schmidtlein, 1983; Hossler et al., 1997; Kane, 
Orszag, & Gunter, 2003; Lowry, 2007; Okunade, 2004). 
A similar proposition to the concept of “crowding out” is known as the “balance 
wheel”.  This concept was found empirically by looking at state allocations for higher 
education during periods of economic fluctuation (Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; Hovey, 
1999).  These studies found that higher education tends to be the public service receiving 
the largest cuts during times of economic struggle.  As stated with crowding out, overall 
state resources decline and legislators are forced to prioritize amongst different public 
services.  These studies posit that higher education tends to be lower on the priority list 
because of two reasons.  First, college students are not the neediest population in the 
state.  When confronted with choosing between funding welfare programs, children 
services, homeless prevention, and the like, college students simply do not make up the 
population most at risk.  Second, higher education is unique when compared to most 
public services in that it can charge a fee for services.  Therefore, state legislators make 
the decision to cut funding for higher education with the assumption that institutions will 
be able to make up for lost state allocations through higher tuition.  However, while 
higher education is found at the bottom of state priorities during an economic recession, it 
nears the top of the list during periods of economic growth.  When the economy is doing 
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well, higher education is quick to rebound, receiving larger increases in allocations than 
most other state services. 
During the 1970s, these concepts were evident as states cut allocations for higher 
education and switched from a policy of low-tuition and low-aid to a policy of high-
tuition and high-aid (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Hearn & Longanecker, 1985; Hossler 
et al., 1997; St. John, 1991).  This move was meant to keep a focus on access by asking 
students who could afford higher tuition to pay more and using the additional revenue to 
offset the tuition for low-income students.  However, the Bennett hypothesis (1987) took 
a different approach.  Rather than viewing higher tuition as driving aid, this hypothesis 
outlined that increased aid and state support was responsible for the increase in tuition.  
Institutions raise tuition because students are receiving higher aid and therefore would 
pay less if tuition remained fixed.  Instead, they raise tuition, which keeps out-of-pocket 
expenses stable, maximizes revenues, and exploits the generosity of federal and state aid 
programs.  However, this hypothesis has been tested and found to be inconsistent with 
actual behavior (McPherson, Schapiro, & Winston, 1989). 
Since this time, state allocations have declined in relative importance in higher 
education funding.  While annual appropriations have increased, marginal gains have 
declined from year to year, relative purchasing power has decreased, and the funding per 
student has declined, due in large part to increasing enrollments.  In short, states have 
been unable to keep pace financially with the growing numbers of students and 
increasing costs associated with higher education. 
Now, state allocations are no longer the primary source of institutional budgets.  
Tuition has overtaken state appropriations as the largest source of revenue at many PCUs 
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and is on a trajectory to become the new major source of revenue at the remaining 
institutions. 
 
Tuition 
Since the economic decline of the 1970s, higher education has struggled to regain 
its public perception.  Public support of state services, including higher education, waned.  
Originally, states had a policy of low-tuition and low-aid.  This involved high state 
appropriations.  During the 1970s, states cut allocations to higher education, consistent 
with the balance wheel hypothesis.  Institutions responded by raising tuition and using a 
high-tuition, high-aid policy.  While the balance wheel points out that state higher 
education funding rebounds during times of economic prosperity, tuition acts as a ratchet, 
easily going up but rarely, if ever, coming down. 
Institutions were focused primarily on maintaining or improving quality but 
policymakers were less interested in quality than they were budgetary constraints.  This 
conflict over the institutions focusing too heavily on quality versus states not agreeing 
that marginal increases in quality warranted the additional expense led institutions to 
adopt the higher tuition policy (Archibald & Feldman, 2008a; Lowry, 2007).  The initial 
move to this high-tuition, high-aid policy was meant to provide aid to high-achieving, 
low-income students to attract them to campus and keep quality high despite lower state 
appropriations (Alexander, 2000).  This need-based aid was meant to be supported by the 
increased revenues stemming from tuition hikes, but need-based aid quickly turned into 
merit-based aid during the political and economic shifts that followed.   
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In the 1980s, as states recovered from the economic recession, new policies 
surrounding merit-based aid were introduced.  The most famous of these policies is 
Georgia’s HOPE (Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally) Scholarship.  This 
scholarship, instituted under Georgia governor Zell Miller, created a scholarship funded 
through statewide lottery revenues.  These scholarships would be awarded to students 
with a history of academic success, measured by high school GPA and standardized test 
scores.  As arguments of using merit-based aid gained favor, similar programs spread
10
 to 
other states throughout the country (Doyle, 2006).  These programs were meant to be 
more equal than need-based aid, targeting all students willing to work hard enough in 
high school rather than focusing on inequities by social class.  The merit-based programs 
implemented more market-oriented incentives for highly qualified students.  In practice, 
these programs ended up rewarding middle-income students rather than low-income 
students who lacked school, neighborhood, and family resources.  Without the social 
capital of more well-to-do students, such as access to test preparation programs, lower-
income students ended up at a disadvantage.  Instead, middle-income students are the 
ones who received state merit-aid and, ultimately, the reduced tuition (Adams, 1977; 
Hansen & Weisbrod, 1969; Hoenack, 1982). 
More recently, PCUs are adopting a high-tuition, low-aid policy due to ever 
increasing financial burdens on the states and higher education sector (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2006; Hossler et al., 1997).  Rather than using higher tuition revenues 
generated from wealthier students to offset the sticker price for low-income students, 
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 Doyle’s (2006) event history analysis found no evidence of diffusion or political 
ideological significance, but rather posits the spread of merit-based policies are likely tied 
to other educational policies such as low state attainment levels. 
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institutions are choosing to use tuition revenue to offset declines in state appropriations.  
These funds are being used to support general operations rather than being dedicated for 
financial aid.  This, combined with the poor targeting of state merit-based aid, means that 
tuition is rising but aid is not keeping pace, particularly for those most in need. 
In addition, the structure of aid has changed.  Previously, financial aid took the 
form of grants and scholarships, particularly those offered by institutions, states, and the 
federal government.  These forms of financial aid required no repayment by the student 
and simply offset the cost of tuition.  Now, financial aid is primarily driven by loans that 
require students to pay back the balance.  This means that rising tuition prices are not 
being offset by government subsidies, but are requiring greater out-of-pocket expenses by 
students.  Student loan availability is simply deferring tuition from the present to a later 
time when the increased income from a degree is hoped to cover the costs incurred while 
in college.          
 
State Funding & Higher Education as a Public Good 
 The public funding decisions surrounding state allocations and tuition depict a 
change in the view of higher education’s purpose in society.  As outlined in the first 
section, higher education provides benefits to both public and private parties.  However, 
states have shifted their view from a public standpoint to more of a private approach 
(Kezar & Eckel, 2004) as is illustrated through their shift from public support of higher 
education to a reliance on tuition.  This shift, coupled with the changing nature of 
financial aid, has greatly affected out-of-pocket expenses for students and families. 
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 During the economic struggles of the 1970s, the Carnegie Commission and the 
Committee for Economic Development both released reports in 1973 calling for higher 
out-of-pocket support for higher education (Hauptman, 2001).  These reports focused on 
the private benefits of higher education, particularly the increase in financial 
compensation that is associated with a college degree.  As stated previously, if the 
benefits of higher education were limited to private returns, then a move to personal 
investment would seem logical.  However, this approach overlooks the benefits of an 
educated society and disproportional access to higher education for low-income and 
minority students.  These major societal issues, which were at the forefront of educational 
discussions in the 1950s and 1960s, had lost their place on the public agenda as issues 
surrounding the status of the economy triumphed. 
 In the forty years since these reports, states have increasingly turned their 
attention to private returns of higher education and the need for students to support their 
own education.  This is demonstrated in declining public financial support per student 
and an increasing emphasis on students using loans to support themselves rather than 
being subsidized through grants from the government.  The result of this has been higher 
out-of-pocket expenses for students.  Furthermore, the cost of higher education extends 
beyond the stated sticker price.  The higher education cost index has increased rapidly, 
faster than inflation.  In addition, the cost of higher education as a percent of total 
household income has increased as well.  This combination of rapidly increasing costs, 
declining aid, and larger expenses as a percent of income has threatened the affordability 
of higher education. 
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 Higher education, as a means of entrance into the middle class through social 
mobility, is simply not affordable for low-income students.  Even middle-class students 
are, arguably, now being threatened in terms of access to higher education and 
maintaining their social standing.  These limitations in the current personal funding 
model of high-tuition and low-aid are bringing attention to the failures of higher 
education to stay affordable, provide service to society, and operate efficiently.  As the 
media devotes more attention to these issues, states are being forced to address their 
management of higher education. 
 
State Management of Higher Education 
 States have gone through three periods of management for public higher 
education since the end of World War II (Shepherd & McLendon, forthcoming).  In the 
first period, states created governing boards to manage the enrollment growth 
accompanying the federal passage of the G.I. Bill.  These boards were meant to add 
coordination between campuses to reduce redundancy.  Earlier studies suggested higher 
education was acting inefficiently, with large amounts of duplication in services and no 
cooperation between campuses that resulted in wasted resources (Dykstra, 1948).  In the 
second period, the economic decline forced states to look for efficiencies and areas to cut 
costs.  Boards were strengthened to oversee institutions and make financial adjustments 
across the system in order to save money for the state.  Since the 1980s, the last period 
has involved rapid decentralization of authority, giving institutions more autonomy over 
their own financial planning.  This period of re-privatization was meant to allow 
institutions to manage their own money and find efficiencies internally through increased 
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managerial authority.  Most recently, states are experimenting with voucher systems in 
Colorado and public charters in places like Virginia and Ohio where higher education is 
managed not by states, but by market forces.  This section follows the political line of 
research undertaken to explore state characteristics such as governing boards, politics, 
and policy adoption.  It will focus on the aforementioned three periods of state 
management, the public view of higher education, and the associated impacts on funding. 
 In the first period of the 1950s and 1960s, states created governing boards to 
manage the large influx of students demanding access to higher education (McLendon, 
2003b).  The federal government passed four major pieces of legislation during this 
period which greatly bolstered the public investment in higher education.  The 
Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, provided generous 
benefits to returning veterans of World War II.  One benefit in particular, was improving 
access to higher education.  Shortly thereafter, the National Defense Education Act of 
1958 greatly increased the financial resources made available to higher education as 
education became a national defense issue following the Soviet scientific advancements 
seen in the successful launch of Sputnik.  Moving into the 1960s, access to higher 
education again improved as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Higher Education Act of 
1965 protected minority students and women from discrimination on college campuses.  
This period of access and growth was addressed by states in two main ways.  First, states 
invested heavily in higher education.  There was extremely high public support and states 
responded by maintaining a low-tuition policy to ensure students were able to access and 
afford higher education.  Second, states created coordinating boards to better manage 
their public higher education sector.  Previously, institutions had little interaction with 
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state actors or other institutions (Glenny & Schmidtlein, 1983).  Instead, they were 
largely left alone and managed their own operations much like how a private institution 
might operate.  With the influx of students and financial resources, states made it a policy 
to oversee the operations of higher education and ensure there was no duplication of 
services or overlap between institutions within a state.  Therefore, these loose governing 
boards were meant to foster cooperation between institutions and report more directly to 
state policymakers (McLendon, 2003b). 
 As the economy turned in the 1970s and citizens imposed TELs on state and local 
governments, the relationships between the states and higher education changed 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2006).  States were no longer able to afford the high financial 
support they had provided during the previous period.  Public support had started to fade, 
the overall state budget began to shrink with the imposition of TELs, and a variety of 
entitlement programs such as Medicaid took up large portions of what budget remained.  
This crowded higher education out of state support, forcing them to adopt a high-tuition, 
high-aid policy.  This high-high relationship was meant to charge higher tuition for 
students who could pay in order to support low-income students with greater aid 
packages.  In addition, states during this time took a more active interest in higher 
education and the efficient management of its operations.  Indeed, the very beginning of 
the efficiency evaluation perspective can trace its roots to this period of economic 
struggle and the associated shifts in the attention of state policymakers from access and 
affordability to efficiency and productivity (McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007).  The 
coordinating boards of the previous period were given more power and states with 
multiple boards ended up combining these into a consolidated board with increasing 
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jurisdiction on tuition, state allocations, and the management of higher education affairs 
(McLendon, 2003b).  Accompanying this shift was the beginning emergence of 
monitoring outputs rather than inputs to ensure accountability and high performance in 
higher education. 
 Since the 1980s, states have adopted a more market-driven view of higher 
education (Johnstone, Teixeira, Rosa, & Vossensteyn, 2006; McLendon, 2003b; 
Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Taylor, Cantwell, & Slaughter, 
2013).  This has involved dismantling strong governing boards and giving more authority 
to institutions.  This move was meant to make institutions more directly accountable for 
their actions and to give them the managerial resources for managing their own 
operations.  In order to maintain some sort of oversight, states adopted new performance 
based management systems in exchange for this increased autonomy (Ferris, 1991; 
Rabovsky, 2013; Tandberg & Hillman, 2013).  Institutions became more directly 
responsible for their efficiency and outcomes, including on measures such as graduation 
rates, time to degree, and cost per student.  In some states, the re-privatization of public 
higher education has gone beyond public funding and state management to institutional 
and system-wide reform. 
 One of the recent fads in the state management of higher education has been the 
introduction of public charters.  These legislative actions were meant to mimic legislation 
in places such as California and Michigan, where public institutions receive tremendous 
autonomy from the state.  In these locations, the University of California (UC) system 
and University of Michigan are protected from legislative and gubernatorial meddling by 
their state constitutions.  The UC system, in particular, has been called a fourth-branch of 
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government in the state, largely isolated from both executive and legislative influence.  
Both of these systems have been considered examples of public higher education 
excellence, with consistently high academic measures, large public endowments, and 
major research funding.  In Virginia, the state legislature undertook a similar move, 
passing legislation
11
 to give charters to their public institutions (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008).  
The University of Virginia, in particular, was seen in the eyes of legislators as being 
competitive with the top public and private institutions in the country.  Therefore, if they 
were competing with elite institutions, they should be managed like an elite institution.  
To legislators, this meant giving them the ability to manage their own operations.  While 
this initiative was not as strong as constitutional protection, the charters allow institutions 
to set their own tuition, create their own purchasing agreements, and manage their own 
personnel.  In return, they forego a percentage of state funding.  In theory, the managerial 
flexibility and ability to set their own tuition is meant to offset the loss of state funds.  By 
freeing institutions from the “red tape” of state oversight, institutions are hypothesized to 
save time and money.  In other states, Wisconsin has discussed introducing charters for 
the University of Wisconsin at Madison and Milwaukee while Ohio recently adopted a 
charter program in 2011 with the passage of House Bill 153. 
Similar reforms have been seen throughout the United States to varying degrees.  
Texas passed legislation
12
 deregulating tuition and allowing institutions to set their own 
price.  This popular measure typically sets an administrative ceiling above which public 
institutions cannot increase their tuition.  If the annual change in tuition exceeds this 
                                                          
11
 Restructured Higher Education Financial and Administrative Operations Act of 2005 
and Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011. 
12
 House Bill 3015 in 2003. 
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ceiling, 5 percent in Virginia, institutions are penalized through a loss of state aid.  Other 
reforms have received attention in Louisiana with Bobby Jindal’s GRAD Act and in 
Oregon with the move to create P-16 governing boards. 
In Colorado, states eliminated public funding for higher education.  Instead, they 
switched to a voucher style system, awarding funding directly to students.  Institutions 
then were forced to compete for students and the funding associated with their 
enrollment.  This created a market for students, like with any other commodity, and 
competition between institutions was intended to force them to act efficiently or students 
would self-select to choose elsewhere.  Initially, states proposed a $4000 stipend for 
every enrolled full-time student on a four-year campus in Colorado.  By the time of actual 
implementation, this amount had nearly halved to only $2400 per student.  Additionally, 
the competition for students was meant to put pressure on institutions to keep tuition low 
for fear that students would go elsewhere.  Instead, tuition rose 13.5 percent in two years 
following the implementation of the voucher system (WICHE, 2009).  There were other 
unintended consequences, including a decrease in overall enrollments as students chose 
to study out of state, a decrease in underrepresented students, and a decrease in the 
number of Pell recipients (WICHE, 2009). 
 Overall, these market and efficiency based state reforms have had mixed results.  
In terms of cutting money for the state, they have been successful.  However, these cuts 
may have occurred otherwise and the reforms may simply be the easy explanation to 
justify reduced allocations to the public.  In general, the reforms of the past thirty years 
all share a common motivation to implement market-based reforms in order to oversee 
higher education.  However, this focus on private returns and the use of market initiatives 
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has had unintended consequences for the public returns.  In determining that higher 
education should be a privately financed investment, public benefits have suffered, 
minority students have been displaced, and access has been restricted due to the lack of 
affordability (Flores & Shepherd, in press; Kezar & Eckel, 2004).  However, institutions 
themselves have taken a different approach in their management of operations, focusing 
less on financial aspects and efficiency and more on self-interest and aspirations.  
 
Institutional Administration 
While competition has been promoted as a state solution for higher education 
reform, it has also driven up costs as institutions compete for students.  Not only are 
institutions after enrollment numbers, but they are after the best and brightest students, 
seeking to reach performance benchmarks to receive additional state funding.  Similarly, 
they are in competition over research funding and the desire to attract prestigious faculty.  
Finally, they compete against each other and with other state services for public funding.  
This competition, especially the competition for funding and prestige, has been a primary 
driving force behind institutional behavior. 
The relentless pursuit of prestige in higher education has caused the costs to 
increase throughout the entire sector (Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992).  This 
competition for prestige is largely driven by rankings lists (Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 
2002; Ehrenberg, 2002b; Morphew, 2002; Morphew & Baker, 2004).  Reports such as 
those issued by U. S. News and World Report, Forbes, and Times Higher Education
13
 
have pushed institutions to increase their ranking or, if nothing else, to maintain their 
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standing.  Institutions have responded to these lists by focusing on the formulas that 
derive their relative position (Brooks, 2005).  They attempt to improve their standing on 
these measures regardless of if these moves are in the best interest of the institution or its 
students, because an improved ranking boosts publicity and notoriety (Ehrenberg, 
2002b).  In some cases, institutions have been criticized for this approach since the 
motivation to game the system in order to improve rankings has led to false reporting.  
Recently, a number of professional and law schools have come under fire for false 
reporting on measures such as job placement rates in order to boost their institutional 
ranking on these types of lists
14
. 
Furthermore, many institutions are continually expanding to try to move up to 
higher institutional classifications (Morphew & Baker, 2004).  These categories, such as 
Carnegie classification and Barron’s selectivity index, divide institutions into groups of 
similar peers.  Institutions granting master’s degrees seek to grant doctoral degrees.  
Those granting doctoral degrees want to become research universities.  This motivation 
to move into a higher classification is meant to bring notoriety and funding, much like 
moving to a higher standing on rankings lists.  Therefore institutions undergo capital 
projects to renovate dormitories, gymnasiums, stadiums, and recreation centers that are 
used to attract prospective students.  Attracting better students would raise measures such 
as average SAT score and graduation rates, helping to improve an institution’s rank.  
Similarly, building new labs are meant to attract new faculty and generate grants from 
various foundations and government agencies.  Again, this improves an institution’s 
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 For examples, see the Chronicle of Higher Education (De Santis, 2012; 2013) where 
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George Washington University for inflating reported data. 
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relative rank.  The difficulty with this competition is that almost every university is 
striving to achieve the same vertical move.  This shared aspirational motivation is part of 
the isomorphic tendencies seen from campus to campus.  Institutions tend to follow the 
lead of an aspirational, elite institution, such as Harvard (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Morphew & Baker, 2004).  Therefore, institutions will try to replicate the example set by 
their aspirational schools.  This causes many features of institutions to spread from one 
school to another and explains why departments and programs, such as academic 
advising and freshmen orientation, are mimicked nationwide.  Therefore, each institution 
sinks more and more money into these aspirational and isomorphic goals, causing overall 
costs to rise across the entire industry. 
While the competition for students and prestige fosters conversations about costs, 
efficiency, and markets, the business model analogy fails in the details.  In particular, 
public higher education suffers from difficulty in entering and exiting the market 
(Bowen, 1977).  For-profit institutions have been successful in recent years in joining the 
higher education landscape and a number of smaller non-profit institutions have closed 
their doors because of the financial crisis, but public institutions rarely close.  This 
stagnation of public institutions and the large influx of for-profit institutions could be 
contributing to an oversaturation in higher education.  However, the other side of this 
conversation presents the case that steady increases in the demand for higher education is 
driving this expansion, and that the market is simply changing its character.   
Competition extends beyond the relative rank in national publications.  Within a 
state, higher education as a sector competes for limited public resources (Franklin, 1952).  
The balance wheel concept (Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; Hovey, 1999), as previously 
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discussed, is further supplemented with interest group politics.  Higher education makes 
up a large interest group within a state.  In New York, California, and Pennsylvania, over 
100 public four-year institutions make up sizeable higher education sectors (IPEDS, 
2013).  However, other states only support a handful of schools.  In Wyoming, there is 
only a single four-year institution.  Yet, scholars (Baldridge, 1971; Dumont, 1980; 
Tandberg, 2009, 2010, 2013) have posited that higher education is failing as an interest 
group because of internal competition and the structure of governing boards.  Rather than 
working together, institutions are self-interested.  This may be attributable to the 
decentralization and re-privatization that has occurred in higher education since the 
1980s.  As states have eliminated or downsized governance structures, institutions have 
become more self-interested rather than being managed by the state or oversight board.  
This could extend beyond the management of their operations to their funding 
requisitions and, ultimately, the coordination between campuses as they lobby the state 
for funding.  Indeed, previous research has found that consolidated governing boards 
have been found to have a negative effect on the statewide support of higher education 
because the single governing structure limits the ability of institutions to coordinate and 
advocate directly to the legislature (Tandberg, 2013).   
One of the measures of an institution’s worth to the state is their budget success 
rate.  This is the ratio between the amount of funding an institution requests and the 
amount they actually receive from the state (Cogan, 1980).  However, success at one 
institution means failure at another since funds are limited and institutions frequently 
request funding well above the amount they actually expect to receive.  In addition, the 
interests of higher education are so diverse that it becomes difficult to create a unified 
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voice.  Instead, the interests of higher education are split between faculty, students, 
administrators, and the public, making bargaining at the state level difficult (Henderson, 
1969).  However, the study of interest groups in higher education is relatively new and 
requires additional research into topics on politics and political decision making (Lowry, 
2007; Tandberg, 2009, 2010, 2013).  
Finally, institutions have two unique features that affect both their public nature 
and funding requirements.  The first feature is mission creep, or academic drift 
(Aldersley, 1995).  Much like the problems with competitive aspirations above, 
institutions have been criticized for losing sight of their educational mission.  Critics 
allege that institutions are focusing too heavily on research, public service, and internal 
support services, resulting in a rapid expansion of administration and increasing costs 
(Massy & Wilger, 1992; Zemsky & Massy, 1990).  Instead, these critics argue that 
institutions should remain focused on educating undergraduate students, thereby reducing 
per student costs as these, arguably, auxiliary services are cut (Levin, 1991).  This 
mission creep not only affects costs but the public nature of higher education.  On the one 
hand, offering public services helps institutions become more involved in the community, 
targeting needy populations and providing a service beyond the borders of the campus.  
On the other hand, if the mission creep is causing education to suffer, then the public 
financing of higher education is possibly not being used for the intended purpose and 
most effective manner.  The second aspect of institutional management that is unique to 
college campuses is the belief in academic freedom.  PCUs offer an environment to 
conduct research free from judgment, politics, and fear of job insecurity.  The concept 
tying all of this together is academic freedom.  This, along with the associated 
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institutional mechanics of tenure, departmental autonomy, and faculty boards, provides 
the ability to create, develop, and conserve knowledge.  These characteristics foster the 
principles of public higher education. 
 
Summary of the Higher Education Context 
This chapter has provided a description of the history, background, and context of 
higher education.  The main theme throughout the chapter has been examining the public 
and private components of higher education.  This has included a description of the 
public and private benefits of higher education, making the case that since there are 
positive externalities that benefit society, that society is therefore responsible for partially 
funding higher education in return for these benefits.  In addition, states and institutions 
both struggle with this question of who receives the greatest returns and who should pay 
for higher education.  As the public perception of higher education has changed over 
time, policymakers have adjusted legislation to reflect the newly adopted sentiments of 
society given the economic and political leanings of the time.  State and institutional 
management of oversight, funding, accountability, efficiency, and performance have all 
been modified to reflect the perceived nature of higher education.  In general, a clear shift 
has emerged towards considering higher education as being a private good (Kezar & 
Eckel, 2004).  This has resulted in policies reflective of this private view: higher tuition, 
lower state funding, and increased autonomy for institutions.  In the next chapter, a 
conceptual framework is outlined using this background on the public and private aspects 
of higher education, with particular attention paid to the inputs, processes, and outputs. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 One of the difficulties in researching higher education finance is that there is no 
comprehensive conceptual framework for hypothesis testing.  This chapter develops such 
a framework by drawing on literature and theory from a variety of fields including 
political science, public management, non-profit finance, higher education finance, 
economics, and organizational theory.  This framework examines the actors, actions, and 
motivations involved in the financial support of higher education
15
.  Consistent with the 
research questions examining institutional decision making, budgeting, and expenses at 
the institutional and subunit levels, the framework modifies existing economic production 
functions to fit the landscape of higher education.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the conceptual 
framework, building the foundation from previous descriptions of input-output 
production functions (Burke, 1997; Craven, 1975; Hopkins, 1990; Kershaw & Mood, 
1970).   
These theories describe a production process from inputs to processes to outputs 
and outcomes.  The inputs are raw materials which then undergo processes to create 
outputs.  Raw materials in manufacturing might include steel, lumber, or other materials 
that are transformed into a finished product.  In higher education, this assumption is 
particularly sensitive.  While products on an assembly line are uniform and consistent, 
the raw inputs in higher education are students.  This is problematic since age, race,   
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 Public higher education, in particular. 
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Figure 3.1  
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socioeconomic background, academic preparation, and other characteristics of students 
make them inherently different.  Therefore, treating them like a resource commodity, and 
institutions like factories, is a weak metaphor, at best.  In order to take this type of a 
perspective, characteristics of students and institutions must be taken into account in the 
analyses, controlling for these characteristics in an attempt to reduce student and 
institutional variation so that meaningful comparisons might be made based on quantity 
and capacity rather than other attributes.  This assumption, and its limitations, will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters, particularly how certain student 
populations and mission oriented institutions might produce differential effects. 
The processes in a production framework typically involve routine activities such 
as those seen in manufacturing.  In the case of higher education, a service oriented 
industry, the processes are services related to the core operations involving teaching, 
research, and administration.  In both instances, the processes turn raw materials into a 
final product.  Again, in the business sector, this is a tangible product while in higher 
education, it is an intangible service that contributes to human, social, and cultural 
capital.   
Outputs are distinguishable from outcomes in that outputs are simply measures of 
quantity.  Outcomes are instead measures of outputs in relation to inputs and the 
contribution to greater goals.  Unfortunately, most outcomes that directly benefit society 
are incredibly difficult to measure.  Instead, ratios of outputs to inputs are frequently used 
as proxies for outcomes.  These consist of ratios reflective of efficiency and the greater 
impact on the institution and sector.  To illustrate, a simplified economic equation for 
revenues typically consists of price (P) multiplied by quantity (Q).  In this equation, Q is 
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a measure of output.  It is simply a workload count of production and commonly known 
as gross productivity (Baumol, Blackman, & Wolff, 1989; Massy, 1996).  However, 
outcomes take a long-term look at how the outputs are affecting business practices and 
helping institutions achieve goals (Craven, 1975).  This could be a profit margin ratio, 
effectiveness at achieving goals such as a stated graduation rate, cost per unit change in 
productivity, or meeting certain benchmarks.  Early examples of looking at inputs in 
relation to outputs in higher education, or costs in relation to benefits, include the 
decision to admit women to Princeton in 1969 and the examination of medical schools in 
California (Kershaw & Mood, 1970). 
 The model in Figure 3.1 modifies the input-output model for higher education in 
three main ways.  First, budgeting is included as a separate step in the sequence.  This 
helps to distinguish the separate processes of turning revenues into expenditures.  In 
particular, higher education is reliant on states and the federal government for a large 
portion of its revenues.  This creates a disconnect between revenues and expenditures 
wherein expenditures are subject to change based on the decisions of third-party funders 
rather than internal processes.  These funders typically allocate block sums of money to 
institutions rather than budgeting for specific subunits.  In addition, university budgeting 
is a multi-step process whereby states must make allocation decisions, the federal 
government must make funding decisions, and students must decide where to enroll and 
bring their tuition money.  Once these third-party funders have made their decisions, 
institutions must then decide internally how to allocate the various sources of revenues.  
Because of this process in higher education, this step was included to differentiate 
between the sources and uses of funding. 
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 The second noticeable inclusion is a multiplier for quality.  The outcomes in 
business depend on revenues and ultimately profits.  In higher education, price and 
quantity are less meaningful.  There are no profits, and any revenues or unspent money 
must be reinvested in the institution or forfeited back to the state.  Instead, higher 
education is judged on quality.  This affects both inputs and the processes that lead to 
outputs and outcomes.  In terms of inputs, quality is judged by the educational offerings 
of the school, which manifests through the caliber of faculty and students.  These high-
caliber individuals then provide quality service which produces improved outputs.  Better 
outputs, once related to outcomes, improves an institution’s standing, which then attracts 
even more high-quality faculty and students.  This circular loop, affecting both inputs and 
outcomes, is interrelated to the price and quantity formula for production functions.  
Therefore, it warrants inclusion as a multiplier in the higher education production 
function (Atkinson & Massy, 1996). 
 Finally, there are two feedback loops included in the model which are somewhat 
unique to higher education.  The smaller feedback loop between budgets and inputs is 
reflective of the dependent relationship between institutions and their third-party funders.  
Institutions must make decisions regarding how to allocate funds internally once they 
know their revenues.  However, they can also try to influence the relationship with their 
funders.  Rather than only looking further down in the production process, institutions 
can act strategically, employing methods from principal-agent theory to lobby for 
additional funding.   
The larger feedback loop connects the outcomes of higher education with inputs.  
This occurs through two main mechanisms parallel with the different types of inputs: 
 60 
 
human inputs and financial inputs.  Faculty and students are not only the producers of 
higher education but also the consumers and inputs.  They teach classes, produce 
research, learn from fellow faculty members and students, are instrumental in 
institutional rankings, and aid in the recruitment of other quality academics and students.  
This links the human resources as both inputs and producers of output that further 
improves inputs.  The financial loop is reliant on the fact that profits must be reinvested 
in higher education.  Additionally, given the increasing attention at the state level paid to 
institutional efficiency and performance, financial funding has become increasingly 
dependent on outputs.  States are using performance funding and performance budgeting 
in their allocation decisions.  This initiative has created a direct relationship between 
institutional performance on outcomes and the funding allocated to them by the state. 
It should be noted that this framework relies of the aforementioned efficiency 
evaluation perspective.  The focus of this framework is evaluating institutional 
performance from the viewpoint of those most interested in ensuring that institutions are 
acting efficiently.  In particular, it focuses on the core processes at institutions in 
producing outputs related to service, research, and, most centrally, instruction.  This 
framework is not meant to address the many auxiliary services at an institution, such as 
athletics, nor its auxiliary sources of funding.  Finally, while this framework looks at 
institutions and its subunits in producing these outputs, it does not specifically address 
students, who play a large role in institutional mission, services, and outputs.  For 
example, I do not make any assumptions about students themselves and how they are 
affected by certain programs nor their probability of being retained or graduating on time.  
Instead, I use the efficiency evaluation perspective to look at the performance of 
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institutions on the whole rather than the behavior of individual students.  The remainder 
of this chapter is devoted to the description of the theory and processes involved in this 
conceptual framework and, ultimately, how this framework will be used to explore 
institutional budgets and outcomes. 
 
Inputs 
 The production function for higher education begins with a look at inputs.  In 
public higher education, many inputs come from fellow public sources, namely the 
government.  More specifically, taxes are levied on citizens that then go to support higher 
education functions.  This approach makes the case that higher education is a benefit to 
the state and makes its services available to in-state citizens who then receive a discount 
because of their contribution through taxes.  This is, for example, why there is a large 
difference in the price of in-state versus out-of-state tuition.  This relationship can be 
quite complicated.  Institutions receive their funding directly from the state, making them 
agents of both the state legislature and governor (Gerber & Teske, 2000).  This 
relationship varies from state to state as gubernatorial power varies
16
, particularly in 
setting the state budget.  In strong executive states, institutions function more as state 
agencies tied directly to the governor (Thackrey, 1971).  In legislative states where the 
lower house has more budget authority, institutions may be more responsive to the 
legislature and their subcommittees.  However, relationships with governors and state 
legislatures vary within states as well.  Governors tend to focus on higher education as a 
mechanism of economic development while state legislatures are more focused on 
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 For example, the use of line-item vetoes and the development of executive budgets. 
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maintaining accountability and assessing institutional performance (Hearn & Holdsworth, 
2002; Hines, 1988).  Regardless of the relationship, this creates a principal-agent 
relationship between institutions and the state government (Ferris, 1991; Gerber & Teske, 
2000; Lane, 2007).  In addition, institutions are responsive to state governing boards.  
Strong governing boards have been delegated authority by the state government to 
oversee higher education and manage its functions.  This can include setting tuition, 
making budget recommendations, hiring executives, among other varying powers from 
state to state.  Again, a principal-agent relationship happens in this situation with a direct 
link between a governing authority and the institution. 
Figure 3.2 visually displays this relationship.  Each row operates as an agent of 
the principal in the row above.  For state government, elected officials and state boards 
operate as agents of the public.  Moving down, institutions operate as agents of these 
state actors and they, in turn, become principals.  This type of arrangement is also seen 
with the federal government, who operates as an agent of citizens.  Businesses, non-
profits, and foundations all operate as principals, but have less direct connection to 
citizens due to the nature of their operations.  Finally, departments within institutions 
follow a similar path, accountable to the institution but also to the public and the field of 
study.  Each of these relationships will now be detailed with more specifics. 
 The federal government also plays a role in principal-agent relationships for 
institutions.  As the primary funder for research money, institutions rely heavily on their 
relationship with the federal government to support institutional goals for generating and 
disseminating knowledge.  Similar relationships exist with private non-profits, corporate 
partners, and foundations, though these are less accountable to citizens directly.  All of   
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Figure 3.2 
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these offer new sources of inputs but include additional requirements and expectations for 
institutions.  In this situation, each of these principals delegates higher education with a 
research objective and requires certain outputs in exchange for their funds. 
 There also exists a principal-agent relationship between institutions and citizens.  
On the one hand, this relationship is indirect, tying institutions to taxpayers through 
public allocations.  On the other hand, the relationship is more direct as citizens are the 
immediate consumers of higher education and pay tuition directly to the institution.  This 
operates independently of the relationship through other state and federal actors and their 
subsequent relationship with citizens. 
 Finally, institutions themselves can act as principals of their subunits and these 
subunits can be actors beholden to outside actors as well.  Research funding from the 
federal government, businesses, non-profits, or foundations can go directly to 
departments to support research interests.  This can deter departments from acting in the 
interest of the institution in favor of acting in the interests of their other principals.  This 
could especially be true if departments see themselves as being more beholden to the 
public and contributing to the field of knowledge rather than creating direct outcomes for 
the institution.  
 This means that PCUs and their subunits are agents of multiple actors, sometimes 
in conflict with one another (Behn, 2001; Gerber & Teske, 2000; Lane, 2007).  Each 
managing principal is able to provide different inputs and looks for a different type of 
performance.  The complexity in such relationships makes congruence, a key aspect of 
principal-agent theory, quite difficult.  Congruence is the strength of alignment between a 
principal’s and agent’s goals.  The more aligned they are, the stronger the congruence and 
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the higher the probability that an agent’s behavior will lead to favorable outcomes for the 
principal.  Alternatively, economic agency theory speculates that resources can be used 
for self-interested goals of agents rather than those of the principal (Massy, 1996; 
McLendon, 2003a).  In the case of higher education, congruence is low since behavior is 
dictated by multiple principals.  Aligning tightly to one principal could put the 
relationship with others at risk.  This is especially true when the relationship is more 
general.  Tight requirements, such as those found in research grant contracts or through 
the use of line item budgets, leave little room for interpretation or non-congruence.  
However, the looser relationships with states and citizens, with fewer explicit conditions, 
leave institutions with more flexibility to pursue their own goals.  This is similar to 
behavior in the government and business sectors.  Tasks that are routine with lower levels 
of complexity offer less ability for non-congruence as the expectations are explicitly set 
by principals.  However, more complex tasks that require more flexibility and 
autonomous delegation leave a disconnect between the principal and the agent wherein 
non-congruence can arise. 
 Furthermore, higher education has intrinsic motivation beyond that dictated by 
their principal-agent relationship.  Depending on an institution’s mission, leadership, and 
behavior, institutions may voluntarily depart from congruence in order to pursue their 
own self interests.  This happens frequently in the study of public administration where 
the goals of management do not align with staff.  The staff then pursues their own goals, 
such as professional development, or pursues their own public service motivation by 
foregoing managers and elected officials and directly addressing the goals they perceive 
as being held by the public. 
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 In order to address the disconnect between the principal and agent, theory dictates 
that the principal engage in oversight of the activities of the agent (Ferris, 1991; Gerber & 
Teske, 2000; Lane, 2007; Massy, 1996).  The problem with oversight of higher education 
is twofold.  First, as discussed, there are multiple principals.  Second, the oversight 
creates transaction costs that drive up costs and potentially make institutions more 
inefficient because of the added expense of monitoring.  Institutions have more 
information about their operations and performance, but their performance is hard to 
measure and costly to report (McLendon, 2003a).  The information asymmetry that arises 
between the institution and their principal requires some sort of feedback mechanism that 
requires additional time and resources to gather.  Therefore, the combination of these two 
factors creates multiple relationships, each requiring oversight and driving up overall 
costs. 
 Lane (2007) draws on the concepts of manifest oversight and latent oversight 
(McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Ogul, 1976) to look at Pennsylvania State University and 
the University of Illinois to examine the oversight mechanisms in place to alleviate 
principal-agent problems.  Manifest oversight includes formal mechanisms of oversight 
while latent oversight encompasses the informal mechanisms.  Lane’s (2007) case studies 
reveal that the budget process is the primary form of manifest oversight while media is 
used as the primary form of latent oversight.  This identification of budget processes as 
encompassing manifest oversight is especially important in the conceptual framework for 
this study.  Budgeting is included as a separate step for this reason: it is the mechanism 
used to combat principal-agent incongruence.  Therefore, it is important not only for 
decision making, but also for accountability. 
 67 
 
 These examples of principal-agent dynamics comprise the matrix for the inputs of 
higher education.  Each actor provides a unique source of inputs which then travels 
through the production function for some type of output, ideally aligned to the principal’s 
goals and expectations.  These actors have been simplified to the largest sources of inputs 
for higher education: the federal government, states, and students.  In addition, the matrix 
has been divided into two components for inputs: financial inputs and those related to the 
human resources.  This creates a 2 X 3 grid which loosely divides into separate input 
components that rejoin later in the process of generating outputs. 
 
Financial Inputs 
 The financial inputs in the public higher education production function stem from 
three major sources of revenue.  Historically, state appropriations have been the largest 
source of institutional revenue.  More recently, state appropriations are increasingly being 
replaced by tuition revenue as comprising the largest share of revenues, particularly at 
elite institutions with very high research activity (IPEDS, 2013).  Both of these sources of 
revenue have been directly linked with enrollment in the past with appropriations and 
tuition both being measured on a per student basis.  This depicts a shift in out-of-pocket 
support.  If appropriations and tuition are both based on a per student basis, then 
declining relative state support per student and increasing tuition per student results in a 
higher out-of-pocket expense.  This not only appears in raw numbers as tuition has 
increased, but also as a percent of household income as tuition has increased despite a 
flat, if not declining, time adjusted measure of income.   
 68 
 
These financial inputs, in terms of an economic model of production, make up the 
price component of the equation where output is determined by price multiplied by 
quantity.   
Revenue = Price * Quantity     (3.1) 
The price is the cost of education, subsidized by state appropriations and aid
17
, to create a 
tuition price.  Note that this is a simplified model and does not include indirect costs or 
non-educational costs such as research.  The aid in this model offsets the out-of-pocket 
expense at the student level.  
   Tuition = Price – (Appropriations + Aid)   (3.2) 
Rearranging the equation yields: 
   Price = Tuition + Appropriations + Aid   (3.3) 
Revenue in equation 3.1 is replaced by output in the higher education context since 
higher education is a non-profit organization and revenues are not as reflective of outputs.  
In addition, the price in this equation is the overall price of education.  Substituting in the 
price equation in 3.3 to the economic equation in 3.1 yields: 
  Output = (Tuition + Appropriations + Aid) * Quantity  (3.4) 
This forms the beginning foundation of the financial portion of the economic formula for 
the input-output production function for higher education. 
The third major source of institutional revenues comes from the federal 
government for research support.  This is different from the previous sources of revenues 
in that it supports research rather than education.  While there is a sizeable investment in 
research by non-profit foundations and private corporations, the investment by the federal 
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 With aid acting as a negative revenue whereby Tuition Paid = Published Tuition – 
(External Aid + Institutional Aid) 
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government at the largest research institutions in the nation comprises a much larger 
portion of institutional budgets.  This is especially true depending on the field of study 
and strength of the relationship with government agencies and functions.  For example, 
there is large federal support through agencies such as the Department of Defense, 
National Science Foundation, and National Institutes of Health. 
 These financial resources, from the varying external funders, then flow into an 
institution’s budget.  If the revenues are not dedicated for special purposes or funds, then 
they deposit into a general fund to support the operations of the institution (Hearn, Lewis, 
Kallsen, Holdsworth, & Jones, 2006).  For educational operations, the sources are much 
more flexible than research funding.  Appropriations and tuition are typically budgeted as 
blocks, with no dedicated purpose.  The general fund is a large pool of money and 
institutional decisions must be made as to where these funds should go.  This flexibility, 
while useful for management, introduces the potential for funds to be misappropriated to 
purposes that are unproductive.  The multitude of differing higher education functions 
introduces mission creep and subsequently reduces efficiency (Levin, 1991).  Federal 
research funds, on the other hand, are typically tied to individual projects, restricting 
flexibility in use and ensuring the inputs are directly linked to designated projects.  
External funders make separate decisions in funding institutions.  Once the institution 
receives these funds, they pool together and institutions are largely free to distribute the 
funds internally as they see fit.  This varies from institution to institution based on the 
state and legal framework as to the discretion the institution possesses, but institutions 
still must determine the best way to spend the money they receive from their various 
sources.  This internal decision process moves the financial inputs down the vertical flow 
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stream through the decision making process of determining who gets what resources.  
The “who” in this question, for the purposes of this study, include functions and 
institutional subunits.  In essence, this requires institutional budget officers to determine 
the level of funding for each area.  This feeds into the budget process of how budgets are 
developed, turning funding decisions into a formalized document of budgetary priorities. 
 
Human Resources 
 The second category of inputs in the public higher education production function 
comprises the human sources of inputs.  In Craven’s (1975) framework, these are 
identified separately as “resources.”  In the service oriented industry of higher education, 
outputs are determinants of the people working for the organization.  The better the 
human resources as inputs, the better the service outputs.  There are two determinants of 
the human resources at an institution.  The first is the inputs for attracting and supporting 
the human inputs while the second is the people themselves and the expertise they bring 
to the institution. 
 The inputs for attracting the faculty and student resources to an institution are 
supported by federal and state policy.  At the federal level, Pell grants, along with other 
sources of federal financial aid, are a major factor in attracting high quality students who 
are financially burdened and would otherwise be unable to attend college.  At the state 
level, scholarships, both need-based and merit-based, help attract students to an 
institution over competing schools.  This also plays into the price component of the 
economic output equation.  These sources of aid offset the price of an education as 
depicted in the previous equations 3.2 – 3.4.  Note that internal grants and scholarships 
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are not included as aid since they are not external sources of revenues and are more 
appropriately classified as either expenses or negative revenues. 
 At the individual level, faculty at public institutions are typically considered state 
employees in some capacity.  In some states they can contribute to state retirement funds 
or are paid by the state legislature, either directly or indirectly.  Therefore, faculty are 
included as state inputs.  The other human resource includes the students themselves.  
These students make the individual decision to attend an institution, comprising 
enrollment and paying tuition.  In a simple measure of outputs, the enrollment could be 
thought of as the quantity measure for equation 3.4.  This would result in an equation for 
institutional revenues: 
  Revenues = (Tuition + Appropriations + Aid) * Enrollment  (3.5) 
However, since revenues, or profits, are not the key output for higher education, and the 
fact that states are moving away from student based funding to performance based 
funding (Tandberg & Hillman, 2013), this means that equation 3.5 lacks information 
about the educational outcomes.  Furthermore, it lacks information on quality, which is a 
key component to higher education outcomes.  Instead, these human resources should not 
be thought of simply as a measure of quantity, but as a contributor to another factor in the 
economic production function, that of quality. 
 This tie to quality, through the quality of the people working at the institution, is 
depicted by the right-hand flow relating the human resources to quality through their 
individual expertise.  Higher quality individuals are expected to yield higher quality 
results for the institution.  Therefore, equation 3.4 would need to include a multiplier for 
quality in the context of non-profit, public higher education. 
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 Output = (Tuition + Appropriations + Aid) * Quantity * Quality  (3.6) 
This multiplier then interacts directly with the financial inputs, budgeting, and processes 
in determining what kind of outputs are created in the production function. 
 
Quality 
 Continuing with the human resources inputs, the conceptual framework extends 
along the right side of the model down to quality.  As described above, quality is a 
multiplier that has a direct impact on output.  Quality is so important to higher education 
that Pestieau & Tulkens (1993) posited that quality is the only valid measure of 
performance for higher education.  Indeed, quality is especially important in this 
production function type framework given the inherent differences in students, faculty, 
and institutions.  However, quality is difficult to quantify, let alone capture by a single 
measure (Ehrenberg, 2002b; Zhang, 2005).  Frequent measures of quality include 
rankings such as U.S. News and World Report, Barron’s index, Carnegie classification, 
SAT scores of entering freshmen, admissions rates, and tuition and fees.  Brooks (2005) 
examines the factors related to U.S. News and World Report rankings including 
reputational surveys and research productivity, and concludes that all measures are 
somewhat flawed.  For example, research productivity varies between the disciplines, 
between journals and other publications, by journal impact factor, by federal research 
awards, and can be difficult to attribute faculty publications to a single institution.  
However, Zhang (2005) tested the relationship between institutional quality and a 
graduate’s earnings.  The results revealed that the different measures of quality – 
Barron’s, Carnegie, tuition, and SAT scores – were all positive and statistically 
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significant in their impact on earnings.  He concludes that quality matters, regardless of 
the measure of quality utilized. 
The quality multiplier in this production function is a representation of the 
expertise that students, faculty, and staff bring to the institution.  For students, expertise is 
measured in aptitude.  The highest quality students have the potential for greater 
educational outcomes.  By improving the quality of students, institutions are directly 
increasing their potential outcomes.  Not only is this because of individual student 
characteristics, but also because of interactions that take place between students and 
faculty, fostering a learning environment.  The difficulty with such a measure of student 
quality is that it not only includes the individual quality components but also the 
institutional environment.  Traditionally, student-faculty ratios have been used as a proxy 
for quality (Enarson, 1960; Glenny & Schmidtlein, 1983; Levin, 1991).  This measure 
assumes that interactions are of higher quality when this ratio is low.  Yet institutions are 
challenged by this arrangement.  Adding more students would increase revenues but 
simultaneously increase this ratio, causing quality to arguably decline.  Adding more 
faculty would decrease the student-faculty ratio, improving quality but adding substantial 
costs.  More recently, this is bringing new challenges about quality in public higher 
education as the student-faculty ratio has increased while private institutions have seen a 
decrease (Kane & Orszag, 2003).  Alternatively, entering SAT scores, the percent of 
freshmen graduating in the top 10% of their high school class, and institutional 
admissions information is now frequently being used as proxies for quality (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2008b; Breu & Raab, 1994; Zhang, 2005). 
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For faculty, quality is expressed by notoriety, publishing experience, and high 
quality teaching.  In particular, the focus has traditionally been on faculty research 
outputs in the form of grant funds and publications.  However, experience can also work 
in the reverse, resulting in lower quality as faculty age and productivity declines (Glenny 
& Schmidtlein, 1983).  Finally for staff, expertise has grown in recent years as higher 
education administration has become more professionalized with advanced degrees and 
competition with the private sector for quality workers.  By increasing quality, the 
potential outcomes for an institution are also expected to increase.  Whether the actual 
outcomes increase is determined by the processes involved at an institution, but the 
potential outcomes are based on this concept of quality. 
 However, quality can also limit potential outcomes.  The classic discussion of 
bounded rationality and satisficing posits that humans are bounded in their decision 
making process by information asymmetry and resource constraints forcing them to 
decide based on imperfect conditions (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1965).  In this sense, 
they make the best decision they can given their circumstances.  Satisficing is this 
concept of trying to maximize utility under conditions of constraint.  Individuals know 
they are unable to achieve perfect information and obtain unlimited resources.  Therefore, 
they must come to a conclusion without spending too much time or money in the process.  
This prevents an efficient outcome, which, under perfect economic assumptions, would 
be situated along the utility maximization curve.  Instead, they are situated within the 
curve, at an inefficient point compared to if situations were perfect.   
This concept of satisficing is included in the section on quality because it affects 
optimal outcomes.  First, the students, faculty, and staff are bounded in their decision 
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making process for becoming part of an institution.  They must decide whether to enroll 
or take a job at an institution and this decision is imperfect.  For example, students must 
weigh issues of cost, family ties, distance, institutional fit, and other factors in deciding 
where to go to college.  While brochures and campus tours can help to educate a student, 
there is still imperfect information between the student and the institution.  Therefore, 
students must make a decision based on the information they have and consider external 
factors and family preferences in their decision process.  This decision ultimately 
influences their enrollment and contribution to an institution’s quality.  In addition, it can 
have a meaningful impact on student outputs.  For example, if the quality of the 
information provided to students is poor, their enrollment decisions may be based on 
imperfect information and may ultimately lead to poor measures of student success such 
as low retention rates.  Second, satisficing also factors into institutional processes.  Even 
if one were to assume a fixed student body and faculty composition, these actors have 
imperfect information in institutional operations.  Administrators must make institutional 
decisions with limited time and resources.  These constraints also can limit potential 
outcomes if the information they use to make the decisions is imperfect. 
These two quality concepts of quality people and quality decision making act as a 
multiplier in the input-outcome production function.  Higher quality people will improve 
the potential for better outcomes.  However, even if the best people were in place, the 
decision making processes involved are limited by resource constraints and, therefore, the 
need for satisficing.  Thus, these two factors of quality both directly impact potential 
outcomes and the quality of processes in transforming inputs into outputs. 
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Budgets 
 Moving down from the inputs, and more specifically those inputs from external 
funding sources, is a sub-process for budgeting.  The budget development process is 
separate from other institutional processes in that it is a determinant of the uses of inputs 
but has no direct link to the creation of outputs other than through its decision making.  
Rather than turning inputs into outputs, budget processes develop short-term and long-
term plans about how inputs are to be used throughout the organization (Atkinson & 
Massy, 1996; Kotler & Murphy, 1981).  Despite the lack of output generation, it is 
instrumental in subsequent organizational processes in determining funding priorities and 
the amount of resources available to subunits.  Furthermore, as discussed previously, it is 
instrumental as the primary form of manifest oversight (Lane, 2007).  Therefore, it 
doubles as a decision making mechanism and as an accountability mechanism. 
The budget process itself is analogous to institutional policymaking.  Departments 
submit requests for funding much like the institution does to the state government.  
Administration reviews requests and ultimately determines the funding levels for each 
department.  In essence, the budget becomes the communication tool between 
administration and its subunits about institutional priorities and focus (Cogan, 1980).  In 
what Cogan (1980) calls the “Normative Design Characteristics for Desirable Internal 
Budget Processes”, he outlines five suggestions for ideal budget procedures.  These 
include minimizing conflict, quickly identifying critical issues, making multiyear 
projections and using these to develop long-term plans, ensuring short-term fluctuations 
do not threaten long-term plans, and dealing with departments directly.  Most budget 
planning systems incorporate these suggestions into their processes in one form or 
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another, indicating that budgeting is a complex process with multiple actors, competition, 
and multi-year timeframes that requires sensitivity in budget formation. 
 The classic budget is the line item budget listing individual lines for every 
expense category.  This is the most detailed budget with each line set up like an 
accounting workbook.  Budgets, which determine funds available, are itemized by 
department and then by each line item, such as office supplies.  These budgets require 
micro level decision making for each unit but tie directly to accounting categories from 
where the money is actually expended, ensuring accountability and specificity in 
oversight.  Therefore, rather than having to look into such detail, budgets became 
incremental policy documents.  Every budget was based on the previous year’s 
allocations and typically received some inflator based on the price of goods or inflation.  
This incremental rate is known as the budget growth rate, the ratio between the amount of 
money allocated in one year as compared to the amount allocated in the next year 
(Cogan, 1980). 
 In the 1970s, Jimmy Carter introduced a popular RAND proposal to government 
budgeting in the form of Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB).  With ZBB, units started each 
year with zero allocations.  They were required to make the case every year for their 
financial support from the ground up.  The ZBB system required departments to look at 
all of their expenses and defend their budget requests each year.  This attempted to 
eliminate incrementalism by challenging programs to justify their support and, ultimately, 
their very existence.  However, ZBB failed because of the managerial burdens it placed 
on the departments.  Collecting the information required to justify building a budget from 
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the ground up every year was simply too expensive and time intensive, resulting in 
massive transaction costs that doomed ZBB to failure. 
Alternatively, budgets can be formulated at a more macro level.  In this approach, 
funds are allocated in blocks to individual departments or programs.  Rather than 
focusing in the individual items, budget officers allocate large chunks to programs to use 
as they see fit.  This process developed into a series of budgetary systems including 
program and performance based budget systems.  Under such systems, budgets are 
reported more directly in terms of their stated goals rather than their functions.  Rather 
than reporting allocations for budget objects such as office supplies, this system reports 
performance indicators and their associated activities.  These budgets, linking funding to 
activities and performance formed the foundation for state performance reporting and 
implementation of performance funding. 
 Budgets, once developed, operate as institutional policy documents.  They specify 
how much money is allocated to each unit and indirectly, through the budgetary 
formulation process, determine high priority programs and departments.  The budget then 
becomes an organization’s guide for operations and how to turn inputs into outputs 
through these departmental level programs and processes.  This moves the higher 
education production function further down into the processes involved and, more 
specifically, the sub-processes for higher education of teaching, administration, and 
research. 
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Budgetary Feedback Loop 
 While inputs are allocated through budgets to subsequent processes, there also 
exists a feedback loop emanating from the budget process back to inputs.  Much like 
programs and departments are required to justify their budget requests, institutions can do 
the same with their various sources of funding.  In this feedback loop, institutions can go 
back to their funders and request additional money through lobbying and interest group 
politics.  This behavior draws on resource dependency theory (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer, 
1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1995) which outlines that organizations do not 
attempt to act efficiently, but instead try to maximize and secure their various sources of 
inputs.  Institutions, in this regard, can be seen as revenue maximizers, trying to always 
increase the amount of inputs made available to them regardless of the relationship with 
their processes, outputs, or outcomes. 
A classic hypothesis of this sort is Bowen’s revenue theory of costs (1970, 1980).  
This posits that higher education focuses all of its efforts on revenues rather than 
expenses.  Institutions are always seeking to increase the amount of money they receive 
in order to improve their prestige, whether or not these funds are needed or being used 
most efficiently (Alexander, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2002a).  This lack of focus on 
expenditures creates a naturally occurring inefficiency in higher education with 
maximized revenues and a disconnect with expenses.  Instead, higher education simply 
seeks to spend all the money they raise on whatever program they see fit, resulting in an 
always expanding model for higher education.  Similarly, the value theory of budgeting 
states that non-profit organizations, including higher education, are utility maximizers 
(Hopkins & Massy, 1981; Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992).  Since they do not 
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measure performance by monetary returns, as in the private sector, they must measure 
utility differently.  This comes in the form of prestige, which again prompts institutions to 
maximize their inputs in order to improve the amount of money they have available to 
boost their prestige and institutional utility.  Therefore, institutions will continually try to 
increase programs, quality, and prestige so long as the expansion and associated gains 
continue to exceed the additional costs. 
 The economic theory of non-profit enterprises outlines a maximization framework 
similar to Bowen’s law, but from an expense point of view.  This theory posits that 
decision makers will try to maximize total benefits subject to a limit on expenses (Massy, 
1996).  In this framework, institutions are constrained by resources.  Once revenues are 
established, institutions will use them in a manner that maximizes the returns to the 
institution.  This is especially important in this input-output model because of the 
assumption of fixed resources.  Given that expenses in non-profit organizations are 
constrained by the amount of revenue generated, the model assumes that expenditure 
decisions are made after revenues are identified.  Therefore, this theory postulates that 
institutions will use the fixed resources in a manner that maximizes benefits.  In this case, 
the institutions are likely using the resources to maximize outputs and subsequent 
outcomes.  When institutions are not maximizing their returns, they are likely to engage 
in growth by substitution (Massy, 1996).  In growth by substitution, resources are shifted 
from one area to another when greater returns are identified. 
 These maximization models are not unique to higher education.  Niskanen’s 
hypothesis (1971) applies to government agencies, also lacking financial outputs.  In this 
context, rather than operating at the efficient point where marginal benefits equal 
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marginal costs, institutions operate where average benefits equal average costs.  In a 
situation with diminishing marginal returns and increasing marginal costs, this puts them 
at an inefficient position with higher costs than necessary given the benefits.  In essence, 
every additional dollar beyond where marginal costs equal marginal benefits yields a 
lower output than what is being input.  Niskanen’s hypothesis posits that institutions will 
try to maximize their budgets based on these costs.  Furthermore, in government 
organizations, institutions with additional funds at the end of the year are forced to 
relinquish those funds back to the general fund budget.  Having additional funds 
remaining opens these organizations up to budget cuts with the understanding that since 
there was money left over, they do not need the funds in future budget requests.  
Therefore, similar to Bowen’s revenue theory of costs (1970, 1980), institutions will 
spend everything they receive, in a naturally inefficient manner, in order to avoid future 
budget cuts.  Both of these theories are about institutional positioning.  They both 
maximize revenues in relation to their importance and relative standing, whether in 
comparison to other institutions or in regards to the relative portion of budgets.  In this 
regard, they compromise a feedback loop wherein institutions strategically try to manage 
their position with their funding agency in order to maximize the potential inputs they 
might receive. 
 
Processes 
 Once the financial and human resources are established for an institution, budgets 
are prepared to distribute the resources internally to a variety of processes intended to 
produce certain outputs.  Craven (1975) posited that higher education excellence would 
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become more about the effective reallocation of resources rather than the acquisition of 
new resources.  This makes budgeting and processes in this framework arguably the most 
important step in producing quality outputs.  However, because higher education is a 
service oriented industry, resources are somewhat constrained in their allocation to 
processes.  Salaries are, by far, the largest expense item for higher education (Glenny & 
Schmidtlein, 1983; IPEDS, 2013; Santos, 2007; Shepherd, forthcoming).  Therefore, a 
shift in resources from one department or program to another has the potential to impact 
jobs more than resources. 
 There are three levels of decision making that St. John (1991) outlines in state 
management of higher education.  However, these three levels can be applied internally 
as well.  First, strategic planning involves developing objectives, allocating resources to 
achieve these objectives, and monitoring progress.  Second, management control is the 
process used by managers to obtain resources to meet their outlined objectives.  Finally, 
operational control is meant to ensure that processes are conducted efficiently and 
effectively.  In the conceptual framework outlined in this dissertation, the first level is 
assumed to be under the purview of the state and other third-party principals.  This leaves 
the second and third levels to the jurisdiction of the institution.  This conforms to the 
dissertation’s goals of identifying internal resource allocation (level two) and evaluating 
performance (third level). 
The budget step, as discussed previously, is a type of sub-process intended to take 
a macro look at institutional resources and outputs and decide the extent to which 
departments and programs warrant funding.  These departments and programs are the 
direct processes involved in turning their budgets and human resources into outputs.  
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There are three main types of processes in higher education, all linked closely to 
institutional mission.  This includes teaching, research, and administration. 
 
Teaching 
 The teaching aspect of higher education, particularly for undergraduate students, 
is one of the most important functions of an institution.  There are a number of different 
research avenues for academics in higher education including academic integration, 
persistence and retention, diversity, graduation, value-added, and remedial education, 
among others.  These studies largely look at students and seek to understand correlations 
with performance or make causal claims based on various treatments.  However, this 
conceptual framework with the input-outcome education production function is interested 
in the institutional level effects of financial inputs and quality multipliers in the 
production of educational outputs.  Rather than looking at treatment effects, the interest 
in this model is an understanding of how resources are being used.  This involves looking 
at institutional resources and tracking how they are distributed internally and their 
associated outputs. 
 From this institutional perspective, there are a number of organizational changes 
that have the potential to impact outputs.  Nerlov’s (1992) Production Possibility Frontier 
for Teaching Quality and Research (Massy, 1996) depicts faculty outputs in relation to 
teaching and research.  The model argues that including research requirements for faculty 
increases teaching quality because faculty are able to incorporate research into their 
teaching, thereby improving the quality of education by updating and challenging critical 
thinking.  This is depicted by a positive relationship between teaching and research.  
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However, the returns are diminishing and develop a negative relationship as research 
overwhelms a faculty member’s time, resulting in lowered teaching quality as research 
increases.  Therefore, institutions must identify the point on the production possibility 
frontier that maximizes both teaching and research, without sacrifice to either. 
 
Research 
 The second main product of institutions is research.  Given, this is not universal as 
certain institutional types place less emphasis on research than they do on teaching.  
Research inputs and outputs could have the most direct relationship as inputs are often 
dependent upon promises of certain outputs.  Research grants are proposed by faculty and 
once approved, the funding is dedicated specifically for the project and investigators 
involved.  Therefore, there is less flexibility in how grant funding can be used.  
Additionally, there are dedicated research faculty, post-docs, and staff at research based 
institutions dedicated strictly to research.  These components comprise a parallel input-
output function to that of teaching, but with clear differences in assumptions.  The issue 
with such a close relationship is the issue of causality.  Research funds are frequently 
used as research outputs because they reflect a market value of the research that is being 
conducted at that institution (Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2003, Ahn, 1987; Brooks, 2005; 
Cave, Hanney, & Kogan, 1991; Izadi, Johnes, Oskrochi, & Crouchley, 2002; Johnes, 
2006). Yet in other studies, research funds are treated as inputs (Beasley, 1995; Johnes & 
Johnes, 1993; 1995).  For the purposes of this study, I take the outputs based approach 
where research funding is used as a proxy for productivity and, therefore, outputs.  
Instead, faculty are treated as inputs for both teaching and research. 
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 One of the factors influencing research processes is cost disease.  This idea posits 
that the reliance on labor causes wages to increase in the competition for workers and 
inability to substitute for technology (Archibald & Feldman, 2008a; Levin, 1991; Massy 
& Wilger, 1992).  It further explains that this phenomenon is especially relevant in 
service oriented industries, such as higher education, which rely more heavily on labor 
for inputs rather than materials.  Stated otherwise, cost disease drives up per unit costs 
because of this reliance on labor and the ever rising costs of labor inputs.  Higher 
education relies heavily on its labor inputs and therefore suffers from a continual upward 
pressure on wages, driving costs upwards.  While the theoretical framework for cost 
disease could explain some of the increase in institutional costs, the empirical results 
have only shown a small relationship between cost disease and the rapidly growing costs 
of higher education.  Indeed, cost disease has only been attributed to explaining roughly 
1% of the increase in costs (Massy, 1996). 
A somewhat related theory, growth force, introduces quality as a component.  
This explains that higher education is in a constant state of expansion, trying to generate 
new knowledge and research (Massy & Wilger, 1992).  In order to stay competitive in 
terms of research outputs, institutions spend money to hire experienced researchers who 
might generate new research.  In order to hire these elite researchers, institutions must 
pay a wage premium to attract them away from other institutions and private firms.  In 
addition, the rapid expansion is accompanied by additional regulation and compliance in 
order to oversee the new institutional reach.  These costs of expansion are the growth 
force components to inflating higher education costs. 
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Finally, faculty are heavily invested in research as a self-interested focus on 
prestige.  Researchers posit that faculty members are more dedicated to their field of 
study than they are to their employing institution (Gove & Floyd, 1975; Massy, 1996).  
With research, faculty are directly engaging in their field and creating a personal 
reputation.  This makes them entrepreneurial in their research activities and the 
associated external grants, copyrights, and prestige.  This process, known as the academic 
ratchet (Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992), gives faculty members job security and an 
argument for higher salary.  However, similar to cost disease, there is little evidence of 
the academic ratchet driving up costs (Massy & Wilger, 1992). 
 
Administration 
 Administration also plays an important part in the education production function, 
including areas such as orientation, advising, housing, academic tutoring, student affairs, 
and service.  As institutions have extended their mission beyond teaching, administration 
has been forced to adapt.  With students, administrators are pushing processes that 
improve quality and outputs, helping to attract better students and improving an 
institution’s prestige.  In addition, as peer institutions improve their own services, 
institutions must respond in order to remain competitive.  This isomorphic pressure 
results in an ever expanding administrative structure simply to keep pace with the 
evolving higher education environment.  This expansionist pressure has resulted in a 
concept known as the academic lattice (Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992; Zemsky & 
Massy, 1990).  This shows a growing amount of administrative staff, growing even faster 
than faculty during the same period of time (IPEDS, 2013).  Additionally, administrators 
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have become more professionalized with specialized training and ownership over 
institutional functions.  The growth of institutions necessitated that tasks formerly held by 
faculty members be transferred to administrative staff simply because of time and 
resource constraints.  Rather than having faculty engage in these tasks, staff is used as a 
more cost effective means of accomplishing administrative tasks. 
More administrative staff is also needed as faculty engage in more research 
activity.  Functions with lower relative returns are often shifted to staff in order to free up 
time for faculty to engage in teaching and research functions that are more directly 
related to an institution’s mission.  This professionalization in administrative staff 
resulted from earlier criticism that faculty were too involved in administrative tasks that 
had little return to the institution and their time was better spent on more high yield 
activities (Enarson, 1960).  At the time, critics argued that faculty used the course 
catalogue to create job security by developing new courses that fit their own self-interests 
rather than those of the institution.  Finally, having an established staff can be an 
appealing feature of an institution for attracting new faculty, who can see the personnel 
and policies in place that will help support their activities.   
Furthermore, administration extends beyond staff to both faculty and students in 
its mission of service.  Institutions heavily involved in local and state outreach, land grant 
institutions for example, have a third mission of service to the community.  These involve 
activities, such as extension services, which are run by institutions for the purpose of 
service.  These programs must be staffed and also often seek to involve faculty and 
students in helping to bring the service to the community.  This requires additional 
financial and human resources in order to function.   
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Finally, administration also means structure.  The institutional organizational 
structure and hierarchy can also play into processes and outputs.  Questions of authority, 
management, and “red tape” can all impact the processes of turning inputs into outputs 
and whether the processes are operating efficiently.  Birnbaum’s (2000) Management 
Fads in Higher Education explores many of the managerial experiments that occurred in 
higher education.  These include styles such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
Management by Objectives (MBO), intended to improve institutional performance and 
promote efficiency.  However, he challenges the effectiveness of these initiatives, 
pointing out the short cycle accompanying most management fads, only to be replaced by 
the next idea. 
 
Outputs & Outcomes 
 The penultimate step in the input-outcomes framework includes the outputs 
created by the processes that transform inputs.  In manufacturing, this is primarily 
measured by a quantity count.  In higher education, this would entail raw figures on 
outputs such as the number of degrees awarded, a common measure used by the state in 
performance evaluation.  In this case, the output is a simple quantity count.  
Alternatively, outputs can be a function of the inputs.  For example, revenue is an output 
based on financial inputs per student and enrollment.  This was outlined previously in 
Formula 3.5, reprinted below. 
  Revenues = (Tuition + Appropriations + Aid) * Enrollment  (3.5) 
  While outputs can be useful for measures of short term performance, they don’t 
carry the meaning that outcomes have in relation to institutional goals.  These outcomes 
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are often expressed by ratios rather than quantity counts.  For example, there is no 
numeric count for efficiency, but institutions might use an outcome ratio of the cost of 
education per student to compare the use of resources to outputs across different 
programs, institutions, and contexts.  New statistical techniques have also been used to 
create measures of efficiency. 
 Outcomes are often expressed as weights, costs per unit, or other comparisons 
between inputs and outputs.  These outcomes are useful because they provide a measure 
for concepts like efficiency and accountability, which are functions of the use of funds 
rather than a measure of output.  Unfortunately, the lack of a clear definition for these 
concepts leaves outcome measures open to interpretation.  Popular media frequently 
releases reports claiming to rank institutions in a variety of different areas such as value.  
However, the measures they use to develop a ratio for value often has very little to do 
with actual value and more to do with their choice of readily available data.  Regardless, 
widely accepted measures in the higher education sector provide a face validity argument 
that best practices are being employed and offers a way to compare institutions against 
one another. 
 
Performance Feedback Loop 
 After the outcomes of the higher education production function comes the 
evaluation process.  The more popular term has become performance, which differs from 
program evaluation of a single initiative.  There are four ways to evaluate performance 
based on which output or outcome measures are being examined (Craven, 1975).  
Extensiveness is related to outputs in that it measures quantity.  Effectiveness looks at 
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how the outputs related to objectives.  Said otherwise, it looks at whether programs are 
doing what they intend to do.  For higher education, this would entail ensuring that 
departments are aligning with institutional goals.  The third evaluation technique is the 
one that has garnered the most attention in recent years.  This looks at efficiency, or how 
inputs are being utilized in the generation of outputs.  This question of efficiency is 
especially important because it links the financial resources dedicated by the federal 
government, states, and students to the perceived performance of the institution on 
various output measures.  Indeed, the efficiency approach for this framework and the 
dissertation mirrors the increasing attention being paid to institutional performance and 
the efficiency in producing institutional outcomes.  Finally, benefit is an examination of 
the long-term value.  Again, this is an outcome based approach which looks at whether 
departments are contributing to the institution and whether the institution is thereby 
contributing to society.  This is difficult to measure and essentially combines the three 
previous elements to determine the benefit they are creating for society given their inputs 
and production levels.  These four evaluation techniques have been adopted by state 
policymakers with different measures taking precedent at different times.  More recently, 
the efficiency evaluation perspective has taken these measures of performance and begun 
using them not only as an evaluation tool, but also as a mechanism for making future 
budget decisions. 
Since the 1970s, output and outcome measures have become increasingly 
important as they began creating a direct link between institutional performance and 
inputs.  Originally, performance budgeting allowed state policymakers to allocate funds 
based on performance.  This system required institutions to submit performance reports 
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to the state legislature and governor’s office.  These reports were then studied by officials 
and used in determining how much an institution should receive the following year.  On 
the one hand, officials could reward an institution with additional funds for high 
performance.  On the other hand, policymakers could give more money to struggling 
institutions who may need more resources in order to improve their performance. 
 More recently, performance funding has been a popular budgeting tool (Tandberg 
& Hillman, 2013).  This system originally set aside a small amount of money to use as 
incentive funds for intuitions who met certain benchmarks.  Traditionally, this bonus fund 
was quite small, only about 5 percent of budgetary allocations.  Institutions received their 
typical state allocations and earned extra funds for improving their performance on 
outcome measures such as graduation rates.  In 2010, Tennessee extended their 
performance funding formulas to encompass all higher education funding.  Under the 
Complete College Tennessee Act, institutions are stratified by Carnegie classification and 
receive all of their funds based on their outcomes.  This has been adopted in other states 
as Performance Funding 2.0, where performance funding is no longer a bonus, but 
directly ties to base appropriations (Tandberg & Hillman, 2013).  Additionally, rather 
than setting flat benchmarks, financial benefits in Tennessee were based on incremental 
levels instead of just a threshold.  This setup was meant not only to compensate 
institutions for excellent performance and efficient use of resources, but also to help curb 
institutional aspirations and help them focus on their own mission orientation.  Instead of 
fostering unabated desire for rankings, this system caused institutions to pause and 
consider whether it was in their best interest to move to a higher Carnegie classification 
and therefore different funding structure.  Stated otherwise, performance funding was 
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implemented as an accountability measure to ensure that institutions aligned their mission 
with the goals of public higher education, which tend to focus on the instructional 
mission of higher education (Dumont, 1980; Ferris, 1991; Hearn & Holdsworth, 2002; 
Massy & Wilger, 1992). 
 These types of funding arrangements are designed to hold institutions accountable 
based on their educational delivery and performance on state mandated benchmarks.  
They assume that administrators are influenced by resource dependency theory and are 
inherently inefficient in their operations due to their focus on maximizing revenues rather 
than looking for efficiencies or cost-cutting initiatives.  By holding institutions 
accountable for their decision making and quality of educational programs, the legislation 
is meant to curb revenue seeking behavior, improve accountability and oversight, and 
maximize institutional and system wide efficiencies.  However, recent research 
(Tandberg & Hillman, 2013) has called into question the effectiveness of these types of 
performance funding structures, finding similar incremental budgeting patterns that 
emerge because of small incentives or low threshold benchmarks that replicate the 
previous budget system rather than reforming based on performance. 
 Institutions undertook similar efficiency and performance reforms internally.  
Responsibility centered budgeting (RCB)
18
 makes departments responsible for both their 
revenues and expenses rather than focusing solely on the expense side of the ledger 
(Hearn et al., 2006; Lasher & Greene, 1993; Levin, 1991; Massy, 1996; Rodas, 2001).  
                                                          
18
 Also known as Responsibility Center Management (RCM), Value Centered 
Management (VCM), Value Responsibility Budgeting (VRB), or Revenue Responsibility 
Budgeting.  A slightly modified structure, Performance Responsibility Budgeting, 
allocates block budgets to units rather than making them directly accountable for 
revenues.  
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As students enrolled in a department’s class or major, their tuition funding went to the 
department.  They paid a share back to central administration for support services and 
overhead.  The measure was meant to curb the budget maximization behavior described 
in the budgetary feedback loop.  Instead of seeking to maximize revenues, departments 
were forced to evaluate how they were supporting their operations and instead focus on 
maximizing efficiencies.  However, Balderston (1974) raised concerns about this type of 
arrangement, pointing out that decentralized budgeting such as this could make 
departments less responsive to institutional policies and goals.   
In terms of principal-agent theory, this type of internal arrangement would posit 
that departments would become less sensitive to the needs of the university, their 
principal, because they have increased autonomy and reduced oversight.  Instead, they 
are responsible for their own budget, which is supposed to raise efficiency through 
competition, but could end up weakening their allegiance to the institution.  By making 
departments accountable for their own budgets, duplication of services could re-emerge 
as being problematic with the same courses being offered by different departments in 
order to keep revenues in-house, a move reflecting self-interest rather than institutional 
goals (Enarson, 1960).  Therefore, while departments would be receiving additional 
tuition revenue for these courses, the institution as a whole would suffer since they are 
losing the potential for economies of scale that would happen with interdepartmental 
cooperation (Hoenack, 1982).  In order to combat this, central administration must 
maintain oversight of departmental decision making to ensure there is no leakage from 
decentralized budgets.  This means making institutional goals clear and incentivizing 
departments for aligning to the goals of the university over goals of their individual 
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department (Levin, 1991).  One example includes gain-sharing, combating Niskanen’s 
(1971) inefficiency hypothesis and self-interest by allowing departments to keep a 
portion of the money they saved through efficiencies rather than returning it all to the 
institution. 
 As an example, the University of Minnesota implemented such a policy under the 
name of Incentives-Based Budget Systems (IBBS) (Hearn et al., 2006).  Under 
Minnesota’s system, only 20% of budgets were determined by their Incentives for 
Managed Growth (IMG) program while the rest was traditionally allocated through 
centralized budget offices.  The structure that was established designated 75% of 
revenues to the course a student enrolled in while 25% of the associated revenue went to 
the student’s designated major.  Central administration also made agreements with 
schools and colleges within the institution about goals and plans.  This structure parallels 
that seen at the state level, with funding components tied to outputs in exchange for some 
kind of autonomy.  Thus, the principal, central administration, used the planning and 
performance agreements to maintain oversight and help curb self-interest problems that 
might arise by giving departments full control over budgets. 
 However, performance funding models suffer from limitations as well.  While 
these models are intended to curb self-interest and produce more efficient outcomes, they 
typically contain a flaw in execution.  By setting benchmarks, institutions and subunits 
fixate on hitting a minimum performance for stated metrics.  Prospect theory, stemming 
from studies of psychology, looks at risk taking behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
It posits that in situations with equal values of gains or losses, the utility derived from a 
gain is smaller than the utility lost in event of a loss.  Therefore, people are risk adverse 
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and will avoid risky behavior.  When applied to the context of higher education, 
benchmarks create such a decision.  Administrators and executives want to avoid 
sanctions if they fail to meet benchmarks, therefore they work very hard to achieve this 
minimum level of performance.  In essence, they are avoiding the risk of losses tied to 
state performance requirements.  However, there is no incentive to perform any better 
than the minimum benchmark.  Even though there may be utility derived from exceeding 
the minimum standard by the same degree as initially required to meet the benchmark, 
the utility is smaller than that from simply meeting the minimum.  Thus, once the 
benchmark has been met, administrators and executives have no further motivation to 
improve performance and instead move to making sure they meet other minimum 
requirements. 
 Another budget system, one unique to higher education, is differential pricing
19
.  
Under this system, tuition and fees are allowed to vary by department (Levin, 1991; 
Yanikoski, 1989; Yanikoski & Wilson, 1984).  This allows departments to determine 
their own fees based on their educational costs and goals.  In terms of costs, departments 
in higher cost programs could charge more per student in order to break even and reduce 
the subsidy required from central administration under a traditional fixed tuition policy.  
Similarly, those programs with higher expected wages after graduation could charge 
more.  Under this assumption, students consider future earnings in their decision to go to 
college and which major to choose.  Therefore, departments could earn more revenue by 
charging more if there is little elasticity in enrollment based on price.  For example, 
engineering programs, which have high costs due to high wages of faculty and the need 
                                                          
19
 Also known as Internal Pricing. 
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for expensive equipment, could charge more to students.  In addition, engineering majors 
have higher expected earnings upon graduation, further making the case for raising 
tuition and fees in this field.  However, engineering is a low-demand field.  While those 
who currently enroll may not be deterred by higher prices, it may be in the department’s 
best interest to actually reduce tuition and fees in order to recruit more students.  In this 
scenario, the departmental goal of raising enrollment trumps revenue as a motivator.  
Indeed, the current educational atmosphere promoting the need for more domestically 
trained STEM majors could be perceived as more important than forcing these programs 
to sustain themselves.  Thus, central administration would want to continue subsidizing 
these programs, or even increase their subsidies, to lower the tuition and fees for their 
STEM students. 
 These performance-based systems, both externally and internally, form the 
feedback loop that ties performance to funding.  This has become arguably the most 
important part of the input-outcomes production function.  Higher education is not a 
manufacturing plant.  It is a non-profit in a service oriented industry with mixed private 
and public funding.  Therefore, questions of accountability and efficiency abound as 
these components also make it highly political.  Oversight is necessary in order to ensure 
institutions are accountable to the public and acting efficiently.  This oversight, in the 
form of linking performance to funding, is meant to force institutions to evaluate their 
operations and ensure their inputs are being spent efficiently and on the best processes 
available. 
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Summary of the Input-Outcomes Production Function 
 The higher education inputs to processes to outputs and outcomes production 
function differs from that typically outlined in business or manufacturing.  First, the 
relationships between institutions and external funders, especially state government and 
research funders, creates pressures that cause mission drift and drive up costs through 
transaction costs and diverse preferences.  Second, quality is a key component for higher 
education that is not captured simply by measuring price and quantity.  Third, there are a 
number of feedback loops whereby institutions interact with funders for budget 
allocations, both in terms of budget requests and in terms of funding based on 
performance.  These components are included in the conceptual framework because they 
are well documented in higher education literature, but not fully incorporated into 
institutional behavior. 
 This conceptual framework draws on political, economic, and organizational 
theory to describe how inputs are turned into institutional outcomes.  These outcomes are 
then fed back to higher levels of oversight where states and other funders use the 
information to determine future allocations.  The modern move to performance funding 
and budgeting warrants deeper exploration as inputs and outcomes are more directly 
connected than ever before in the history of higher education.  This framework builds the 
foundation of this study for looking into the internal processes that accompany external 
inputs and how they are turned into outcomes through this model.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter I present contemporary research on measuring and evaluating the 
inputs, outputs, and efficiency of higher education.  Unlike the previous chapters, which 
focused on the background and conceptual construct from a theoretical perspective, this 
chapter reviews the empirical literature most related to the purposes of this dissertation.  
In particular, I present research looking at resources, expenditures, the higher education 
production function, and those using data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier 
analysis to examine efficiency in higher education. 
 
Revenues 
As stated previously, the largest traditional sources of revenue for public 
institutions have been state allocations and tuition.  Previous research has focused at the 
state level and examined how state funding, in particular, can vary based on enrollments, 
politics, economics, and institutional characteristics.  These studies can be roughly 
grouped into three sections consisting of those focusing on politics, public management, 
and miscellaneous revenues.  
 
Politics 
Across the studies of higher education finance is a lingering question of state 
action.  As states change public allocations, institutions face questions regarding tuition, 
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savings, financial aid, wealth, and private fundraising.  Yet state characteristics such as 
party affiliation, budget strength, governing boards, and interest groups can influence the 
entire framework.  Echoing Kingdon’s policy streams (1984/2011), politics, problems, 
policies, and timing all converge and can influence state higher education policy and its 
subsequent consequences. 
In one of the earlier works looking at state characteristics and their impact on state 
funding, Hossler and colleagues set out to examine the relationship between these state 
characteristics and decisions regarding allocations and support of financial aid (Hossler et 
al., 1997).  They began by pointing out a number of concerns about higher education 
finance.  First, that state allocations for higher education have been declining since 1977.  
Second, that purchasing power has decreased while tuition and fees have increased faster 
than the consumer price index.  Third, they point to a disconnect between tuition and 
financial aid policies within states.  They find few linkages in policy setting for tuition 
and aid, raising concerns that decisions are made independently rather than in 
conjunction with each other.  This further raises questions of access and affordability if 
financial aid does not keep pace with the rising rates for tuition.  They therefore conclude 
that the model that has emerged is one of high-tuition but low-aid and hypothesize that 
this finding is attributable to an increase in conservative ideologies and the use of loans to 
support students. 
More recently, researchers began to focus more specifically on the political 
dynamics within a state and the associated impacts on appropriations.  One of the most 
frequently cited studies of the early 2000s is that by Archibald and Feldman in 2006.  In 
their study, they looked at state funding levels for higher education based on political and 
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demographic characteristics of states.  They used the, now common, dependent variable 
of state appropriations to higher education per $1000 of personal income.  They found 
that Democrats were associated with higher funding levels for higher education since 
1980 and that the slowdown in the support of higher education following the economic 
decline of the 1970s could be attributed to the tax revolt and the associated tax and 
expenditure limitations.  However, they also point out that higher education moves in the 
same direction as other state services.  Rather than looking at the share of the state budget 
allocated to higher education, the common dependent variable in studies of “crowding 
out,” they looked at the actual dollar amount and show that as the total state budget 
increases, higher education allocations in dollars are expected to increase as well. 
Following this study, McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher (2009) extended the study of 
state allocations to additional political, economic, demographic, and organizational 
variables.  Similar to Archibald and Feldman (2006), McLendon and colleagues found 
that Democrats were associated with higher levels of funding for higher education.  In 
addition, they introduced interest groups and lobbyists as being important to higher 
education, revealing that the increased presence of these types of organizations is 
associated with greater levels of funding. 
That same year, McLendon, Mokher, and Doyle (2009) looked at how states fund 
different institutions within their four-year sector, seeking to understand why some states 
privilege their research institutions while others are more equitable in their allocations per 
FTE.  They explored a number of hypotheses, including that the types of students 
attending research institutions are more expensive to educate.  They found that being a 
research institution was a statistically significant predictor of funding.  In addition, those 
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institutions with large enrollments in graduate school and STEM programs were 
associated with higher per student funding.  These findings were consistent with previous 
research (Brinkman, 1981; Harter, Wade, & Watkins, 2005) and the hypothesis that 
certain types of students are more costly to educate.  In particular, graduate and STEM 
students are costly because of the lab equipment, funding, and high salaries demanded by 
faculty in these fields. 
Most recently, Weerts and Ronca (2012) used mixed level models to examine the 
intrastate variation of higher education support.  They explored what variables explain 
the difference in state appropriations across states and sectors from 1984 to 2004.  When 
breaking the variation out by institutional characteristics instead of simply by state, they 
found that Republicans are actually more generous in funding higher education at the 
community college level, but not for four-year institutions.  This finding calls into 
question many previous studies that focused exclusively on research institutions or four-
year institutions and supports the use of additional research using longitudinal data, 
nesting at the state and sector levels, and expanding the focus of research beyond just 
private or research focused institutions. 
These studies reveal the importance that politics can play in funding higher 
education.  While some of the results are mixed due to the years of analysis, cross-
sectional versus longitudinal nature of the data, and sample, the studies show that state 
appropriations are indeed a political process.  In the next section, I show that 
appropriations are not the only aspect of higher education that is political.  I introduce the 
management of higher education and reform legislation and show that these processes are 
also political and can affect institutional behavior. 
 102 
 
Public Management 
The above section presented research showing that political actors and structures 
are important to higher education and the state appropriation process.  In this section, the 
management of public higher education is also shown to impact revenues, expenses, and 
outcomes.  Rather than focusing on elected officials, this section focuses on the state 
bureaucracy and how public institutions function as state agencies, public corporations, 
and are otherwise managed through governing boards and state legislation. 
Richardson, Bracco, Callan, and Finney (1998) focused on the state management 
of higher education through the use of governing boards in California, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas.  They warn that increased decentralization can 
weaken the state as a mediator between the institution and the public, threatening long-
term planning.  Indeed, this introduction of using governing structures as a state 
management technique was important for future work done by McLendon (McLendon, 
Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006) and Tandberg (2013). 
Motivated by this work, Martinez (2002) looked at state policies for higher 
education in South Dakota.  There, public higher education quickly adopted efficiency 
based higher education reform, a move posited to be associated with a strong Republican 
presence in the state government.  In 1995, the legislature mandated that higher education 
find 10% savings for instruction by eliminating low-enrollment programs and re-
designing their administrative staff.  They also implemented performance funding, 
reserving 5% of funding for meeting state set policy incentives.  Martinez (2002) offered 
mixed results for this system of managing public higher education, indicating that the 
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savings in 1995 were successful, but the performance funding initiatives were less 
successful due to easily achievable minimum standards. 
Following these studies, Michael McLendon, James Hearn, and Russ Deaton 
published two papers looking at the determinants for the adoption of various state 
policies.  In one study, McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) test 10 hypotheses about 
accountability and performance policies in higher education while in another (McLendon, 
Deaton, & Hearn, 2007), they test 9 hypotheses to determine how state characteristics 
influence higher education policy.  In the first study, they found that a larger 
representation of Republicans in state legislatures is associated with the passage of 
performance policies.  This differs from previous research because rather than focusing 
on allocations, it highlights reform legislation.  This finding is not surprising given the 
previous assertions by Hossler and colleagues (1997) that conservative ideologies are 
associated with the shift to more market based reforms and the use of higher tuition and 
financial aid.  In addition, McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton found evidence that states 
without centralized governing boards are more likely to adopt performance funding while 
states with boards are more likely to adopt performance budgeting.  The findings indicate 
that states without boards prefer systems of formula based performance funding while 
states with boards prefer to use performance as a consideration in budgeting, but not as an 
automatic qualifier.   
In their second paper, McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) use a state politics 
framework to look at reform.  Rather than focusing on accountability and performance 
initiatives, as was done in the previous paper, this article treated reform more broadly.  
They found that a unified state government, newly elected governors, and growing 
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Republican representation in the state legislature are all associated with higher 
likelihoods of enacting higher education reform.  The significant results for Republican 
legislators
20
 are consistent across both studies, suggesting a robust relationship between 
Republicans and higher education reform.  Thus, not only does direct public financial 
assistance affect institutions, but state characteristics, such as politics, can affect both 
higher education finance and the larger policy landscape. 
David Tandberg has also arisen as a leader in the field of public management in 
higher education.  His studies, of which I present two, have focused on the state 
structures and their impact on higher education finance and management.  In the first 
study that I present, Tandberg (2010) looked at the role of interest groups in higher 
education.  He concludes that interest groups for higher education can increase 
appropriations and that competition from other interests can reduce the share of a state’s 
budget allocated for higher education.  In addition, like previous scholars, he addressed 
the question of party affiliation and found that while Democratic governors are associated 
with greater appropriations in terms of dollars appropriated per dollar of personal income, 
Democrats are associated with lower amounts as a percent of a state’s overall budget. 
In one of Tandberg’s (2013) more recent publications, he again raises the question 
of the impact that governing boards can have on the budget for higher education.  As with 
those before him (Richardson et al., 1998; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006), Tandberg found that governance structures impact 
the state support of higher education, however, they do so in conjunction with other 
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 McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher (2009) also found that Republicans spend less on higher 
education, consistent with Archibald & Feldman’s (2006) earlier finding that Democrats 
spend more. 
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political factors.  Consolidated governing boards, the most centralized system, are 
associated with less support in states where governors have the most budget authority.  In 
addition, these boards magnify the existing effects of professional legislatures, the 
presence of Democrats in state legislatures, and political ideology.  These findings of the 
interaction between state boards and elected officials puts additional emphasis not only 
on the politics of higher education or the public management of public systems, but on 
the interactions between politics and governance and highlights how institutions can 
benefit by circumventing centralized oversight boards and lobbying directly to the state 
legislature. 
As with the section on politics, the public management of higher education has a 
meaningful impact on institutions.  Structures, such as governing boards, are important 
for appropriations, accountability, and reform.  Similarly, the passage of higher education 
reform legislation is also a political process, though the actors involved in reform 
legislation are different from those associated with increased funding.  While Democrats 
tend to favor greater allocations for higher education, Republicans are those more likely 
to pass reform measures.  This body of work has helped to shed light on the behind-the-
scenes political processes involved in the funding and management of higher education.  
However, states are not the only actor involved in the funding, management, and 
operation of public institutions.  In the next section, I review the literature on other 
sources of revenues and the impact on institutions. 
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Miscellaneous Revenues 
 While state allocations and tuition have traditionally been the focus of research 
due to their large representation in institutional budgets, a number of smaller revenue 
streams have been examined as well.  For example, Kaufman and Woglom (2003) argue 
that public institutions are able to be more aggressive in their investments because they 
have a more diverse revenue portfolio due to the certainty of state financial support. 
Institutional wealth, which includes endowments, is a large contributor to budgets 
for both public and private institutions.  Bradburd and Mann (1993) explain that most 
institutions rely on state appropriations, tuition, research funds, and private giving, but 
private institutions rely heavily on endowments and investment income.  However, they 
also point out that public institutions actually exceed private institutions in total wealth 
simply because private endowments cannot keep pace with the multiple sources of non-
endowment income at PCUs.  Their work with the Higher Education General Information 
Survey (HEGIS) data from 1985 also descriptively explains that the wealthiest schools in 
the nation are approximately 12 times richer than the bottom 10% of institutions on a per 
student basis.  This shows a large gap between the haves and have-nots in higher 
education.  However, the methodology and data are both simple and dated and these 
relationships have likely changed, particularly as endowments have produced negative 
returns in the early 2000s. 
 More recently, Carbone and Winston (2004) looked at wealth in terms of saving 
activity using IPEDS.  They found, unsurprisingly, that private institutions rely heavily 
on endowments and that public institutions rely most heavily on state appropriations.  
Again, this relationship may be changing in recent years since IPEDS now reports that 
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tuition has overtaken state appropriations as the primary source of revenues at many 
public institutions.  However, the report also points out that private institutions save 
approximately seven times that of public institutions.  While not specifically mentioned 
by the authors, this finding might be attributable to Niskanen’s hypothesis (1971), which 
deters PCUs from engaging in saving because they are non-profits and receive large 
amounts of money from the state, which then could be returned to the state if the funds 
are not spent (Strauss, Curry, & Whalen, 1996).  Therefore, public institutions may 
simply be structurally deterred from engaging in savings activities due to their non-profit 
nature and their relationship with the state. 
 One study that addresses the changing dynamics of public funding looks at how 
state allocations are related to private gifts (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 2008).  They use a 
framework addressing the Matthew effect, which posits that state funds are influential in 
generating revenues from other sources (Merton, 1973; Trow, 1993).  The findings of the 
study are consistent with their hypothesis, showing that a $1000 reduction in state 
funding is related to lower levels of private giving by $45.  However, this coefficient falls 
to only a $19 reduction once fixed effects are introduced.  Furthermore, they looked at 
institutional characteristics related to private giving and found that the ranking of 
professional schools is a significant factor in private donations while undergraduate 
selectivity is not.  The study, while only cross-sectional, shows a correlation between 
different revenue sources.  This indicates that the expenditure of certain revenues could 
result in the generation, or loss, of other types of revenues in the future. 
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Expenses 
 In shifting from looking at revenues to expenditures, the literature in this area is 
more scarce.  Getz and Siegfried (1991a; 1991b) looked at expenses across Carnegie 
classification and found that expenses per student increased fastest for student services, 
administration, and scholarships.  In addition, they point out (1991b) that increases in 
expenses per student were largely driven by increases in faculty salaries, non-faculty 
instructional expenses, and non-instructional expenses.  This early finding points to 
anecdotal evidence that institutions are spending more on student services and salaries in 
order to attract quality students and faculty.  In addition, the finding for non-faculty 
instructional expenses foreshadowed the shift to using adjunct instructors. 
 Following these studies, Harter, Wade, and Watkins (2005) looked at expenses at 
four-year, public institutions between 1989 and 1998 and found similar results.  
Expenditures rose fastest for scholarships, transfers, and public service over this decade.  
In addition, instruction was again among the slowest growth areas.  However, it should 
be noted that while growth for instruction was slow, it still comprised the highest amount 
spent for these institutions.  Therefore, similar dollar amount increases across the 
different expense categories would equate to a smaller percent increase in instruction 
simply because it is the largest expense item.  Institutional support followed instruction as 
the next largest expense item, followed by academic support and plant operations.  
Harter, Wade, and Watkins also found similar drivers of the expenses as Getz and 
Siefried (1991a; 1991b), with faculty salaries comprising 42% of the growth in 
expenditures per student followed by non-instructional expenditures and non-faculty 
instructional expenses. 
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 In another study on expenses, Morphew and Baker (2004) looked at institutions 
that moved to a higher Carnegie classification and the associated impact on expenses.  In 
particular, they looked at institutions that moved into the highest research classification, 
finding that as they moved to the higher category, they spent less on institutional support 
and instruction and spent more on research.  The authors explain that this shift in internal 
funding mimicked the behavior of existing research universities rather than exhibiting the 
patterns seen from their previous classification. 
 The final article regarding expenditures links the previous section on the politics 
and state management of revenues with expenses.  Rather than applying the state 
characteristics framework to revenues, Rabovsky (2013) looked at performance 
accountability legislation and the associated impact on institutional spending.  His study 
used state appropriations at an institution as the dependent variable and common 
performance metrics as independent variables to evaluate whether performance funding 
was indeed working as intended and an institution’s budget was indeed based on these 
metrics.  He identified that the most commonly used performance metric was graduation 
rates followed by retention rates.  The results of the study did show a positive relationship 
between performance and funding, particularly at research universities where it showed a 
boost to instructional expenses and a decline in the focus on research.  However, 
Rabovsky also warned that such measures of performance could result in the stratification 
of higher education as institutions could game the system to earn more money by 
focusing on the funding formulas at the expense of access. 
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Higher Education Production Function 
A handful of recent papers have begun to look at the relationships between 
revenues, expenses, and outcomes.  These studies are especially important to my 
dissertation because they are closely related to the higher education production function 
that was presented in the previous chapter.  However, while these studies present 
individual pieces of the production function, they fail to look at the full framework, and 
they often only look at the relationships between states and institutions rather than the 
internal components of institutional budgeting and processes. 
In one such paper, Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, and Zhang (2012) present a paper 
closely related to my study of the relationship between revenues and expenditures, the 
first step in the production function process.  In their study, the authors point to the 
conflict between revenue providers and university expenses.  In particular, funders look 
for a particular output, but there are multiple outputs at institutions, leading to conflict 
when institutions focus on an area that is not congruent with the funder’s wishes.  Their 
study used neo-institutional theory, classic institutional theory, and classification theory 
to explore the alignment of revenues to expenses at research universities between 1984 
and 2007.  They found that public research institutions were most closely tied to classic 
institutional theory, where the institutions were stable and focused on teaching, research, 
and service, in that order.  Indeed, instructional expenses were associated with tuition and 
research was associated with grants.  Private research universities, on the other hand, 
were associated with neo-institutionalism.  They focused most extensively on the 
production of research and emphasized publications and contributions to the field. 
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Moving along the production function to the stage between expenditures and 
outputs, Pike, Kuh, McCormick, Ethington, and Smart (2011) examined the relationships 
between institutional expenses, student engagement, and educational outcomes.  They 
combined information from IPEDS and NSSE to test the mixed results from previous 
research and found that undergraduate educational expenses are positively related to the 
NSSE items of academic challenge and student-faculty interaction. 
Feeney and Welch (2012) present a similar study to Pike et al. (2011), but look at 
the relationship between inputs and outputs instead of expenses and outputs.  They 
examined institutions of higher education to examine the regulative, 
normative/associative, and cultural cognitive aspects of knowledge creation on university 
campuses.  In particular, they looked at knowledge creation as the outcome of interest 
and examined the various sources of revenues to see how they might be associated with 
such outcomes.  For the regulative hypotheses, they found that federal research funding 
and federal student aid were both positively associated with education outcomes.  
However, state support and tuition were negatively associated with knowledge outcomes.  
State support was only positively associated with service outcomes.  However, much like 
the Leslie et al. (2012) piece, their study included both public and private institutions and 
was restricted to only research institutions.  The relationships were not differentiated by 
public or private institutions or by the different types of institutions or students served.  
Regardless, this finding is especially concerning since state support and tuition are the 
largest sources revenues for public institutions.  This could either mean that maximizing 
educational outcomes has already been achieved or that institutions are somehow using 
the additional funding on expenses that are not related to educational outcomes.   
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Similarly, Taylor, Cantwell, and Slaughter (2013) present another model of the 
relationship between revenues and outcomes for humanities degrees.  They posited that 
research institutions are increasingly focused on research activities, which tend to favor 
STEM fields at the expense of the humanities.  They found that public institutions are not 
experiencing a decrease in degrees awarded in humanities, but private institutions are 
seeing a decline, particularly as funding for research and development from industrial 
partners increases.  They suggest that state appropriations help public institutions shelter 
themselves from the market forces that are affecting private institutions.  However, the 
authors point out that the humanities are still heavily supported by private institutions 
with large endowments, revenues from fundraising, and in places where there is a high 
demand from students with high verbal proficiency scores on standardized tests.  These 
studies by Feeney and Welch (2012) and Taylor, Cantwell, and Slaughter (2013) provide 
evidence that there are links between inputs and outcomes, but these studies still fail to 
address the question of expenses, an especially important question given the lack of 
information on how institutions are using their funds internally. 
In another study tightly linked to the institutional budget questions posed in this 
dissertation, Santos (2007) used data from the American Association of Universities Data 
Exchange and Delaware Expenditure Data to examine the rate of return to teaching and 
research productivity in departments at 10 research universities in 1998.  Santos found 
that quality, graduate education, and schools of engineering all increase departmental 
income.  He also found that undergraduate teaching is used to subsidize research 
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activities
21
.  However, the study suffers from a number of limitations that are addressed 
in the design of this dissertation.  First, the study was cross-sectional, only focused on 10 
research institutions, and used OLS to pool the 152 departments.  It offers no insight 
longitudinally or across the different types of higher education institutions.  In addition, 
the measures of productivity are inconsistent with economic theories of efficiency and 
production possibilities.  Instead, they simply measure workload outputs.  Finally, the 
data is from 1998, well before the economic shift following 9/11, the Great Recession, 
and the subsequent challenges for public higher education.  
Marvin Titus’s (2006) study is stronger than Santos’s (2007) in that it is 
longitudinal and uses individual student, institutional, and state-level data through 
hierarchical modeling.  His institutional and state-level variables are particularly 
important in relation to the production function model used in my dissertation.  He found 
that an individual’s probability of completion was positively associated with an 
institution’s reliance on tuition and the amount spent per student on education and 
general expenses.  At the state level, completion was positively associated with state 
grants and need-based aid per students.  Given these findings, Titus explained that the 
reliance on tuition could mean that institutions focus on educational expenses
22
 and 
therefore boost educational outcomes.  This is precisely the type of relationship one 
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 It should be noted that previous research (Ehrenberg, Rizzo, & Jakubson, 2007; Leslie 
et al., 2012; Taylor, Cantwell, & Slaughter, 2013) explains that undergraduates at public 
universities do not act as perfect subsidies for graduate education.  Rather, they already 
receive a subsidy from the state rather than having to pay for the full cost of their 
education.  Therefore, the state actually indirectly subsidizes graduate education more per 
student than undergraduates. 
22
 A finding later confirmed by Leslie et al. (2012) for public research institutions. 
 114 
 
would expect in a higher education production function where the inputs, expenses, and 
outcomes are all interrelated. 
Related to the links between revenues, expenses, and outcomes is the question of 
efficiency.  In essence, the studies that deal with efficiency are looking to ensure that the 
inputs are being used on expenses in a way that maximizes the output produced.  These 
studies are the precursor to the efficiency measures captured through data envelopment 
analysis and stochastic frontier analysis presented in the next section.  Robst (2001) 
examined the efficiency of institutions as they respond to changes in tuition.  Using a 
series of regressions, Robst found that larger schools have greater inefficiencies, but these 
disappear with additional controls for enrollment, research, and Carnegie classification.  
However, he concludes that state support and tuition both affect efficiency.  Institutions 
with large declines in state support and those with large increases in tuition, to offset said 
decline in state support, end up acting less efficiently.  According to his model, those who 
maintain small tuition increases are those with the largest efficiency gains.  These 
findings imply that revenue maximization makes institutions less efficient while those 
who reallocate funds internally with fixed tuition and state resources become more 
efficient.  Furthermore, major state declines in financial support can go beyond “cutting 
the fat” and actually have detrimental impacts on institutional efficiency.  This is 
especially important for the current study as internal funds are the subject of interest and 
could reveal additional information regarding efficient resource allocation. 
Powell, Gilleland, and Pearson (2012) present another approach for measuring 
efficiency.  They developed a model linking various outcomes, measures of efficiency, 
and effectiveness using structural equation modeling.  They found that expenditures are 
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indeed related to both efficiency and effectiveness, but in opposite directions.  Namely, as 
expenditures increased, efficiency decreased but effectiveness could be improved.  They 
conclude that there is an optimal spending level for institutions.  Exceeding this optimal 
level could improve effectiveness on measures such as graduation rates and retention 
rates, but would cause a decline in efficiency at a rate that is faster than the growth to the 
effectiveness measures.  They warn that institutions may be overspending and could 
potentially improve their efficiency while keeping effectiveness relatively stable and 
reducing expenditures. 
 
Data Envelopment & Stochastic Frontier Analyses 
 As previously discussed, higher education is charged with more than simply 
educating students.  It has an instructional component, research component, and service 
component.  These multiple outputs necessitate the use of models that extend beyond 
those focused on a single output such as regression or stochastic frontier analysis.  
Instead, higher education can be classified as a multi-product firm (Cohn, Rhine & 
Santos, 1989; Johnes & Johnes, 2009; Lacy, 2010; Leslie et al., 2012) and multiple 
outputs are needed as dependent variables, with a balance that must be struck between 
producing them.  Spending too much money or attention on a single output puts the other 
products at risk.  The results of previous studies using data envelopment analysis and 
stochastic frontier analysis are presented below while the technical details of the methods 
are outlined in the next chapter on methods. 
 Many of the studies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) emanate from the UK or Australia.  Avkiran (2001) introduced DEA to 
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Australian universities as a way to evaluate institutional performance on the production 
of multiple outputs.  Avkiran introduces three sets of outputs: enrollment in relation to 
research, the delivery of different educational services, and the performance of fee-
paying students.  These types of studies result in a list ranking the relative performance of 
the institutions and lists peer institutions that those not operating on the production 
frontier might want to emulate.  More importantly, Avkiran not only provided an 
excellent summary of previous research using DEA and SFA, but he provided a 
framework for future studies.  In particular, the study introduced production theory as a 
way of choosing inputs and outputs.  Avkiran argues that inputs should be constrained to 
physical and human capital while outputs should focus on teaching and research.  
 Staying in Australia, Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003) again use DEA and assert 
that inputs should be restricted to those which administrators can control.  These include 
the number of academic staff, non-academic staff, operating expenses, and the value of 
non-current assets.  For outputs, the authors use enrollments and degree completions as 
teaching outputs while research grants are used as the research output.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter on the production function, Abbott and Doucouliagos share the 
assumption that research grants, though a revenue, are frequently used as a measure of 
the market value for research conducted by an institution (Cave, Hanney, & Kogan, 1991; 
Izadi et al., 2002; Johnes, 2006; Tomkins & Green, 1988) and therefore appropriate for 
use as an ouput.  As with the study by Avkiran (2001), the authors also conclude that the 
institutions are performing with high levels of efficiency, but point out that the system as 
a whole may not be as efficient as possible and simply that the institutions within the 
system are all operating at a similar level (Johnes, 2006). 
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 In another study, Johnes (2006) provided another set of recommendations for 
conducting data envelopment analysis based on her work in England.  In her analysis, 
outputs included degrees awarded and research grants, again measuring research output 
by grants received.  The inputs included enrollment, entrance exams, faculty and staff, 
expenditures on administration, expenditures on libraries, and the value of interest 
payments and depreciation.  However, she ultimately only includes enrollment, 
expenditures on administration, and the value of interest payments and depreciation after 
conducting tests to evaluate the impact on efficiency scores with the removal of each 
input (Pastor, Ruiz, & Sirvent, 2002).  Similar to the other studies in Australia, Johnes 
finds that universities in England are operating with high efficiency measures, but again 
underscores the concern that the sector itself may not be efficient, just that institutions 
within the sector are operating close to the frontier. 
 In the last analysis presented using DEA, Eff, Klein, and Kyle (2012) use DEA in 
the United States, not to measure efficiency, but to evaluate best buys in American higher 
education.  They review previous studies using data development analysis, including 
those that evaluate institutions (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Eckles, 2010; 
Athanassopoulos & Shalle, 1997; Flegg & Allen, 2007), departments (Gimenez & 
Martinez, 2006; Johnes & Johnes, 1993, 1995; Tauer, Fried, & Fry, 2007), DEA rankings 
in comparison to published rankings (Sarrico, Hogan, Dyson, & Athanassopoulos, 1997; 
Bougnal & Dula, 2006), and use quality as a component to determining the frontier 
(Marshall & Shortle, 2005).  The authors found that best buys are concentrated in the 
Southeast and that institutions tend to compete based on price, output, and geography. 
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 Moving to stochastic frontier analysis, another model evaluating measures of 
efficiency, Izadi, Johnes, Oskrochi, & Crouchley (2002) use stochastic frontier analysis 
to conduct a similar study in Britain to those conducted using DEA.  This technique is 
less common in the study of higher education and has received criticism from those 
preferring data envelopment analysis.  Namely, critics point out that DEA is non-
parametric and the frontier is developed by the institutions in the analysis.  SFA, on the 
other hand, requires the development of a model with the correct functional form.  They 
argue that DEA is superior because it does not have to make assumptions about the 
functional form or error term.  Furthermore, DEA looks at higher education as a multi-
product firm with multiple inputs and outputs while SFA only looks at a single output 
measure.  However, Izadi and colleagues counter the criticism, saying that the use of SFA 
allows the error term to be decomposed into a part for measurement error and a part of 
inefficiency, which helps to identify the actual efficiency of institutions rather than 
assuming the frontier is best developed based on other institutions.  The results of the 
SFA analysis reveal results similar to those of DEA.  Namely, institutions in Britain have 
relatively high efficiency scores.  However, there may be room for improvement through 
benchmarking exercises and lifting the productivity of the sector as a whole. 
 These studies introduced data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier 
analysis as methods to evaluate the efficiency of institutions of higher education 
throughout the world.  There are a number of key consistencies across these studies.  
First, these methods are susceptible to a number of assumptions regarding inputs and 
outputs.  The decisions about the choice of variables used in the model develop the 
frontier and affect the efficiency scores.  Economically, institutions not on the frontier 
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should eventually go out of business because they are not operating efficiently.  
However, the assumption about the variables means that while they are not operating 
efficiently when compared to other institutions on these measures, there are other 
variables not included in the model where they likely succeed and are therefore able to 
attract students and funders.  This means that the choice of variables is particularly 
important.  For example, while research grants are a revenue and arguably an input, they 
are consistently used as an output measure of research, reflecting a type of market value 
for the research conducted at that institution.  Given the introduction of performance 
funding and other accountability techniques, states are beginning to establish which 
inputs and which outputs are important to the state, a key consideration for these types of 
studies moving forward.  In addition, these variables must be measured correctly.  
Otherwise, the frontier could be developed based on inaccurate information that would 
result in poor scores.  Finally, most studies are cross-sectional and look at institutions.  
This leaves a gap in the literature to explore longitudinally how efficiency scores are 
changing, whether units are becoming more or less efficient over time based on the 
variables selected, and how the scores differ at the different levels of departments, 
schools, and institutions. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter has introduced the contemporary literature that empirically evaluated 
the components of the higher education production function.  These components include 
the revenues, expenses, and outputs of higher education.  They vary their focus in the 
higher education production function and the methods used, but they have been 
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instrumental in taking the background, theory, and framework to a new level by testing 
the relationships throughout the production function.  However, each study is limited in 
some capacity.  Many studies are cross-sectional, use data prior to the Great Recession, 
restrict the analysis to institutions or, even more specifically, only research institutions, 
and they tend to only focus on one relationship in the production function process rather 
than looking at the full process.  Therefore, these limitations need to be empirically 
addressed.  This dissertation seeks to do just that, taking the insight from the literature 
and empirical research presented in the last three chapters and testing the higher 
education production function across different levels. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESEARCH OUTLINE, DATA, & METHODS 
 
 To empirically test the research questions using the framework illustrated in the 
Chapter 3, a number of details must be outlined.  This chapter will outline the sampling, 
assumptions, and methods used to evaluate the questions raised.  To begin, the research 
questions are re-introduced: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between institutional revenues and institutional expenses? 
RQ2: What is the relationship between institutional expenses and student outcomes? 
RQ3: What is the relative efficiency of the various units in the analysis in producing 
outputs in relation to inputs? 
RQ4: How do these relationships change based on type of institution and over time? 
As stated previously, these questions focus on public, four-year institutions.  This focus is 
motivated by the large enrollments seen at public institutions, their unique financial 
relationship with states, and accountability requirements set forth by the state and its 
citizens.  The assumption of the models in this study requires that institutions face the 
same environment and production frontier.  Given these characteristics of public, four-
year institutions, other types of institutions are likely to have processes that differ from 
those of public, four-year institutions.  Therefore, this study excludes private, for-profit, 
and two-year institutions from the analysis.  The remaining public, four-year institutions 
will be analyzed both holistically and separately by Carnegie classification to account for 
differences in mission orientation and the associated differences in the production process 
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by type.  In addition, research questions 2 – 4 include models at the school and 
departmental level, which adds analyses of subunits within the 9 member University of 
Texas System.  In an ideal world, these questions would be addressed at all levels 
through a representative sample of four-year public institutions, however, there are a 
number of limitations that prevent such a study.   
 The first limitation to a comprehensive nationwide approach is that there is 
variation in state laws for both open records requirements and budget systems.  Sunshine 
laws require public agencies to be transparent, including financially transparent.  
However, the level of detail required for published budget documents varies from state to 
state, meaning that what is acceptable in one state may not meet the same level of detail 
as in another state.  This limits the information that is available in some states.  In 
essence, not all public institutions are required to publish departmental level budgets or 
performance information.  In addition, there are differences in budget systems.  A state 
with a program based budget system would report outcomes but have little detail on how 
money is being allocated.  Alternatively, a state using line item budgets may have a lot of 
detail on how money is allocated, but little information on performance.  This variation 
across state budget requirements makes comparisons virtually impossible without access 
to each institution’s financial, accounting, and reporting systems. 
 The second limitation involves institutions.  Again, budget systems can vary from 
institution to institution, which limits comparability.  However, institutions also vary in 
their capacity.  Large, research institutions tend to have formalized budget and financial 
offices with many professionally trained analysts.  Smaller institutions may not need such 
a structure and their budget, financial, and accounting services may be combined, 
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possibly under the jurisdiction of a single or few individuals.  Similarly, smaller 
institutions may not have the technological capacity to make archived budget documents 
available on their websites or report any information beyond that required by the U. S. 
Department of Education.  Therefore, there is missing information that becomes more 
likely as institutional complexity declines. 
 Finally, while IPEDS contains a wealth of financial and enrollment information, 
the information reported is at the institutional level and does not include any school or 
departmental information.  This problem in the level of reporting is further complicated 
by the parent-child problem in IPEDS wherein institutions report information as part of a 
system rather than as an institution.  This was especially problematic in large systems 
prior to 2004, such as the State University of New York.  Taking into account these 
limitations in IPEDS, nationwide analyses are possible, but there still does not exist a 
single source for intra-institutional budgets or performance throughout the country that is 
reported at the program, department, or school level.  In order to collect information at 
this level, each institution would have to be surveyed separately, requiring a massive 
investment in time and resources. 
 Given these limitations, three sources of data are targeted to attempt to answer the 
research questions.  These sources include IPEDS, the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, and the University of Texas System.  These three sources, once 
combined, offer departmental and school level data within the U.T. System and 
nationwide data at the institutional level.  This limits the generalizability of the findings 
at the intra-institutional levels to the U.T. System, but provides an empirical case study to 
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inform future research into higher education’s production function and measures of 
efficiency. 
 
Data Sources 
 In this section on data sources, I present the three sources of the data and describe 
the nuances of each.  In addition, I describe the methods employed in merging and 
cleaning the data in preparation for analysis.  This is followed by an introduction to the 
models used by each level of analysis and their connection to the primary research 
questions. 
 
The University of Texas System 
 The University of Texas System (U.T. System) provides detailed, line-item 
budget information for their nine public institutions
23
.  The uniform requirements across 
the system allow for easy comparability between institutions and over time.  These 
budgets include departmental level information and have been collected from Fiscal Year 
2009 (FY2009) until FY2013.  These institutions and their Carnegie classification can be 
seen in Table 5.1. 
While there are a total of 34 public four-year institutions in Texas, these are the 
nine contained in the University of Texas System.  This may raise concerns about the 
generalizability of any findings since it does not encompass a full state, nor does it 
represent a sample of institutions from the full nation.  In order to evaluate the robustness 
of the University of Texas System, I created scores based on what a typical state’s higher   
                                                          
23
 Excluding health and medical centers. 
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education sector might look like.  I first created an average number of institutions by 
type.  This yielded an average of 1.46 RU/VH institutions, 1.46 RU/H institutions, 0.56 
doctoral granting institutions, 5.36 Master’s granting institutions, and 2.52 Bachelor’s 
granting institutions per state
24
.  Using this information, I constructed scores for each 
state to measure how different they are from this hypothetical average state.  The formula 
used is listed below as Formula 5.1. 
    
∑ 
 
√   
(      ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
 
√  
(      ̅̅ ̅̅ )  
 
√    
(        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )  
 
√   
(      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
 
√   
(      ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
 
  (5.1) 
In this formula, y acts as a score centered around 0 for states most resembling an average 
state’s higher education sector.  The nationwide average of each type of institution is 
subtracted from the individual state’s number.  This is then divided by the standard 
deviation for that type of institution.  In essence, this creates normalized scores for each 
institutional type.  These scores by type are then aggregated and averaged to give the 
state’s total score.  I then separately created a numeric value for the U.T. System, treating 
it as if it were its own state
25
.  These results are presented in Table 5.2. 
As this table depicts, the U.T. System is actually very similar to what an average 
state system of higher education looks like.  While the state of Texas itself is very 
different from the national average, the University of Texas System looks similar to the   
                                                          
24
 RU/VH is defined as institutions with very high research activity while RU/H are 
institutions with high levels of research activity. These classifications replaced the older 
definitions of R1 and R2 institutions. The differing size classifications for Master’s and 
Bachelor’s granting institutions were aggregated into single categories based on the level 
of degree offered. 
25
 The University of Texas System data is included in the figures for Texas.  It is not 
treated as an independent state for the purposes calculating nationwide averages or 
variance. 
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Table 5.2 
Higher Education Sector Standardized Scores 
State Score State Score 
Wyoming -0.720 South Carolina 0.010 
Rhode Island -0.680 Tennessee 0.079 
Delaware -0.673 Missouri 0.105 
Alaska -0.639 Louisiana 0.116 
Hawaii -0.603 Maryland 0.145 
New Hampshire -0.530 Illinois 0.152 
Iowa -0.529 Alabama 0.220 
Vermont -0.515 Colorado 0.265 
Idaho -0.488 Indiana 0.276 
Nevada -0.473 Virginia 0.378 
South Dakota -0.447 North Carolina 0.454 
Connecticut -0.442 Georgia 0.513 
Arizona -0.432 Michigan 0.516 
Utah -0.386 Florida 0.634 
Nebraska -0.372 Ohio 0.952 
North Dakota -0.371 California 1.389 
Montana -0.371 Pennsylvania 1.531 
New Mexico -0.360 New York 1.636 
Maine -0.350 Texas 2.305 
Washington -0.327 
  Kentucky -0.312 
  Minnesota -0.281 
  Kansas -0.278 
  Oregon -0.256 
  West Virginia -0.215 
  Arkansas -0.197 
  Mississippi -0.141 
  Wisconsin -0.118 
  Oklahoma -0.089 
  Massachusetts -0.047 
  New Jersey -0.036 
  University of Texas System -0.004 
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system in an average state.  The one RU/VH institution, four RU/H institutions, and four 
MA institutions mirror national averages very closely.  In fact, it is the closest system to 
the national average, followed shortly by the systems in South Carolina and New Jersey.  
For this reason, the University of Texas System seems to provide not only excellent data, 
but when viewed separately from the state of Texas, looks similar to an average state’s 
higher education system. 
 The data from the U.T. System includes detailed financial information at the 
budget item level.  In particular, these budget items roughly approximate academic 
departments and other subunits within an institution.  This includes the budget code, 
description, expense category as reported to IPEDS, and full-time equivalent count for 
faculty, administrators, and classified staff.  In addition, the data includes expenses on 
salaries, other wages, travel, and miscellaneous expenses.  This data focuses specifically 
on the educational and general fund at these institutions, which makes up the largest fund 
at every institution except for UT-Dallas.  The educational and general fund in FY2013 
ranged from a low of 31% of total institutional budgets at UT-Dallas to 65% at UT-Pan 
American.  Other funds, including designated funds, auxiliary funds, restricted funds, and 
capital funds are excluded since they are smaller and do not follow the same budget 
structure as the educational and general fund.   
 One university, the University of Texas at Dallas, strays from the reporting of the 
other eight institutions.  More specifically, UT-Dallas does not report budget information 
at the departmental level for all schools.  Instead, they frequently report multi-unit 
aggregate information.  For example, the School of Arts and Humanities does not include 
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any departmental information but instead only reports aggregate faculty salaries as a 
single line item.   
Another issue with this dataset is that institutions frequently go through 
reorganizations and changes in budgeting.  Therefore, budget codes were used as the unit 
identifier rather than the department description.  For example, UT-Pan American had 
separate departments for Anthropology and Sociology until 2013, when the department of 
Sociology and Anthropology was formed.  In these instances, the new department was 
treated as a separate new department because it resulted in a new budget item and there 
was no information on how the departments were merged, or, in other instances, how 
they were divided.  In a somewhat related detail, when budget information for a 
department is unavailable, the data is coded as missing rather than 0.  This helps in the 
fixed effects analysis by restricting to an institution that reports data rather than imposing 
0 on data that is unavailable. 
 The U.T. System data provides the greatest level of detail at the departmental 
level.  While the U.T. System may not be perfectly reflective of national sectors of higher 
education, it does resemble the national average and provides variety both by type of 
institution and over time.  Since the research questions are primarily about internal 
budgeting, this approach seems appropriate for examining the differences across this 
system. 
 
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board 
 The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board collects data on a multitude of 
variables from the public institutions across the state of Texas.  In particular, there is a 
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focus on enrollment, majors, and degrees awarded.  These are posted to the 
organization’s website and collected for every semester from 2000 to 2011.  However, 
degrees awarded were not available for the most recent academic year, limiting its span 
to 2010.  This information is reported at a very detailed level, down to the CIP code, 
which is the classification of instructional programs (CIP) used by the National Center 
for Education Statistics to identify academic programs.  In particular, the information by 
institution and CIP code is included for enrollment by level, degrees awarded by level, 
declared major by curriculum area, and semester credit hours by level.  The semester 
credit hour (SCH) data is a combination of student enrollments and the credit hours 
awarded for the course, meaning that it is essentially a measure of student contact hours.  
This definition means that if 30 students were enrolled in a course worth 3 credit hours, 
the reported SCH would be 90. 
 One of the issues in dealing with the THECB data is the reliance on CIP codes.  
These are codes assigned according to NCES reporting requirements, but do not 
necessarily align to an institution’s organizational structure.  This presents three 
problems.  First, these CIP codes must be matched to the related institutional programs.  
This required combining THECB data with the University of Texas System and the 
institutional data using individual course catalogues to match the THECB data reported 
by CIP code to the departmental data provided by the U.T. System.  The second issue 
with the reporting by CIP code is the designation of interdisciplinary studies.  This means 
there is information for multi-disciplinary programs that do not have a designated home 
at an institution.  For example, a biochemistry program could either be in a department of 
biology or a department of chemistry.  Therefore, CIP programs with a designation of 
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interdisciplinary studies are not included at the departmental analysis.  Rather, these 
programs are only included in the school level analyses where a program like 
biochemistry clearly falls under the jurisdiction of a school of natural sciences.  However, 
interdepartmental programs are also problematic in the school level analysis.  There are a 
handful of programs that operate across schools.  In these 7 instances, the schools are 
merged together by CIP program area.  For the University of Texas at Brownsville, the 
College of Biomedical Sciences and Health Professions is merged with the College of 
Nursing.  Arlington combines the School of Social Work and the School of Urban and 
Public Affairs.  Austin has three collapses: the College of Liberal Arts with the Lyndon 
B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and the School of Social Work, the College of 
Natural Sciences and the Jackson School of Geosciences, and the College of Pharmacy 
and the School of Nursing.  Finally, the University of Texas El Paso collapses 
information for the College of Health Sciences and School of Nursing as well as a 
collapse for the College of Liberal Arts and University College. 
Finally, semester credit hour by CIP code contains 11,545 observations across the 
9 member U.T. System since 2009.  Due to time and resource constraints that it would 
require to look up each of these using course catalogues, I use the structure of the CIP 
code to collapse to the first 2 digits, which includes aggregate program information.  
Because of the difficulty in assigning these aggregate collapses to departments, this 
information is only used at the school level, much like the interdisciplinary information is 
only included at the school level. 
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Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) 
 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) is hosted by the 
U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics and reports data 
for those institutions receiving federal financial aid as required by the federal government 
through the Higher Education Act of 1965.  This includes enrollment information, 
admissions and price information, graduation rates, and budget information for both 
revenues and expenses.  Unlike the U.T. System budget information, the IPEDS reported 
data includes revenues and expenses across all funds.  IPEDS includes a long history of 
data, back to 1986.  Prior to IPEDS, the Higher Education General Information Survey 
(HEGIS) was conducted between 1966 and 1985.  This dataset has been used extensively 
in academic publishing and is the primary source for groups such as the College Board 
and the Delta Cost Project.  According to IPEDS, there are 572 public, 4-year institutions 
nationwide that will be used in the various analyses, providing a full picture of public 
higher education, albeit only at the institutional level.  The information provided by 
IPEDS is used in every model.  In the institutional models, IPEDS is the primary source 
of information.  In the school and departmental levels, IPEDS provides the institutional 
information used as control variables. 
There are a number of nuances about using IPEDS data.  First, one drawback is 
that the information is restricted to aggregate institutional information, it is rarely broken 
by level of student, and it does not include any subunit information.  The only subunit 
information is that expenses must be reported by category.  These categories include 
instruction, research, public service, academic support, student services, institutional 
support, plant maintenance, scholarships, auxiliary expenses, hospital services, 
 133 
 
independent operations, and other.  Therefore, while IPEDS cannot provide information 
about departments or schools, it offers a different view of how money is used based on 
area.  In some capacity, this information might be viewed as being just as important as 
departmental or school based budgets.  Rather than focusing on which units get funds, it 
focuses on how the funds are spent.  However, the reported expense category can change 
from year to year and is somewhat subjective based on an institution’s interpretation.  For 
example, faculty salaries are budgeted under the category for instruction despite the fact 
that faculty are required to produce outputs in instruction, research, and public service 
simultaneously. 
Another key issue with IPEDS is the parent-child relationship.  Institutions may 
report information at a system level rather than at the institutional level.  This means that 
the figures listed in IPEDS may be for a multi-campus system rather than a single 
institution.  This type of reporting was especially prevalent prior to 2004.  However, 
since the 2004 academic year, only 9 institutions have a parent-child relationship that 
might threaten this study.  The San Diego State University system reports at the system 
level for a majority of their variables.  The remaining 8 systems include the University of 
California System, Pennsylvania State System, Rutgers University, Vermont State 
Colleges, Kent State University, West Virginia University, University of Pittsburgh, and 
University of Washington.  These 8 systems only report their financial information at the 
system level.  In order to preserve as much information as possible at the institutional 
level, the variables directly affected by the parent-child relationship are replaced as 
missing rather than aggregating all of the institutions to a single system level as is done 
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by the Delta Cost Project.  This keeps enrollment and test score information intact while 
only omitting the financial information that is not applicable at the institutional level. 
Individual variables also are somewhat problematic as the definitions can change 
over time.  For example, the SAT added a writing component in 2006 which changed the 
previous label of SAT Verbal to SAT Reading.  For the purposes of the analyses, these 
scores are treated interchangeably.  However, IPEDS does not report an average test 
score.  Rather, for both SAT and ACT, IPEDS reports the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile scores.  
For simplicity purposes, the midpoint between these scores is used as a single measure of 
an institution’s test scores. 
Finally, IPEDS uses its own form of imputation to add information when missing.  
However, the imputation methodology is poor, frequently carrying forward values from 
prior years, using values from the nearest neighbor, or imposing a value of 0.  In these 
instances, the information was replaced as missing rather than using the imprecise 
estimates provided by IPEDS. 
 
Data Merging & Cleaning 
 In order to create working data to analyze the research questions, the three sources 
of data had to be combined and cleaned.  The IPEDS data is reported at the institutional 
level and includes its own identification number.  The Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board reports data at the program level by CIP code.  The U.T. System data 
includes budget information at the departmental level as reported by budget codes.  In 
order to merge the various sources of data together, I first had to identify the needs at 
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each level of analysis.  This includes creating a dataset at the institutional level, a dataset 
at the school level, and a dataset at the departmental level. 
 The data at the departmental level is instrumental in the various analyses as it is 
the data that is reported at the most detailed level of analysis.  In order to merge the 
various sources of data together, I searched through each institution’s course catalogue in 
the U.T. System.  I matched the information to that reported to the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board and included the CIP code for courses and degrees offered 
for each department.  I was then able to merge the THECB data with the U.T. System 
data using the matching CIP codes acquired through the various course catalogues.  I also 
merged IPEDS data to this by matching based on institutional identifiers.  In addition, the 
data across the three datasets is reported at both fiscal and academic years.  An academic 
year runs from fall to the following summer.  For example, academic year 2011 includes 
fall 2011 through summer 2012.  However, a fiscal year runs from September through 
August.  In this instance, the academic year that runs from September 2011 to August 
2012 is actually fiscal year 2012.  Therefore, I matched information by subtracting 1 from 
each fiscal year so it aligns with the academic calendar.  One issue that arose with this 
matching is the overlap in years.  The U.T. System data includes financial information for 
academic years 2008 to 2012 but the THECB data only includes data up to 2011 and is 
even further restricted to 2010 once including graduation information.  One final thing to 
note is that excluded from this lower level of analysis is the inter-departmental 
information and information on semester credit hours, as  mentioned previously, because 
of the level of complexity in reporting directly as departments. 
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The data at the school level rolls the departmental level information up to the next 
highest unit.  This was done with a simple collapse to the closest usable unit.  In addition, 
this collapse allowed me to re-introduce the interdisciplinary information and semester 
credit hours.  These two sources of information, which were too complex to include at the 
departmental level, could be included when looking at schools and colleges. 
Finally, for the institutional dataset, the information primarily comes from IPEDS.  
This includes all 572 public, 4-year institutions and is cleaned to account for the major  
issues in IPEDS including the parent-child relationships, imputation, and changes in 
variable definitions. 
 
Summary of Data Sources 
The three sources of data all provide a different angle in examining how 
institutions allocate money and what they are producing.  The U.T. System data looks 
within a system over time at departments, but lacks certain inputs and outputs that are too 
complex to include at a departmental level.  The school level data is able to include all of 
the various sources of data most comprehensively, but lacks the detail of the departmental 
level and reduces the sample size.  Finally, IPEDS provides information for hundreds of 
institutions over time, but only at the aggregate level.  These sources are summarized in 
Table 5.3.  By conducting the analysis on these three different datasets, all at different 
levels, it provides a more comprehensive look at evaluating the research questions by 
taking advantage of the differing components in each. 
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Assumptions 
 There are a few assumptions that must be outlined in transitioning from the 
conceptual framework to the empirical study and the limitations on the data available.  
First, and most importantly, this study is primarily concerned with expenses, and less so 
with revenues.  Therefore, the focus is on what institutions do with funds after they are 
received, not on the allocations decisions of states or other funders.  This makes the 
assumption that institutions make their internal funding decisions only once their 
revenues are identified.  This is common practice in non-profit organizations that must 
maintain balanced budgets and therefore must know how much money they have to spend 
before they decide how to spend it (Massy, 1996).  Given this assumption, states and 
other funders become less important to institutional processes.  This is why revenues are 
treated as independent variables. 
However, as outlined in the conceptual framework, there are multiple feedback 
loops that tie institutions back to their funders.  This raises questions about simultaneity 
and the fact that not only do revenues drive expenditures, but expenditures can drive 
future revenues.  Indeed, the literature identified such studies testing the Matthew effect 
where state revenues actually drive the production of other types of revenues (Cheslock 
& Gianneschi, 2008).  Therefore, institutions could be spending money from state 
allocations in such a way that it generates revenues from other sources.  In addition, the 
development of performance funding and performance budgeting creates a direct tie 
between institutional outcomes and future funding.  To reiterate, this study is focused on 
the production side.  While outcomes may be aligned to future funding, motivation to 
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achieve outcomes is not the area of interest.  Rather, this study looks at the mechanisms 
involved in producing the outcomes, not the link between outcomes and future revenues. 
 
Variables & Methodology 
The variables in these datasets can be presented in four different ways.  The 
financial data, in particular, can be reported as (1) raw figures, (2) as logged values, (3) as 
amounts per student or per staff member, or (4) as a percent of total institutional 
expenses.  There are benefits and limitations to each.  For example, models using raw 
figures provide detailed information, but this does not account for size or complexity.  
Logged values are useful in looking at percent changes over time in log-log regressions 
and are commonly used in most financial studies.  Similarly, per FTE models are quite 
common, especially in studies on tuition and financial aid.  Finally, using figures as a 
percent of total institutional expenses show the importance of various departments and 
schools in comparison to the overall institution.  Each of these will be used when 
appropriate given the question and model.  For example, raw figures and percentages are 
used in many of the descriptive statistics, amounts per student or per staff member are the 
primary focus in the regression to be consistent with previous research (Leslie et al., 
2012), and logged values must be used in the stochastic frontier analysis.  Values per full 
time equivalent also have an advantage over the other measures because it helps control 
for size while curbing collinearity in the regressors.  In models with faculty salary as a 
right-hand side variable, if FTE faculty counts were included, there would be collinearity 
between the salary amounts and FTE counts.  Therefore, creating a measure of salary per 
FTE helps remove the collinearity and keeps the variance inflation factor under 10. 
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 The variables themselves can be divided into three primary categories: outcomes, 
financial variables, and control variables.  Outcomes are the primary dependent variable 
in most of the analyses, particularly research questions 2 through 4.  These include 
typical measures used by institutions, states, and the federal government to analyze 
performance such as degrees awarded, majors by subject area, retention rates, and 
graduation rates.  Indeed, Rabovsky (2013) pointed out that the most commonly used 
outputs for state performance metrics are retention and graduation rates.  Financial 
variables differ based on the data used.  Revenue is only included in the IPEDS data at 
the institutional level.  These are broken down by different sources of revenue according 
to NCES reporting requirements.  Similarly, expenditures are listed in IPEDS by the 
institutional expense category.  In the Texas data, however, expenditures are recorded as 
true budget items.  These budget items are classified by expenditures on personnel, 
operating expenses, or on capital projects.  Furthermore, expenditures are broken down 
by program use.  For example, a budget item in a department of economics would contain 
information about personnel expenses on faculty and staff and operating expenses such as 
travel, but all of these would be rolled into the category for instruction in IPEDS.  
Finally, control variables for enrollment, staffing, and other characteristics are included to 
deal with differences in size and structure across the different units of analysis. 
 In addition to the above comparisons across the IPEDS and Texas data, I 
examined the data at the various levels to ensure consistency across the variables and to 
provide a check for the validity of the data.  The raw U.T. System data is relatively 
consistent with that reported in IPEDS.  For example, the UT-Arlington budget lists 
instructional expenses of $131 million and institutional support of $32 million in 
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FY2009, similar to their IPEDS report that year of $136 million in instructional expenses 
and $32 million in institutional support.  In another example, the budget for UTEP in 
FY2010 showed revenues of $42 million from federal operating revenues and $40 million 
from federal nonoperating revenues.  IPEDS that year listed revenues of $41 million and 
$35 million, respectively.  However, it should be noted that there are some differences 
between the U.T. budgets and IPEDS, with IPEDS frequently having higher reported 
numbers than that listed by the U.T. System budgets.  These slight discrepancies are 
likely due to budgets being a proposed plan of spending prior to the beginning of a fiscal 
year while IPEDS reports actual and adjusted spending for that fiscal year.  This also 
explains the higher values frequently reported by IPEDS.  In general, the consistency 
across institutions and the various sources provides a reassurance that the data is valid.  
However, the school and departmental analyses are restricted to a single fund, the 
educational and general fund, and to the academic departments identified, when 
applicable. 
 
Testing the Simplified Framework 
 The full conceptual framework found in Chapter 3 is largely theoretical and has 
many components to test, some of which cannot be quantified.  I present a simplified 
framework below, which visually depicts the testable relationships in the higher 
education production function. 
 In this figure, the four main testable relationships are depicted as they related to 
the various research questions.  The first relationship (1) is the link between revenues and 
expenses.  In this model, expenses are determined by the various sources of revenues.    
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Figure 5.1 
Simplified Framework for Regression Models 
Revenues
Expenses
Outputs
1
3
2
4
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This model ties directly to the first research question which looks at this very 
relationship.  The second relationship (2) looks at the link between expenses and outputs.  
This is directly associated with the second research question.  In addition, this link can be 
examined across the different levels of analysis and in a multi-level approach where the 
departments and subunits affect institutional outputs.  The third link (3) looks at the link 
between revenues and outputs.  This is an indirect look at which revenues might be 
associated with various outputs.  Rather than looking at the direct links seen in the first 
two examples, this relationship looks at the indirect links in the production process.  This 
blends the second and third research questions, looking at the production of outputs, 
which is associated with the second research question, but also looking across the broad 
spectrum on the production function, introducing the input-output relationship for the 
third research question.  Finally, the field represents the fourth (4) relationship in the 
analysis.  This last analysis extends the previous components, which focused on 
individual relationships into a measure of technical efficiency with data envelopment 
analysis and stochastic frontier analysis.   
 The controls in the different models address the other components seen in the 
conceptual framework from Figure 3.1.  These include controls for Carnegie 
classification, selectivity, enrollment, and other factors that might impact the quality or 
composition of the inputs, processes, or outputs.  As mentioned previously, the quality of 
the inputs is likely to impact the performance on outputs.  For example, while all of the 
institutions in the analysis are public, four-year institutions, the type of student attending 
a selective research institution is likely to differ from those attending an open access 
comprehensive institution.  These differences in the student inputs are likely to affect the 
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performance on the institutional outputs and are therefore controlled for in the various 
models.  Controlling for these attributes is especially important when using the 
production function framework and its underlying assumptions of turning raw inputs into 
finished products.  The various relationships introduced above will now be broken down 
into more detail with the associated models and variables used in each analysis. 
 
The Relationship Between Revenues & Expenses 
For the first question regarding the relationship between sources of funding and 
expenses, I use descriptive statistics to display differences across institutions, types, and 
time.  At the institutional level, this uses IPEDS to compare institutions in regards to their 
sources of funding and their spending on different categories such as instruction, 
research, and institutional support.  Because revenue information is only available at the 
institutional level, the U.T. System data is not used to address this research question.   
In addition to the descriptive analysis, I developed a fixed effects model to look at 
the relationship between revenues and expenses.  This is a precursor to the models that 
are tested in the third hypothesis regarding efficiency.  The fixed effects model for this 
analysis uses revenues as independent variables that influence the dependent spending on 
various expense items.  This model is displayed below in formula 5.2. 
                                                       (5.2) 
In this model, the dependent variable is a chosen expense item according to 
IPEDS.  This structure is very similar to the models run previously by Leslie and 
colleagues (2012), but with updated data and using all types of four-year institutions 
rather than just focusing on research institutions.  The independent variables include 
 145 
 
revenues and a series of controls.  For example, it would look at how spending on 
instruction varies based on revenues from state appropriations and tuition, among others.  
In addition, this model includes year (  ) and institutional (  ) fixed effects to allow for 
the examination of changes in funding within an institution over time.  The coefficients 
on the regressors in this example would indicate an association between revenues and 
expenses within an institution and over time.   
There are a number of considerations when dealing with fixed effects models.  
First, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the model must be under 10.  This is to ensure 
there is no multi-collinearity in the regressors.  In each model, the VIF is indeed under 
10.  Second, fixed effects models are less efficient than random effects models.  
Therefore, both models must be run and compared.  The Hausman test can compare the 
estimates to ensure the estimates are consistent.  If the estimates are similar and the 
Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis that both estimates are consistent, then 
random effects can provide more efficient estimates.  However, if the Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis, then fixed effects should be employed as it should provide the 
consistent estimates.  Indeed, the Hausman tests all reveal the need to use fixed effects 
models.  The third consideration involves strict exogeneity.  When dealing with panel 
models, the estimates could be biased because of correlations between the regressors and 
the error term.  In essence, the error term at any time cannot be correlated with any of the 
regressors at any time in the panel, including future values.  To test for this potential 
source of bias in the estimates, future values of the independent variables can be included 
to see if they are associated with current values of the outcome variable (Wooldridge, 
2009).  If the future values are significant, there may be correlations across time and the 
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use of instrumental variables would be necessary to deal with the potential bias.  This is 
somewhat of a concern in the models using IPEDS data as future values of revenues are 
indeed significantly related to current levels of expenses, even after controlling for 
current and lagged values of revenues.  It is less problematic in evaluating the 
relationship between expenses and outputs or for the school and departmental models.  
This is likely due to the incremental nature of budgeting and future values of revenues 
and expenses both being based on current funding and expense levels.  I continue forward 
with the fixed effects analysis to replicate the study conducted by Leslie et al. (2012), but 
caution the possible need to use instruments in future research. 
 
The Relationship Between Expenses & Outputs 
 In this second research question, the relationship between expenses and outputs is 
explored.  The structure is very similar to descriptive and fixed effects analyses seen in 
the previous question with a few key exceptions.  First, expenses in this analysis are now 
independent variables while outputs become the dependent variable.  Second, the 
structure of the data allows these regressions to be conducted across the different levels 
of data.  This means that models including outputs at the departmental, school, and 
institutional level are now possible when it comes to relating expenses to outputs.  The 
general formula closely aligns to 5.2, but the subscripts are now generic as a unit of 
analysis, u, rather than institution.  This is presented below as formula 5.3. 
                                                (5.3) 
Finally, I include a model which looks at the indirect links between inputs and 
outputs as shown in Figure 5.1 as relationship (3).  Following the work by Feeney and 
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Welch (2012) and Taylor, Cantwell, and Slaughter (2013), this looks at the links between 
inputs and outputs.  This introduces these various relationships before using data 
envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis used in the measures of efficiency.  
These models look at a single output and determine which inputs are associated with their 
development. 
                                                    (5.4) 
Formula 5.4, shows this relationship between outputs and revenues, taking a similar 
structure to the previous models but using revenues as the indirect link to an output rather 
than the direct relationships between revenues and expenses or expenses and outputs. 
 
Measures of Efficiency 
 In the conceptual framework, the combination of various resources and quality 
produces outcomes through processes conducted by institutions.  However, actual 
outcomes may not be reflective of potential outcomes.  DEA and SFA models create 
values for potential outputs
26
 based on inputs and this allows the actual outputs to be 
compared to this value.  This ratio of actual outputs to potential outputs creates a type of 
efficiency score that is unique to each unit of analysis.  In this model, the interest is less 
about the direct relationship between inputs and outcomes, but rather about how 
                                                          
26
 Outputs are used here rather than outcomes because the models that follow are drawn 
from economics and the study of gross productivity (also known as productivity ratios) in 
terms of relating outputs to inputs.  The examples used in these studies are from the 
private sector in terms of measuring the production of goods in relation to the labor and 
capital involved in the production process.  However, many measures considered 
outcomes in higher education will be used interchangeably in this study with this 
definition of outputs. 
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effectively the units are acting in comparison to peer units that develop a frontier of 
production. 
 The models that use this type of approach include data envelopment analysis and 
stochastic frontier analysis.  As described in the literature review on these models, both 
have strengths and weaknesses when it comes to evaluating efficiency.  The mechanics of 
such models draw on Coelli’s (1998; Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, & Battese, 2005) An 
Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis
27
.  While this book comes from a 
business and manufacturing background, the concepts of efficiency can readily be applied 
to the non-profit and higher education sector, similar to how other theoretical concepts 
from business and public administration have transferred to higher education as outlined 
in the literature review and conceptual framework.  The econometric models outlined use 
technical efficiency to measure optimal performance.  Technical efficiency, which is the 
primary focus of these models, is defined as optimizing outputs given fixed inputs.  This 
is parallel to the discussion of efficiency in the conceptual framework for ensuring money 
is allocated toward functions with the greatest returns.  In addition, scale efficiency 
measures the extent to which institutions can take advantage of their size and economies 
of scale by altering their composition to fit the best size.  This is an important 
consideration given Robst’s (2001) findings that efficiencies differ by institutional size.  
The various authors who conduct these types of analyses (Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2003; 
Avkiran, 2001; Coelli, 1998; Coelli et al., 2005), point out that it is often easier for 
institutions to improve their technical efficiency through internal budget allocations than 
it is to adjust their scale efficiency through altering the size of their institution.  These 
                                                          
27
 See also: Ainger, Lovell, & Schmidt (1977); Cobb & Douglas (1928); and Meeusen & 
van den Broek (1977). 
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concepts combine to create a production frontier of maximum possible performance 
based on the performance of peers.  Actual performance is then compared to this frontier. 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis
28
.  In stochastic frontier analysis, outputs are a 
function of inputs, inefficiency, and random noise.  Rather than choosing inputs and 
outputs and letting the performance of peers develop the frontier, as will be seen with 
data envelopment analysis, this model uses a parametric approach to develop measures of 
efficiency.  This is illustrated in Formula 5.5 below
29
. 
         (         )     (  )      (   )   (5.5) 
  Where 
      (         ) is reflective of the frontier based on inputs, 
      (  ) is a random error component, and 
   (   ) is the inefficiency. 
Observed levels of inputs and outputs can then be plotted against the frontier to determine 
inefficiency.  Units with observed values that are closest to the frontier, after accounting 
for random noise, are said to have lower levels of inefficiency.  Said otherwise, they are 
more efficient in the use of their resources. 
 Unlike data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis looks at the 
technical efficiency on a single measure of output.  The parametric approach allows for 
traditional measures of model fit, including coefficients, confidence intervals, and 
significance testing, which cannot be done with the non-parametric approach used in data 
envelopment analysis.  With this approach, I also use variable returns to scale and 
examine the technical efficiency of the units.  The use of variable returns to scale is 
                                                          
28
 Belotti, Daidone, Ilardi, & Atella, (2013a; 2013b); StataCorp (2014) 
29
 Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, & Battese (2005, pp. 243) Formula 9.5. 
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preferred to constant returns to scale due to the differences in efficiency that accompany 
differences in size (Robst, 2001).  In addition, stochastic frontier analysis also allows for 
panel models, allowing for fixed effects to be introduced in order to examine whether a 
unit is moving towards or away from the frontier over time.  In essence, this looks at the 
annual measures of efficiency in comparison to their performance over time.  Positive 
values would be associated with becoming more efficient while negative values of 
technical efficiency would indicate that units are become less efficient over time. 
Data Envelopment Analysis
30
.  Data envelopment analysis is a non-parametric 
procedure which develops a frontier based on the performance of the individual 
institutions on their multiple outputs.  This technique is helpful because it lets the data 
create a frontier rather than forcing a relationship through a specified functional form.  In 
addition, this model allows the comparison of multiple inputs to multiple outputs while 
stochastic frontier analysis was limited to looking at a single output at a time.  The 
problem with such a model, however, is that it is especially susceptible to measurement 
error (Avkiran, 2001; Van Biesebroeck, 2007).  If observations are measured with error, 
they are likely to affect the development of the frontier and create measures of efficiency 
that are not accurate.  In addition, DEA often assumes there are constant returns to scale 
(Johnes, 2006).  Only by comparing to a DEA model with variable returns to scale can 
measures of scale efficiency be developed.  Therefore, both variable and constant returns 
to scale are included in the output, with greater emphasis put on those with variable 
returns to scale in order to account for differences accruing because of size. 
                                                          
30
 Ji & Lee (2014); StataCorp (2014) 
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There are two ways of conducting data envelopment analysis, through input 
orientation or output orientation.  Input orientation focuses on the amount that inputs can 
be reduced in order to keep outputs stable.  Output orientation focuses on increasing 
outputs given fixed inputs.  While my initial approach was to use an output orientation to 
maximize outputs given fixed inputs, I ultimately chose to use an input orientation for 
two reasons.  First, the results of the initial research questions suggested that inputs are 
more variable than outputs.  Second, once considering this finding, it made sense that 
states and policymakers would likely be interested in seeing how far they could cut 
institutional revenues and save money without harming outputs.  Thus, I employed an 
input orientation to look for potential financial savings that would more closely mirror 
the current economic climate of reduced state appropriations, rather than looking at 
output generation. 
In addition, there are also a number of technical considerations for DEA.  Avkiran 
(2001) points out that the sample size is especially important in choosing the number of 
inputs and outputs that can be used, citing that the sample size should be 3 times larger 
than the sum of inputs and outputs or larger than the product of inputs and outputs.  
Finally, the choice of which inputs and outputs to include is also important.  Johnes 
(2006) suggests that there are two ways of dealing with inputs in data envelopment 
analysis.  The first technique is to include all inputs, as also recommended by Cubbin and 
Tzanidakis (1998) and Grosskopf (1996).  This technique assumes that all inputs affect 
the production of outputs and that all institutions in the sample face the same 
environment.  If the environment is especially harsh, institutions will have scores that 
make them look less efficient because they include aspects of the environment that they 
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cannot control.  The other technique is to use a two-stage procedure where only 
controllable inputs are used.  Then non-controllable inputs are used in the second stage.  
However, Johnes points out that McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) tested the different 
techniques in a study of secondary education and found no difference in the results.  I 
ultimately used a one-state model to be more conservative in the estimates.  This would 
produce more inefficient values because it does not include aspects of the environment.  
Results with many efficient values would indicate that institutions are efficient in spite of 
their environment.   
 Using data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis provides a means 
for objectively comparing the different subunits and institutions across the various 
datasets.  This allows for an analysis of how departments, schools, and institutions use 
their resources to create various outputs and outcomes for higher education.  
Furthermore, it allows for an examination of whether these resources are being used most 
efficiently. 
 
Differences by Time, Location, & Type 
 Finally, the previous questions will make use of the variation across the different 
datasets to compare across the different subunits and over time.  Not only is there an 
interest in finding out the relationships between revenues, expenses, and subsequent 
outputs, but also if these relationships differ based on institutional type or have changed 
over time.  For example, research institutions may spend less on instruction per student 
than a liberal arts institution because they are focused more on research.  Similarly, the 
economic constraints in the early 2000s have changed the source of various revenues and 
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this change in composition could have changed how funds are allocated.  These sub-
analyses all stem from the previous questions, but simply view them from a different 
angle.  The same techniques, both descriptive and empirical, are used as outlined in the 
previous questions but the focus is on the use of different comparison groups and fixed 
effects to evaluate the within and between variation at different levels. 
 In particular, this has important implications for the stochastic frontier analyses.  
Rather than simply looking cross-sectionally at how units score in comparison with each 
other, common in the previous studies using these techniques, I use longitudinal data to 
examine how efficiency has changed over time.  This is especially important because it 
does more than simply rank units at a single point in time.  Instead, it reveals the 
institutions that are becoming more or less efficient over time and helps to identify the 
characteristics of these units in achieving this change in their performance. 
 
Summary of Data & Methods 
 This chapter has presented an outline for the empirical study presented in this 
dissertation.  The data is drawn from three primary resources: the University of Texas 
System, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, and IPEDS.  This data is then used 
to evaluate the four research questions using various techniques including descriptive 
analyses, fixed effects models, and measures of efficiency including data envelopment 
analysis and stochastic frontier analysis.  This is summarized in Table 5.4. 
This table summarizes that there are three sources of data, all consisting of data at 
different levels to exploit the variation in each by unit of analysis, institution, and time.  
In addition, there are four separate research questions, each with methods outlined to best   
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Table 5.4 
 
Summary of Data, Variables, and Methods 
 
Data  Variables 
UT-System Raw Figures 
Departments, School, Time Logged Values 
THECB  Per FTE 
CIP Code, Time % of Institutional Expenses 
IPEDS   
Institutions, Finance, Time  
   
RQ1: What is the relationship between institutional revenues and institutional expenses? 
 Methods  
 Descriptive Analysis 
Multivariate Regression 
 
 Fixed Effects  
 
RQ2: What is the relationship between institutional expenses and student outcomes? 
 Methods  
 Descriptive Analysis 
Multivariate Regression 
 
 Fixed Effects  
 
RQ3: What is the relative efficiency of the various units in the analysis in producing 
outputs in relation to inputs? 
 Data Envelopment Analysis  
 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
 
RQ4: How do these relationships change based on type of institution and over time? 
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fit both the research question and data.  Finally, the various equations can be modified 
with different measures of variables to examine dollar for dollar relationships, percent 
changes, changes per student or staff member, and changes in relation to overall 
institutional budgets.  Similarly, the dependent variable for outputs and outcomes can be 
applied to a number of institutional factors including, but not limited to, graduation rates 
and retention rates.  In addition, the frontier models create a comparison of actual outputs 
to potential outputs given various input levels. 
These different variables, models, and samples provide for a thorough 
examination of the higher education production process and offer new insight into the 
relationships between revenues, expenses, and outputs in the higher education production 
function and whether the units are acting efficiently.  This study therefore contributes to 
the literature in higher education finance, politics, and economics by combining topics 
and theory into a more comprehensive conceptual framework, collecting updated data 
more reflective of contemporary finances, and using methods to empirically test 
institutional budgeting and processes, a topic that has received a lot of attention at the 
state level, but little attention within institutions.  With accountability, efficiency, and 
performance dominating the public agenda for higher education, this study directly 
addresses concerns of taxpayers and policymakers in evaluating institutions and the 
public and private returns on investment in public higher education.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, I present the findings for each research question.  I begin with a 
discussion about the descriptive statistics across the different datasets and follow with an 
examination of each research question and the models that accompany each question.  In 
addition, each research question is addressed at the different levels of analysis, where 
applicable. 
 
IPEDS Descriptive Statistics 
The data from IPEDS includes information from 555 institutions spanning across 
academic years 2005 to 2012 once accounting for 17 institutions that have issues with 
parent-child indicators and imputation.  This information, presented in Table 6.1, 
includes the means and standard deviations for the variables in the various analyses and is 
separated out by Carnegie classification.  The data presented is averaged across the panel 
and adjusted for inflation where applicable. 
 
Revenues 
 In the overall sample of 4-year institutions, the standard deviations exceed the 
means of the financial variables, largely because of the vast differences across Carnegie 
classification.  For example, RU/VH institutions average $303 million in revenues from   
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Table 6.1 
 
Institutional Descriptive Statistics by Carnegie Classification 
 
 
Public 4-Year 
Institutions RU/VH RU/H Doctoral MA BA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Revenues in Millions             
State Appropriations 85.61 106.06 303.16 148.54 118.83 57.84 80.53 50.56 49.47 33.60 17.53 12.66 
Tuition and Fees 77.33 100.63 261.80 159.04 125.93 65.41 69.75 42.01 43.97 34.12 12.77 12.84 
Federal Operating Grants 
& Contracts 
40.63 94.93 224.70 173.21 53.10 47.43 16.70 10.92 8.25 10.19 3.79 4.72 
Sales & Services of 
Auxiliary Enterprises 
35.70 56.39 139.33 94.69 50.66 35.58 31.40 44.07 17.28 15.94 6.36 5.98 
Other Sources of 
Operating Revenues 
39.65 91.87 203.35 182.69 49.24 44.15 17.28 12.25 10.90 9.87 4.59 5.56 
Other Nonoperating 
Revenues 
39.41 112.08 166.19 286.02 43.49 35.88 35.71 25.97 18.81 19.73 8.45 10.51 
Total Operating & 
Nonoperating Revenues 
339.65 507.19 1444.53 766.39 490.23 231.27 268.46 151.47 157.21 95.42 56.82 39.77 
Total Revenues 356.90 599.49 1555.60 1054.01 481.68 225.23 261.82 144.02 155.75 94.38 56.07 38.32 
Expenses in Millions 
            
Instruction 99.40 132.43 362.26 207.16 144.07 66.06 87.81 52.93 54.66 36.93 18.24 14.78 
Research 43.99 107.81 264.13 178.78 58.45 46.03 11.90 8.72 3.58 7.76 0.96 2.14 
Auxiliary Enterprises 37.38 58.90 145.27 98.97 54.29 36.74 36.25 47.93 17.20 15.44 7.31 6.33 
Academic Support 26.09 41.21 101.25 74.76 39.32 25.01 20.32 9.02 12.98 9.55 4.20 3.47 
Institutional Support 25.07 28.37 77.32 45.60 35.06 15.39 23.63 11.33 16.60 11.50 6.67 5.33 
Public Service 18.20 44.69 95.27 90.42 23.87 23.83 8.25 7.98 4.73 6.51 1.42 1.65 
Student Services 15.29 14.62 37.54 21.00 21.87 11.03 14.65 9.42 12.09 9.42 4.57 3.42 
Scholarships & 
Fellowships 
13.61 17.79 39.96 30.60 18.30 14.14 15.46 9.64 9.40 10.10 3.54 4.49 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
 
Institutional Descriptive Statistics by Carnegie Classification 
 
Public 4-Year 
Institutions RU/VH RU/H Doctoral MA BA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Expenses in Millions (Continued)            
Other Expenses 41.27 61.98 169.35 105.86 55.12 25.07 28.74 16.01 20.97 12.43 7.43 4.31 
Total Operating Expenses 309.79 506.66 1350.75 852.05 422.00 195.93 225.29 128.56 134.99 78.92 48.57 31.81 
Total Expenses 332.32 544.47 1443.64 920.13 447.05 207.87 242.01 132.53 146.05 87.24 52.19 35.62 
Control Variables 
            
Published In-State Tuition 
and Fees (in Thousands) 
7.03 2.58 8.35 2.47 7.98 2.89 6.42 1.75 6.43 2.02 7.15 3.20 
ACT Score 21.87 2.65 25.17 1.97 23.16 2.25 20.62 2.26 21.07 2.07 20.52 2.15 
Admissions Rate 68.45 17.07 64.45 16.23 71.50 15.78 68.55 16.75 67.36 17.22 72.33 17.27 
SAT Score 1038.07 110.82 1176.85 72.46 1092.76 84.44 978.81 87.57 1006.08 87.01 971.85 91.99 
Student-Faculty Ratio 18.16 3.34 18.51 3.33 18.37 3.25 18.65 2.48 18.51 3.24 16.89 3.49 
Student FTE Enrollment 
(in Thousands) 
11.12 9.77 27.90 10.37 15.74 6.43 11.45 5.60 7.79 5.23 2.88 2.76 
Outputs             
BA Degrees 1811.97 1846.33 4996.20 2235.85 2650.31 1253.96 1840.40 1077.00 1368.55 1055.14 347.17 382.67 
MA Degrees 551.15 657.74 1587.62 775.15 944.71 520.08 672.48 502.89 390.43 394.20 9.73 18.53 
Full-Time Retention Rate 73.12 10.91 86.36 6.38 76.28 8.16 70.74 8.32 71.76 9.73 66.62 10.31 
4-Year Graduation Rate 23.86 14.95 39.76 16.56 25.81 14.87 19.87 9.29 20.92 12.60 20.03 13.19 
6-Year Graduation Rate 46.76 16.26 66.65 13.79 50.96 13.87 42.87 11.74 43.89 13.71 37.85 14.23 
Observations 4424  568  576  224  2130  926  
Groups 555   71  72  28  268  116  
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Figure 6.1 
 
Operating and Nonoperating Revenues by Carnegie Classification 
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state appropriations, $262 million from tuition and fees, and $225 million from federal 
operating grants and contracts.  However, BA granting institutions only average $18 
million, $13 million, and $4 million respectively from these various sources.  I also 
created values in relation to operating and nonoperating revenues, which can be seen in 
Figure 6.1.  Again, the figures are averaged across the panel after adjusting for inflation. 
The blue wedge in these graphs, representative of state appropriations, is larger in 
the Carnegie classifications focusing on doctoral, MA, or BA granting institutions.  In 
essence, these types of institutions rely more heavily on state appropriations than research 
institutions.  Tuition and fees, on the other hand, does not exhibit such a pattern, with 
percentages ranging from 24% at institutions with very high research activity to 33% at 
MA granting institutions with no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing importance.  
Finally, federal operating grants and contracts, the yellow wedges, which makes up the 
third largest proportion of revenues at both types of research institutions, is less than the 
sales and services of auxiliary enterprises and other nonoperating revenues at the other 
types of institutions.  This reflects the importance of research at these types of institutions 
while other types of institutions are more reliant on the state.  Indeed, high research 
institutions drew 28% of their revenues from state appropriations, on average, while 24% 
was from tuition and fees.  For BA granting institutions, these figures are larger, at 38% 
and 28%, respectively.  This indicates that despite the larger amounts received at research 
institutions, BA institutions rely more heavily on these two sources of revenues.  In 
essence, research institutions have a more diverse profile of revenues when compared to 
non-research institutions. 
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Figure 6.2 
 
Institutional Revenues Over Time 
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Figure 6.3 
 
Institutional Revenues at RU/VH Institutions Over Time 
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 When looking at these patterns over time, with a particular focus on state 
appropriations, tuition and fees, and revenues from federal operating grants and contracts, 
interesting patterns emerge.  Since fiscal year 2010, tuition and fee revenues have 
replaced state appropriations as the largest revenue source, as shown in Figure 6.2.  
However, when restricting to only institutions with very high research activity, as seen in 
Figure 6.3, tuition and fee revenues, which were roughly equivalent to federal operating 
grants and contracts in 2006, have overtaken both federal revenues and state 
appropriations and become the leading source of revenues in only 5 years.  In addition, 
this graph shows that average state appropriations have been declining since 2008 while 
federal operating grants and contracts have been increasing, closing the gap between the 
various revenues sources.  While the aggregation of all institutional types in Figure 6.3 
showed relatively flat growth to research grants, restricting to research granting 
institutions showed a rapid growth in the importance of research funds. 
This trend over time is especially interesting for research institutions because it 
shows a restructuring of institutional revenue sources since the Great Recession.  In 
particular, tuition and fees is not only now the largest revenue source at research 
institutions, but for many other types of institutions as well.  However, the second largest 
source of revenues at research institutions may also soon change if the negative trend 
with state appropriations and positive trend for federal operating grants and contracts 
continues.  If federal operating grants and contracts, synonymous with research funding, 
overtake state appropriations as the second largest source of revenues at these 
institutions, it may be reflective of a shift for both funders and institutions.  Namely, this 
could show an increasing reliance on research outputs at these types of institutions, not 
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only for prestige, but for funding purposes.  As this occurs, the relative importance of 
state funding as a revenue source could further decline, shifting the focus away from state 
policymakers to those stakeholders interested in research, thereby putting additional 
pressure on faculty and administrators to produce research outputs at the potential 
expense of state and educational goals.  In addition, the increasing reliance on tuition and 
fee revenues, given declining state support, could lead to changes in enrollment profiles.  
Research institutions could widen the gap in student inputs with other types of 
institutions as the cost of higher education increasingly falls to tuition support rather than 
state support.  This means that the ability to pay may stratify students into a certain 
institutional type even more than in the past.  These two revenue forces, the increasing 
reliance on research revenues and the individual support for instruction, could therefore 
change how expenses are appropriated within institutions. 
 
Expenses 
 For institutional expenses, Table 6.1 again shows that standard deviations exceed 
the means for the full sample because of the differences across Carnegie classification.  
For example, institutions with very high research activity have means of $362 million 
spent on instruction, $264 million spent on research, and $95 million spent on public 
service.  BA institutions only spend $18 million on instruction, less than $1 million on 
research, and $1.42 million on public service.  However, instruction makes up a larger 
percent of institutional budgets at BA granting institutions when compared to research 
institutions.  Indeed, Figure 6.4 shows the breakdown of expenses by Carnegie 
classification and illustrates that BA granting institutions report that roughly 38% of their   
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Figure 6.4 
 
Operating Expenses by Carnegie Classification 
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expenses are spent on instruction while only 2% is spent on research and 3% is spent on 
public service.  At research institutions, only 31% of institutional budgets are spent on 
instruction while nearly 22% is spent on research.  These findings are not particularly 
surprising, but illustrate the clear differences in spending patterns based on the 
institution’s mission. 
 While there are differences in expenditures based on institutional focus, the shifts 
over time that were seen with revenues are not present for expenses.  Instead, 
expenditures over time have a relatively slow and stable increase across instruction, 
research, and public service.  None of these items seems to be overtaking the other, 
despite the shifts in funding source.  This could illustrate that while research is increasing 
both as a revenue source and expense item, the shift toward tuition in lieu of state support 
is not impacting expenses on instruction or public service.  In fact, expenses for all of the 
various items are increasing or relatively stable.  Rather than foregoing one expense for 
another, expenses as a whole are increasing, illustrating the rising costs of higher 
education (Ehrenberg, 2002a) despite revenue fluctuations.  In particular, despite tuition 
and research revenues increasing at research institutions while state appropriations 
decline, expenses on instruction, research, public service, and the like all show increases 
over time.  This could indicate the stability of expenses that result from increased tuition 
and fees offsetting the loss of state appropriations.  These relationships will be further 
explored in the regressions that follow. 
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Controls & Outputs 
 In addition to the differences in finances, institutions differ based on student 
inputs and outputs.  For example, despite the increased expenses on instruction at non-
research institutions, incoming students have lower test scores.  Average SAT scores are 
less than 1000 at BA granting institutions while they are nearly 1200 at institutions with 
very high research activity.  Similarly, reported ACT scores are just over 20 at BA 
granting institutions while they exceed 25 at institutions with very high research activity.  
The admissions rates also differ across Carnegie classification.  While research 
institutions average an admissions rate of only 64%, BA institutions admit over 72% of 
applicants.  Furthermore, enrollments at research institutions average nearly 28,000 while 
BA granting enrollments are only 2900.  This could explain some of the test score 
differences, with larger research institutions being able to pick more qualified students 
from a larger applicant pool.  BA granting institutions, needing a certain enrollment 
threshold in order to hit their financial benchmarks, might be forced to admit more 
students from their application pool, including those with lower test scores. 
 Finally, student outputs also vary across institutions.  Given the enrollment 
differences, it is no surprise that research institutions produce over 14 times the amount 
of BA degrees as BA granting institutions.  However, research institutions are also more 
successful at producing graduates within 4 years and within 6 years.  The graduation rates 
at institutions with very high research activity average roughly 40% of students 
graduating within 4 years while 67% graduate within 6 years.  At BA granting 
institutions, these figures are significantly lower at 20% and 38%, respectively.  
Similarly, the full-time retention rates at these institutions differ dramatically, with a 
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retention rate of over 86% at research institutions while BA granting institutions reported 
a full-time retention rate of just under 67%.  Descriptively, not only are research 
institutions larger and more selective, but the students that do enroll are more likely to 
stay for multiple years of schooling and graduate more quickly.  This could either be 
because of the institutional delivery of educational services or simply a reflection of the 
quality of students enrolling at these institutions.  These issues will be further explored in 
the empirical analyses that follow later in this chapter. 
 
School Level Descriptive Statistics 
 Moving into the data from the University of Texas System and Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board, the descriptive statistics for the school level variables are 
presented in Table 6.2.  These include 64 schools from the 9 institutions included in the 
UT-System for academic years 2008 to 2011.  The data is averaged across this time after 
adjusting for inflation in the financial variables.   
 At the school level and for academic programs, faculty salaries dominate 
expenses, with roughly $9.3 million spent on average.  The next closest expense item is 
on classified staff at $1.1 million.  Similarly, faculty counts are significantly larger than 
administrative and classified staff, with 88 faculty members compared to 6 administrative 
staff and 26 classified staff.   
The student outputs at the school level include degrees granted, majors, and 
semester credit hours.  Not surprisingly, undergraduate outputs are by far the largest in 
these categories.  This is not only because of larger undergraduate enrollments, but also 
because of institutional mission.  For example, UT-Brownsville, UT-Pan Am, UTPB, and   
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Table 6.2 
 
School Level Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean SD 
Expenses in Thousands   
Faculty Salary 9262.42 11,223.46 
TA Salary 665.82 1890.14 
Administration Salary 677.37 679.14 
Classified Staff Salary 1074.70 1418.23 
Wages 128.83 179.34 
Travel Expenses 26.20 41.98 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 319.94 842.21 
Full-Time Equivalents   
Faculty 88.50 92.39 
Administration 5.99 5.78 
Classified Staff 26.25 28.64 
Degrees Granted   
Bachelor’s 468.67 519.49 
Master’s 186.72 225.08 
Professional 9.06 51.95 
Doctoral 22.68 46.83 
Majors   
Undergraduate 5084.54 4799.66 
Master’s 1184.13 1153.24 
Professional 59.79 345.42 
Doctoral 383.29 743.48 
Semester Credit Hours in Hundreds   
Undergraduate Lower-Level 346.85 561.71 
Undergraduate Upper-Level 274.20 249.19 
Undergraduate 621.05 767.37 
Master’s 85.05 84.00 
Professional 8.79 49.05 
Doctoral 24.67 51.29 
Total 739.57 823.75 
Institutional Variables   
Published In-State Tuition and Fees in Thousands 7.44 1.95 
4-Year Graduation Rate 21.54 16.86 
6-Year Graduation Rate 43.93 19.76 
ACT Score 22.72 3.47 
Admissions Rate 69.67 18.72 
SAT Score 1072.99 121.77 
Observations 253  
Groups 64  
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UT-Tyler, are all MA granting institutions and would, therefore, not be expected to 
produce doctoral degrees.   
 The data in this table are from academic schools and excludes information from 
non-academic departments such as the operation of plant and maintenance.  This is 
because non-academic departments do not produce academic outputs and are therefore 
not used in the school level and departmental regressions that follow.  These types of 
non-academic expenses are included as controls in the institutional level regressions since 
they are overhead that affect total institutional expenses and outputs.  These non-
academic departments are primarily associated with administrative salaries, wages, and 
miscellaneous expenses.  Administrative salaries are typically classified as institutional 
support, wages are primarily used for student services and libraries, while miscellaneous 
expenses include staff benefits and scholarship expenses.  Miscellaneous expenses are 
arguably the most important of these expenses since it is the largest single line-item 
expense for institutions.  For example, UT-Austin, the largest institution in the study, 
reported between $125 million and $138 million spent annually on staff benefits.  While 
this covers all faculty and staff in the entire institution, it is double their expenses on 
faculty salaries in their school of liberal arts, their largest individual school.  Their next 
highest miscellaneous expense was on scholarships and fellowships, ranging between $55 
million and $69 million per year.  Indeed, this pattern holds across the other institutions, 
with staff benefits and scholarships dominating non-academic institutional expenses. 
 In addition, the school level descriptive statistics show considerable variation.  
This not only applies between institutions but also within institutions.  For example, UT-
Austin spends 28% of its budget on its school of liberal arts and public affairs and 23% 
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on its school of sciences.  However, their nursing program and college of communication 
only receive 5% of expenses.  UT-Tyler has a much smaller budget than UT-Austin, but 
is more equitable with its schools.  Their college of arts and sciences receives 30% of the 
budget but nursing and health sciences receives 23% and the remaining schools all 
receive between 14% and 17%. 
 
Departmental Level Descriptive Statistics 
 The final dataset includes information from the individual departments.  As with 
the school level data, it includes information that pertains directly to academic 
departments and the production of outputs within that department.  In general, faculty 
salaries per FTE are largest in schools of business and particularly within departments of 
finance and accounting.  These are followed by programs for engineering and computer 
science, when applicable.  For classified salaries and wages, the expenses are largest in 
the various sciences such as chemistry, physics, and biology.  Again, engineering and 
computer sciences follow.  These patterns could reflect higher wages for faculty in 
business but the need for qualified research assistants in the sciences, which drives up the 
demand for classified staff and the higher premiums paid to non-faculty staff. 
 The data reported in this table are for 1192 observations from academic years 
2008 to 2011 in 299 departments across the 9 member system.  As with the previous 
tables, the data is averaged across the panel and adjusted for inflation where needed.  
When looking at the departmental descriptive statistics in Table 6.3, again faculty salaries 
exceed other departmental expenses.  Within a department, roughly $1.8 million is spent 
on 18.5 faculty members on average.  Administrative staff counts are less than 1 on   
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Table 6.3 
 
Departmental Level Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean SD 
Expenditures in Thousands   
Faculty Salary 1780.35 1994.95 
TA Salary 45.55 125.14 
Administration Salary 35.92 160.98 
Classified Staff Salary 134.01 239.17 
Wages 10.09 19.48 
Travel Expenses 3.05 8.15 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 4.38 20.16 
Full-Time Equivalents   
Faculty 18.53 15.73 
Administration 0.32 1.30 
Classified Staff 3.31 5.06 
Degrees Granted   
Bachelor’s 85.97 124.06 
Master’s 37.11 90.34 
Professional 1.82 23.50 
Doctoral 4.49 9.32 
Majors   
Undergraduate 869.74 1176.32 
Master’s 220.21 487.07 
Professional 11.77 154.81 
Doctoral 74.00 141.46 
Institutional Variables   
Published In-State Tuition and Fees in Thousands 7.39 1.85 
4-Year Graduation Rate 21.57 17.71 
6-Year Graduation Rate 44.77 20.86 
ACT Score 22.46 3.54 
Admissions Rate 71.15 19.86 
SAT Score 1062.44 122.24 
Observations 1192  
Groups 299  
  
 173 
 
average while each department employs roughly 3.3 classified staff costing $134,000.  
Similar to the school level data, undergraduate degrees and majors exceed the other types 
of degrees and majors offered.  However, while the mean number of professional degrees 
granted is only 1.82 and below that of doctoral degrees, the standard deviation is much 
larger, indicating that many programs do not offer professional degrees and these 0 
values are bringing down the mean.  For example, business programs have a large 
number of professional degrees, reflective of the MBA degree.  However, many other 
programs do not offer such professional degrees.  Also, while doctoral majors looks quite 
large, with a departmental level mean of 74, this is inflated by large values reported by 
the University of Texas Austin in their engineering, biological sciences, and education 
departments. 
 
Revenues & Expenses 
 The first research question in this study involves the relationship between 
revenues and expenses.  In particular, given the patterns seen descriptively in the 
institutional data, this research question should help address what kinds of relationships 
exist between the various sources of revenues and how institutions spend their money.  In 
particular, revenues from state appropriations and tuition are expected to have a positive 
relationship with expenses on instruction.  Increases in these revenues sources for any 
given institution are likely to be associated with increases in expenses.  Similarly, 
reductions, as is the case with state appropriations, would be associated with declines in 
instructional support.  Revenues from federal operating grants and contracts are expected 
to be positively associated with research expenses.  Additional funding for research 
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would be hypothesized to be linked to additional research expenses.  This would reflect 
the link between the federal government and funding for research activities.  State 
appropriations are expected to have a positive relationship with public service expenses.  
Similar to the state having an investment in instruction, the state also has an interest in 
supporting the public service operations of institutions.  This would manifest through a 
relationship between appropriations and expenditures on public service.  Finally, tuition 
and fees are expected to be positively associated with expenses on scholarships and 
fellowships.  As tuition revenues increase, institutions would have more money to spend 
for institutional aid, reflecting a high-tuition, high-aid policy.  These hypotheses stem 
from earlier work (Leslie et al., 2012) which found evidence of these relationships at 
public research institutions from academic years 1984 to 2007.  This section extends this 
work by examining whether these relationships hold for different types of institutions and 
whether they are still consistent for the years during and following the Great Recession, 
academic years 2005 to 2010. 
 Table 6.4 presents results from fixed effects regressions where revenues per FTE 
are the regressors and the various expenses per FTE are the dependent variables.  In this 
table, which includes institutions of all types, the expected relationships emerge.  State 
appropriations, which have been shown to be declining over time, reveal that a $1 
reduction is associated with a decrease in instructional expenses of 26 cents.  However, as 
an institution receives more tuition money over time, every additional $1 in revenues is 
associated with an increase of 38 cents on instruction.  Federal operating grants and 
contracts are positively associated with research, with a $1 increase in grants being 
associated with a 7 cent increase in instructional expenses, but state appropriations are   
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Table 6.4 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Expenses and Revenues per FTE (AY2005-2010) 
 
 
Instruction Research 
Public 
Service 
Academic 
Support 
Student 
Service 
Institutional 
Support 
Scholarships 
& Fellowships 
        
State Appropriations 
0.26*** 0.14 0.02 0.08*** 0.03** 0.12*** 0.02* 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
        
Tuition and Fee Revenues 
0.38*** 0.26*** 0.06** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
        
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts 
0.07* 0.26*** 0.09* 0.12* 0.02 0.08** -0.02 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
        
Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises 
0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
        
Other Sources of Operating Revenues 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.22) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Other Sources of Nonoperating Revenues 
0.12 0.03 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
        Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        Constant -0.08* 0.06** 0.03 0.03 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.08*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
        Within R-Squared 0.50 0.14 0.09 0.33 0.37 0.22 0.36 
Between R-Squared 0.73 0.78 0.24 0.50 0.05 0.31 0.02 
Total R-Squared 0.70 0.77 0.23 0.46 0.07 0.29 0.00 
F-Statistic 89.75 11.20 7.86 23.62 58.73 24.18 48.26 
Observations 2769 2769 2769 2769 2769 2769 2769 
Groups 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Standard errors in parentheses        
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001        
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not associated with public service.  Finally, tuition and fee revenues are positively 
associated with expenses on scholarships and fellowships.  A $1 increase in tuition and 
fee revenues for an institution is associated with a 14 cent increase on expenses for 
scholarships and fellowships.  However, a number of other relationships also arose that 
were not expected.  Federal operating grants and contracts is not only significant for 
research, but also for expenses on instruction and public service.  This is consistent with 
the results by Leslie et al. (2012), but surprising given the focus of the revenue source 
being research.  It would not be expected that research grants would go to support 
instructional activities.  However, this is explored in more detail when separating by 
Carnegie classification.  In addition, while state appropriations were significant in 
relation to public service in the previous study, it is not significant in this study.  Instead, 
tuition is significant and positive in its association with public service, which was 
significant and negative in the former study.  These differences could reflect the inclusion 
of non-research institutions, which may not have the type of public service mission as 
state flagships.  The other expense categories, which are much smaller, all showed 
positive significant relationships with state appropriations and tuition.  However, only 
academic support and institutional support had significant relationships with federal 
operating grants and contracts. 
While the relationships are generally similar to those found previously, the 
question remains as to whether there are differences because of the updated timeframe or 
because of the inclusion of other types of institutions.  Therefore, I repeated this analysis 
by Carnegie classification, paying particular attention to expenditures on the tripartite 
mission of higher education: instruction, research, and public service.  
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Table 6.5 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Expenses and Revenues by Carnegie Classification per FTE (AY2005-2010) 
 
 Instruction  Research 
 RU/VH RU/H Doctoral MA BA  RU/VH RU/H Doctoral MA BA 
State Appropriations 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.25** 0.21*** 0.15*  0.08 0.18*** -0.02 0.26 0.04 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.20) (0.02) 
            
Tuition and Fee Revenues 0.45** 0.57*** 0.38 0.23*** 0.46***  0.34** 0.20* 0.07 0.02 -0.03 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.28) (0.06) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) 
            
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.16*  0.65*** 0.20** 0.04 0.06 0.02 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
            
Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises -0.04 -0.13 -0.10 0.16 -0.15  -0.25 -0.14 0.06 -0.13 0.01 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.08) (0.21) (0.09) (0.02) 
            
Other Sources of Operating Revenues -0.05 -0.17** 0.09 0.04 -0.02  0.06** -0.08 0.03 -0.19 -0.05 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.18) (0.03) (0.13)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15) (0.03) 
            
Other Sources of Nonoperating Revenues 0.30* 0.19* -0.17 0.07 -0.17  0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.10)  (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
            
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
            
Constant 1.77** 0.19 -0.51* -0.74*** -0.68**  2.90*** 1.34*** -0.95*** -1.49*** -1.88*** 
 (0.64) (0.33) (0.22) (0.11) (0.23)  (0.49) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.07) 
            
Within R-Squared 0.64 0.60 0.48 0.48 0.50  0.61 0.38 0.12 0.08 0.11 
Between R-Squared 0.66 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.38  0.72 0.77 0.11 0.20 0.03 
Total R-Squared 0.63 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.39  0.71 0.74 0.06 0.24 0.06 
F-Statistic 21.60 41.97 15.16 52.99 14.25  50.27 6.53 4.10 2.03 1.88 
Observations 366 416 166 1478 343  366 416 166 1478 343 
Groups 62 70 28 258 86  62 70 28 258 86 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Expenses and Revenues by Carnegie Classification per FTE (AY2005-2010) 
 
 Public Service 
 RU/VH RU/H Doctoral MA BA 
State Appropriations 0.01 0.05** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
      
Tuition and Fee Revenues 0.03 0.09** -0.04 -0.00 0.06* 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
      
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts 0.20* 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.15 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12) 
      
Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises 0.14 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.01 
(0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) 
      
Other Sources of Operating Revenues -0.07* -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) 
      
Other Sources of Nonoperating Revenues 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant 0.92* 0.25*** -0.60*** -0.42*** -0.22 
 (0.46) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.17) 
      
Within R-Squared 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.23 
Between R-Squared 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.26 
Total R-Squared 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.26 
F-Statistic 3.48 3.98 1.75 5.08 2.08 
Observations 366 416 166 1478 343 
Groups 62 70 28 258 86 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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 When separating out by Carnegie classification, the results for instruction at very 
high research institutions are quite similar to those found by Leslie and colleagues (2012) 
for state appropriations and tuition.  In my results, a reduction of $1 in state 
appropriations for an institution were associated with a 41 cent reduction on instruction at 
very high research institutions while this was 32 cents in the former study (Leslie et al., 
2012).  Similarly, I found a relationship for tuition and instruction of a 45 cent increase in 
instruction per $1 increase in tuition and fee revenues.  Leslie et al. (2012) found this 
relationship to be 46 cents. 
In looking at all types of institutions, I found that federal operating grants and 
contracts are not significant in their relationship with instruction for any Carnegie 
classification except for bachelor’s granting institutions.  The coefficients for tuition are 
all larger than those for state appropriations across all classifications, possibly indicating 
the increased status of tuition as a revenue source and its impact on the largest expense 
item, instruction.  The coefficients on state appropriations are larger at research 
institutions and progressively decline for each subsequent Carnegie classification.  This 
indicates a larger decline to instruction for these types of institutions when state 
appropriations are cut, which may reflect the focus on instruction at BA granting 
institutions and their attempts to protect instruction from cuts while research institutions 
have a more diverse mission orientation and are more apt to cut instruction in lieu of 
other activities when support wanes.  However, the same is not true of tuition and fee 
revenues and their relationship to instruction.  High research institutions have the largest 
coefficient in their relationship with instructional expenses followed by BA granting 
institutions and institutions with very high research activity.   
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 In turning to research expenses, no revenue sources are significant for non-
research institutions.  However, for very high and high research institutions, federal 
operating grants and contracts are statistically significant, as are tuition and fee revenues.  
As federal operating grants and contracts increase by $1 for an institution, research 
expenses are associated with an increase of 65 cents.  For tuition and fee revenues, this 
relationship is smaller, at 34 cents.  Finally, state appropriations are significant for 
institutions with high research activity while other sources of operating revenues are 
significant for institutions with very high research activity.  These relationships show that 
research institutions rely on different sources of funds to support their research activities 
while non-research institutions simply do not partake in much research. 
 Finally, the expenses on public service expenses do not have a clear pattern.  
Institutions with very high research activity show a positive relationship with federal 
operating grants and contracts while those with high research activity and master’s 
granting institutions are associated with state appropriations.  In addition, high research 
activity institutions and bachelor’s granting institutions are positively associated with 
tuition.  Therefore, there does not appear to be a clear relationship between funding and 
expenses that is consistent across institutional type for public service, unlike the more 
clear patterns seen for instruction and research.  The results for public service also have 
much smaller coefficients than those for instruction or research.  For example, a $1 
increase in federal operating grants and contracts per FTE at a very high research 
institution is associated with a 65 cent increase in research expenses.  However, the same 
$1 increase is only associated with a 20 cent increase in public service expenses at these 
types of institution. 
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These results, in particular, indicate that while instruction is a consistent goal 
across all types of Carnegie classifications, and therefore shows similar patterns in the 
positive relationships with state appropriations and tuition, the same does not hold for 
research and public service.  In particular, the relationships between revenues and 
expenses on research and public service are not significant for institutions whose 
Carnegie classification does not focus on these types of activities.  Non-research 
institutions do not show any significant results for research expenditures.  For public 
service, there is no clear pattern across the different institutional types. 
By comparing to the results from Leslie et al. (2012), the results are fairly 
consistent, though there does appear to be some shifts because of the Great Recession.  In 
particular, the relationships for instruction are relatively the same with the exception of 
federal operating grants and contracts.  While Leslie et al. (2012) found a significant 
positive relationship between federal grants and expenses on instruction, there is no 
relationship in this data from 2005 to 2010.  For research, tuition in my model is 
statistically significant and has a much larger coefficient than that reported previously.  
However, grants are still the largest coefficient for research in both models.  Finally, 
every regressor in the previous analysis for public service was found to be statistically 
significant.  In my model, grants were positive and statistically significant while other 
sources of operating revenues was negative.  These differences could potentially be due 
to the much larger sample used by Leslie et al. in their analysis over 24 years and the 
long pattern before the Great Recession.  By restricting to 2005 to 2010, I am isolating 
the effects to a smaller timeframe, which changes the ability to fit the model over a long 
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period of time.  In addition, it looks at the time surrounding the Great Recession and the 
potential changes because of the economic downturn. 
In addition to these differences that can be seen in my sample from that conducted 
by Leslie et al. (2012) prior to the Great Recession, my inclusion of other types of 
institutions helps reveal how these relationships between expenses and revenues vary 
based on institutional type.  In addition, they provide a good context leading into the 
second question between expenses and outputs, especially in identifying the importance 
of tuition and state appropriations in instructional expenses. 
It should be noted that models with alternate function forms, including additional 
controls and squared regressors, can be found in the appendix.  The models presented 
above are consistent with those published previously (Leslie et al., 2012).  In one of these 
supplemental models, I include admissions rate as a control proxy for student quality 
(Archibald & Felaman, 2008b; Breu & Raab, 1994; Zhang, 2005).  Admissions rate was 
chosen as the control for student quality because it is commonly used in other research as 
a measure of quality and is highly correlated with both ACT scores and SAT scores.  
However, it is an improvement over standardized test scores because it is consistently 
reported while institutions and states vary greatly in their preference for different test 
scores.  This inclusion had no significant impact on the model results.  In another model, 
I also include student-faculty ratios, a classic proxy for student quality (Enarson, 1960; 
Glenny & Schmidtlein, 1983; Levin, 1991).  However, this data was only available for 
academic years 2008 to 2010, thereby limiting the number of observations and hurting 
the model fit.  In these models, many of the coefficients are suppressed or no longer 
significant.  Finally, I also used models with different functional forms including squared 
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terms for various revenue sources.  These slightly increase the within r-squared but cause 
the between r-squared and total r-squared values to fall.   
 
Expenses & Outputs 
 In the second research question, I seek to determine the relationships between 
expenses and outputs.  While the previous question could only be addressed with IPEDS 
data due to the limitations on revenue data, this question can be addressed at all three 
levels of analysis.  In IPEDS, I look at the relationships between expenses and outputs 
that include degree completions, retention rates, and graduation rates.  As stated 
previously, Rabovsky (2013) describes these as the most commonly used performance 
metrics by states.  In the school level data, I look at outputs that include degree 
completions, majors, and semester credit hours.  Semester credit hours are unique from 
degrees or majors in that they measure students that are not directly linked to the school.  
For example, an English department may have small counts for degrees attained and 
majors, but the semester credit hours would be much larger because of the general 
education requirements of non-English majors to take writing courses.  Finally, the 
departmental level data look at degree completions and majors due to the complexity in 
tying semester credit hours to a single department.   
These models use the same techniques as in the first analysis between revenues 
and expenses.  This primarily focuses on the use of multivariate regressions and fixed 
effects regressions.  Fixed effects regressions are somewhat limited in these models 
because of the short time frame, making changes over time more difficult to detect.  As 
with the other models, expenses per FTE are used to ensure that the variance inflation 
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factor on these models is less than 10.  This is to ensure that the models are parallel to the 
models used in the analysis on revenues and expenses.  I also used Hausman tests which 
confirmed that fixed effects models are preferred to random effects models and looked at 
future values to examine strict exogeneity.  Unlike the previous analysis, future values 
are less predictive of current outputs in the school and departmental samples and strict 
exogeneity is likely less of a problem, however results from the IPEDS level data again 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Institutional Level Expenses & Outputs 
The dependent variables in these analyses include degree completions, retention 
rates, and graduation rates.  For degree completions and retention rates, the years span 
from academic year 2005 to 2010.  For graduation rates, the years span from 2006 to 
2010.  The independent variables include the expenses per full-time equivalent student.  I 
first conducted bivariate regressions between each outcome and the individual expense 
items.  For BA degrees, only student services were significant, with a negative 
relationship in the production of BA degrees.  An increase of $1000 per FTE to student 
services at an institution was associated with a decrease of 38.95 BA degrees in the 
bivariate fixed effects regression, though only significant at the 10% level.  Once 
including controls for tuition and admissions rates, the coefficient became more negative, 
decreasing BA degrees by 62.58 per $1000 of additional expenses per FTE.  In looking at 
full-time retention rates, expenses on instruction and student services were negatively 
associated with retention rates in their individual regressions, but these relationships were 
no longer significant once including other types of expenses.  Finally, the bivariate 
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regressions for graduation rates showed no relationships with any of the major expense 
categories.   
I then conducted full institutional models which are presented in Table 6.6.  The 
first column in each regression includes only expense items while the second column 
includes additional controls for tuition and admissions rate.  These help to control for 
differences in the potential inputs for these institutions.  In these models, which include 
the full sample of institutions, few expenses are significant in the production of student 
outputs.  This is not surprising given the lack of relationships in the bivariate regressions.  
Instructional expenses, which would be hypothesized to be associated with degree, 
retention, and graduation outputs, are not significant in any model.  Similarly, academic 
support, another expense item that may impact these outputs, is not significant.  The only 
significant relationships for degree completions is with student service expenses, which 
operate in the opposite direction as would be hypothesized.  Rather than additional 
expenses on student services improving degree completion, they actually hurt both BA 
and MA degrees.  This negative relationship may be because of the student inputs, with 
lower achieving students utilizing more student services and negatively impacting 
graduation.  While the expenses on academics are not significant, these students may be 
spending more time on social activities and student services, which distract from 
academic endeavors and therefore hurt degree completion.  However, the same cannot be 
said about graduation rates.  In fact, the only significant relationship with graduation rates 
is with scholarships and fellowships, which have a negative relationship with four-year 
graduation rates but no significant relationship with six-year graduation rates.  This  
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Table 6.6 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Various Outputs and Expenses per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
 BA Degrees  MA Degrees 
      Instructional Expenses 7.40 9.75  3.56 4.39 
(8.99) (9.90)  (5.80) (5.50) 
Research Expenses 10.17 9.24  8.05 8.03 
(9.38) (8.62)  (6.44) (6.20) 
Auxiliary Expenses 2.89 -1.57  -1.30 -1.86 
(13.60) (15.81)  (7.10) (7.27) 
Academic Support 5.44 6.76  9.39 8.57 
(5.67) (5.62)  (6.20) (5.09) 
Institutional Support 4.87 9.14  -4.24 -6.66 
(12.15) (13.57)  (7.05) (7.26) 
Public Service -9.41 -17.35  0.86 0.06 
(12.60) (13.42)  (13.24) (14.36) 
Student Services -60.16* -90.45*  -47.03** -44.33** 
(29.48) (36.11)  (15.04) (16.12) 
Scholarship and Fellowships 1.90 5.71  9.15 11.03 
(14.62) (16.44)  (12.73) (14.76) 
Other Expenses 1.59 3.31  1.63 2.47 
(3.62) (3.88)  (3.56) (3.83) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  43.98**   12.56 
 (16.65)   (7.61) 
Admissions Rate  -0.35   0.14 
  (0.45)   (0.24) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 1938.21*** 1784.04***  603.50*** 538.46*** 
 (4.38) (109.65)  (2.57) (52.02) 
Within R-Squared 0.21 0.23  0.13 0.13 
Between R-Squared 0.18 0.16  0.28 0.33 
Total R-Squared 0.11 0.13  0.23 0.28 
F-Statistic 16.73 14.43  11.07 9.90 
Years 2005-2010 2005-2010  2005-2010 2005-2010 
Observations 2769 2522  2769 2522 
Groups 504 464  504 464 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 6.6 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Various Outputs and Expenses per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
  FT Retention Rate  
     Instructional Expenses  -0.25 -0.35  
 (0.23) (0.25)  
Research Expenses  0.08 0.08  
 (0.08) (0.07)  
Auxiliary Expenses  -0.27* -0.29*  
 (0.12) (0.12)  
Academic Support  0.09 0.14  
 (0.07) (0.08)  
Institutional Support  -0.88** -0.71**  
 (0.31) (0.22)  
Public Service  0.04 0.10  
 (0.12) (0.12)  
Student Services  -0.66 -0.60  
 (0.46) (0.49)  
Scholarship and Fellowships  -0.41 -0.32  
 (0.37) (0.37)  
Other Expenses  -0.03 0.02  
 (0.09) (0.07)  
Published In-State Tuition and Fees   -0.13  
  (0.15)  
Admissions Rate   -0.04*  
   (0.01)  
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES  
Constant  73.03*** 77.67***  
  (0.15) (1.42)  
Within R-Squared  0.07 0.08  
Between R-Squared  0.10 0.13  
Total R-Squared  0.05 0.08  
F-Statistic  8.64 10.97  
Years  2005-2010 2005-2010  
Observations  2736 2519  
Groups  497 461  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.6 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Various Outputs and Expenses per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
   4-Year Graduation Rate  6-Year Graduation Rate 
        Instructional Expenses   0.13 0.12  -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.12) (0.11) 
Research Expenses   0.18 0.16  0.16 0.14 
  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.13) (0.13) 
Auxiliary Expenses   0.10 0.11  0.06 0.08 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.16) 
Academic Support   0.02 0.04  0.02 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) 
Institutional Support   0.27 0.27  -0.05 -0.06 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.19) (0.20) 
Public Service   0.16 0.16  0.13 0.14 
  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.20) (0.20) 
Student Services   -0.29 -0.34  0.27 0.15 
  (0.41) (0.42)  (0.43) (0.43) 
Scholarship and Fellowships   -0.90* -0.90*  -0.48 -0.46 
  (0.37) (0.36)  (0.39) (0.38) 
Other Expenses   0.01 0.01  -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees    0.25   0.40* 
   (0.16)   (0.19) 
Admissions Rate    0.01   0.03** 
    (0.01)    (0.01) 
Year Fixed Effects   YES YES  YES YES 
Constant   24.02*** 21.86***  47.77*** 43.41*** 
   (0.10) (1.30)  (0.10) (1.39) 
Within R-Squared   0.09 0.09  0.07 0.08 
Between R-Squared   0.22 0.31  0.19 0.29 
Total R-Squared   0.20 0.28  0.16 0.25 
F-Statistic   8.00 7.06  6.08 6.23 
Years   2006-2010 2006-2010  2006-2010 2006-2010 
Observations   2073 2073  2073 2073 
Groups   452 452  452 452 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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suggests that additional expenses on scholarships and fellowships may be associated with 
students staying on campus longer because of the reduced cost of attendance.
 However, these results include all types of institutions and could exhibit 
differential patterns by Carnegie classification.  In the following tables, I present the 
results by Carnegie classification while focusing on BA degree completion, full-time 
retention rates, and 6-year graduation rates.  Table 6.7 presents the results focusing on 
bachelor’s degree completion.  While the full sample in Table 6.6 showed only a negative 
relationship with expenses on student services, separating out by Carnegie classification 
shows no relationship for this variable.  Instructional expenses show mixed relationships.  
While there is a positive relationship at institutions with high research activity, there is a 
negative relationship at the lower tiered institutions.  In essence, high research 
institutions, with large enrollments and instructional expenses show a positive 
relationship while the other institutions may be operating at a less than optimal scale, 
with more expenditures on instruction than needed in order to produce degrees.  This 
relationship will be further explored in the measures of technical efficiency that follow in 
the stochastic frontier and data envelopment models. 
For academic support, there is a positive relationship between spending and 
degree completions at BA granting institutions.  For every $1000 in additional expenses 
on academic support per FTE at an institution, BA degrees completed are expected to 
increase by 30 to 35 at BA granting institutions.  This could be indicative of academic 
support programs that help students with their studies and help them to finish their 
degree.  However, this is only seen for BA granting institutions.  The finding is not robust 
across the different types of institutions.  Finally, expenses on public service has a   
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Table 6.7 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, BA Degrees by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per FTE  
for AY2005-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 RU/VH  RU/H 
      Instructional Expenses 7.28 16.42  60.60* 62.70* 
(21.19) (27.39)  (26.33) (25.83) 
      
Research Expenses -5.62 -9.66  -32.67 -31.27 
 (16.71) (19.35)  (23.25) (22.48) 
      
Auxiliary Expenses -30.86 -28.91  -71.26* -62.07 
 (45.67) (45.73)  (33.28) (31.49) 
      
Academic Support -2.61 1.96  -35.42 -69.82 
 (3.55) (7.65)  (78.31) (74.95) 
      
Institutional Support -23.98 -22.27  1.40 9.13 
(41.96) (44.07)  (45.41) (49.69) 
      
Public Service -47.74* -47.98*  -168.05** -160.08* 
 (21.97) (21.76)  (63.07) (62.00) 
      
Student Services 34.79 -79.03  -70.57 -111.52 
 (88.53) (198.46)  (69.58) (60.82) 
      
Scholarships & Fellowships 104.02 95.51  86.07 93.77 
(94.11) (91.60)  (62.79) (62.49) 
      
Other Expenses 2.97 6.37  -10.82 7.89 
 (12.19) (15.13)  (30.62) (32.58) 
      
Published In-State Tuition & Fees  40.40   36.64* 
 (82.67)   (16.95) 
      
Admissions Rate  0.46   -0.54 
  (2.84)   (1.24) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
      
Constant 5003.70*** 4684.34***  2684.56*** 2507.70*** 
 (194.83) (700.44)  (48.66) (162.37) 
      
Within R-Squared 0.33 0.34  0.33 0.38 
Between R-Squared 0.02 0.11  0.00 0.01 
Total R-Squared 0.03 0.09  0.01 0.01 
F-Statistic 9.82 8.80  3.77 3.69 
Observations 366 361  416 388 
Groups 62 61  70 66 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, BA Degrees by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per FTE  
for AY2005-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 Doctoral 
   Instructional Expenses -36.84* -36.64 
(17.08) (24.13) 
   
Research Expenses 11.37 17.77 
 (44.22) (53.14) 
   
Auxiliary Expenses 49.75 46.73 
 (36.71) (39.91) 
   
Academic Support -27.61 -48.35 
 (42.71) (52.41) 
   
Institutional Support 30.65 50.52 
(38.28) (57.43) 
   
Public Service 5.77 -2.49 
 (70.41) (84.86) 
   
Student Services 65.45 72.85 
 (57.62) (80.78) 
   
Scholarships & Fellowships -59.10 -66.08 
(49.76) (62.43) 
   
Other Expenses -16.68 -18.39 
 (15.83) (18.16) 
   
Published In-State Tuition & Fees  -22.25 
 (34.52) 
   
Admissions Rate  -0.45 
  (0.91) 
   
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
   
Constant 1877.87*** 2109.08*** 
 (51.68) (209.89) 
   
Within R-Squared 0.38 0.39 
Between R-Squared 0.14 0.04 
Total R-Squared 0.13 0.04 
F-Statistic 3.07 2.97 
Observations 166 151 
Groups 28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.7 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, BA Degrees by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per FTE  
for AY2005-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 Master's  Bachelor's 
      Instructional Expenses -16.66* -17.19*  -8.88 -8.91* 
(7.29) (8.61)  (5.01) (4.18) 
      
Research Expenses -1.82 -0.35  8.75 16.02 
 (3.21) (3.74)  (15.04) (16.50) 
      
Auxiliary Expenses 2.91 1.70  -10.85* -10.08 
 (8.82) (10.10)  (4.64) (5.66) 
      
Academic Support 10.74 13.44  35.53* 30.28* 
 (16.70) (18.98)  (13.62) (11.52) 
      
Institutional Support 15.12 20.49  -12.60* -10.32 
(12.43) (13.97)  (6.11) (6.53) 
      
Public Service -13.51 -21.01  5.42 -14.10 
 (15.25) (19.19)  (9.75) (22.36) 
      
Student Services 20.82 12.32  -11.91 12.10 
 (23.32) (25.48)  (19.77) (17.56) 
      
Scholarships & Fellowships 9.22 12.98  39.31 11.24 
(13.06) (15.27)  (22.86) (14.29) 
      
Other Expenses -0.55 1.66  1.05 -4.98 
 (3.73) (4.40)  (6.31) (4.21) 
      
Published In-State Tuition & Fees  25.40   -11.47 
 (15.55)   (9.55) 
      
Admissions Rate  -0.37   -0.01 
  (0.52)   (0.34) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
      
Constant 1386.67*** 1319.34***  452.27*** 512.89*** 
 (14.39) (99.18)  (35.57) (84.88) 
      
Within R-Squared 0.26 0.27  0.28 0.26 
Between R-Squared 0.01 0.01  0.04 0.01 
Total R-Squared 0.00 0.00  0.03 0.00 
F-Statistic 11.22 9.73  3.71 3.42 
Observations 1478 1355  343 267 
Groups 258 240  86 69 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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negative relationship with degree completion at research institutions.  This could largely 
be due to the nature of the relationship of these institutions with the state as flagship and 
public serving institutions.  Expenses on public service could therefore distract these 
institutions from producing degrees since the focus may have shifted to a public service 
mission of the institution rather than the educational goals. 
 In looking at full-time retention rates, Table 6.6 showed negative relationships 
between auxiliary expenses and institutional support on retention rates.  Once broken 
down by Carnegie classification, as is shown in Table 6.8, the negative relationship with 
auxiliary expenses only holds for institutions with very high research activity.  For 
institutional support, it manifests with institutions with high research activity and BA 
granting institutions.  Academic support and scholarships are also found to be significant 
in these subgroup analyses.  For academic support, positive relationships with retention 
rates emerge for institutions with very high research activity and doctoral granting 
institutions, but only in the simple models before controls for tuition and admissions rates 
were included.  Once controlling for these proxies for student inputs, the relationships are 
no longer statistically significant.  This suggests that academic support may not actually 
improve retention rates once controlling for the quality of the student body.  Scholarships 
and fellowships, on the other hand, are significant in both models at BA granting degrees 
but negative.  An additional $1000 per FTE spent on scholarships and fellowships 
actually reduces the full-time retention rate by 1.2 to 1.7 percentage points at a given 
institution.  This counterintuitive finding only holds for these types of institutions and 
again may be reflective of the student body.  In particular, BA granting institutions may   
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Table 6.8 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, FT Retention Rate by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per FTE 
for AY2005-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 RU/VH  RU/H  Doctoral 
         Instructional Expenses -0.15 -0.16  -1.17 -1.36  -0.30 -0.85 
 
(0.10) (0.10)  (0.87) (0.89)  (1.40) (1.34) 
   
 
  
 
  
Research Expenses -0.06 -0.04  0.18 0.14  2.82 3.10 
 
(0.09) (0.08)  (0.42) (0.42)  (1.77) (2.15) 
   
 
  
 
  
Auxiliary Expenses -0.31** -0.31**  -0.31 -0.32  -0.46 -1.04 
 
(0.10) (0.09)  (0.37) (0.40)  (0.66) (0.64) 
   
 
  
 
  
Academic Support 0.06* 0.05  0.40 0.75  2.29* 1.95 
 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.69) (0.63)  (0.99) (0.96) 
   
 
  
 
  
Institutional Support -0.18 -0.17  -1.69* -1.51  -0.84 -1.17 
 
(0.15) (0.15)  (0.83) (0.84)  (0.79) (1.51) 
   
 
  
 
  
Public Service 0.09 0.09  0.62 0.73  2.00 1.68 
 
(0.08) (0.08)  (0.61) (0.67)  (1.61) (1.67) 
   
 
  
 
  
Student Services 0.51 0.54  -2.83 -3.09  1.97 1.46 
 
(0.39) (0.40)  (1.65) (1.71)  (3.55) (3.74) 
   
 
  
 
  
Scholarships & Fellowships 
0.32 0.33  -0.64 -0.73  0.55 0.99 
(0.27) (0.28)  (1.42) (1.38)  (0.54) (0.96) 
   
 
  
 
  
Other Expenses -0.06 -0.07  -0.43 -0.04  -0.71 -0.81 
 
(0.06) (0.06)  (0.63) (0.34)  (0.54) (0.69) 
   
 
  
 
  
Published In-State Tuition & 
  Fees 
 
-0.13  
 
0.14  
 
-0.60 
 
(0.20)  
 
(0.17)  
 
(1.18) 
   
 
  
 
  
Admissions Rate 
 
0.00  
 
-0.01  
 
-0.01 
  
(0.03)  
 
(0.02)  
 
(0.03) 
   
 
  
 
  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
   
 
  
 
  
Constant 87.21*** 88.11***  76.70*** 77.29***  74.83*** 79.75*** 
 
(0.70) (2.30)  (0.84) (2.10)  (2.94) (10.74) 
   
 
  
 
  
Within R-Squared 0.30 0.30  0.24 0.30  0.13 0.13 
Between R-Squared 0.26 0.29  0.06 0.04  0.05 0.09 
Total R-Squared 0.13 0.16  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
F-Statistic 12.18 11.61  3.35 3.08  13.22 5.75 
Observations 361 361  416 388  166 151 
Groups 61 61  70 66  28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.8 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, FT Retention Rate by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per FTE 
for AY2005-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 Master's  Bachelor's 
      Instructional Expenses -0.03 -0.11  -0.82 -0.96 
 
(0.19) (0.18)  (0.61) (0.65) 
   
 
  
Research Expenses 0.07 0.15  0.97 -0.36 
 
(0.10) (0.08)  (1.45) (2.28) 
   
 
  
Auxiliary Expenses -0.33 -0.36  -0.09 0.12 
 
(0.22) (0.23)  (0.44) (0.53) 
   
 
  
Academic Support 0.18 0.67  -0.86 -0.41 
 
(0.57) (0.47)  (0.91) (0.90) 
   
 
  
Institutional Support -0.90 -0.62  -1.57** -1.66** 
 
(0.61) (0.32)  (0.57) (0.54) 
   
 
  
Public Service -0.17 -0.14  -0.31 0.24 
 
(0.42) (0.44)  (0.61) (1.66) 
   
 
  
Student Services -0.59 -0.56  2.40 3.26 
 
(0.69) (0.71)  (1.48) (1.69) 
   
 
  
Scholarships & Fellowships 
-0.25 0.22  -1.20* -1.68** 
(0.46) (0.35)  (0.52) (0.57) 
   
 
  
Other Expenses 0.02 0.14  -0.45 -0.69 
 
(0.14) (0.11)  (0.31) (0.35) 
   
 
  
Published In-State Tuition & 
  Fees 
 
-0.26  
 
-1.12 
 
(0.27)  
 
(1.05) 
   
 
  
Admissions Rate 
 
-0.05*  
 
-0.05 
  
(0.02)  
 
(0.03) 
   
 
  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
   
 
  
Constant 70.84*** 77.29***  65.46*** 75.35*** 
 
(0.42) (2.12)  (2.90) (7.22) 
   
 
  
Within R-Squared 0.06 0.08  0.11 0.15 
Between R-Squared 0.00 0.01  0.19 0.22 
Total R-Squared 0.00 0.00  0.09 0.10 
F-Statistic 5.27 7.85  4.22 4.87 
Observations 1450 1352  343 267 
Groups 252 237  86 69 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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be forced to spend more on scholarships and fellowships to attract students, but these 
students may not actually want to stay at this institution and end up leaving, despite the 
initial financial incentive. 
 In the final subgroup analysis, Table 6.9 focuses on 6-year graduation rates.  In 
the full sample, expenses were not significant at all, only the controls were significant.  
Indeed, only institutions with very high research activity and doctoral granting 
institutions showed statistically significant relationships between expenses and 
graduation rates.  At very high research institutions, a $1000 increase in academic 
support per FTE was associated with a 0.11 percentage point increase in 6-year 
graduation rates.  In practical terms, this is an incredibly small finding.  These types of 
institutions average 6-year graduation rates of nearly 67% with a standard deviation of 
nearly 14%.  This marginal improvement is likely not worth the added expense.  Indeed, 
the relative lack of variation in graduation rates, coupled with the small coefficients, 
indicate that, in general, these relationships are very weak.  For doctoral granting 
institutions, relationships emerge for research expenses per FTE and public service per 
FTE once controlling for tuition and admissions rates.  An additional $1000 in research 
expenses per FTE are associated with a decrease to graduation rates of roughly 2.3 
percentage points.  This result could indicate that many doctoral granting institutions are 
trying to shift into a higher Carnegie classification that involves research.  This would be 
consistent with the proposition by Morphew and Baker (2004) that institutions are trying 
to move into higher classifications and exhibit spending patterns that reflect those of the 
classification they are trying to move into.  Therefore, as doctoral institutions, the number   
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Table 6.9 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, 6-Year Graduation Rate by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per 
FTE for AY2006-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 RU/VH  RU/H  Doctoral 
         Instructional Expenses 0.04 0.04  -0.13 -0.14  -0.48 -0.31 
 
(0.17) (0.17)  (0.27) (0.27)  (0.40) (0.47) 
   
 
  
 
  
Research Expenses -0.06 -0.05  0.03 0.06  -2.32** -2.31** 
 
(0.14) (0.14)  (0.34) (0.34)  (0.77) (0.78) 
   
 
  
 
  
Auxiliary Expenses 0.22 0.21  0.48 0.53  0.87 1.05 
 
(0.15) (0.15)  (0.39) (0.40)  (0.68) (0.68) 
   
 
  
 
  
Academic Support 0.11* 0.11*  -0.76 -0.73  -1.56 -1.51 
 
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.65) (0.66)  (1.39) (1.48) 
   
 
  
 
  
Institutional Support 0.37 0.35  -0.41 -0.54  0.27 0.27 
 
(0.24) (0.25)  (0.46) (0.46)  (0.95) (1.08) 
   
 
  
 
  
Public Service -0.06 -0.06  0.80 0.90  5.47 6.95* 
 
(0.17) (0.17)  (0.85) (0.81)  (3.35) (3.27) 
   
 
  
 
  
Student Services -1.01 -0.99  0.19 -0.00  0.89 0.46 
 
(1.03) (1.02)  (0.65) (0.70)  (3.01) (2.85) 
   
 
  
 
  
Scholarships & Fellowships 
-0.14 -0.16  0.28 0.31  -0.14 -0.31 
(0.59) (0.60)  (0.71) (0.71)  (1.29) (1.38) 
   
 
  
 
  
Other Expenses 0.06 0.06  -0.07 -0.05  -0.19 -0.13 
 
(0.09) (0.09)  (0.26) (0.23)  (0.44) (0.43) 
   
 
  
 
  
Published In-State Tuition & 
  Fees 
 
-0.05  
 
0.19*  
 
0.45 
 
(0.32)  
 
(0.09)  
 
(0.84) 
   
 
  
 
  
Admissions Rate 
 
0.03  
 
0.03  
 
0.06* 
  
(0.03)  
 
(0.02)  
 
(0.03) 
   
 
  
 
  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
   
 
  
 
  
Constant 63.40*** 62.10***  50.93*** 47.27***  44.69*** 38.46*** 
 
(0.98) (3.02)  (0.73) (1.56)  (1.86) (6.28) 
   
 
  
 
  
Within R-Squared 0.44 0.44  0.15 0.16  0.31 0.36 
Between R-Squared 0.08 0.01  0.07 0.12  0.00 0.00 
Total R-Squared 0.07 0.02  0.07 0.12  0.00 0.01 
F-Statistic 16.44 14.08  2.61 2.93  13.65 27.99 
Observations 300 300  325 325  122 122 
Groups 61 61  66 66  28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.9 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, 6-Year Graduation Rate by Carnegie Classification and Expenses per 
FTE  for AY2006-2010 (in Thousands) 
 
 Master's  Bachelor's 
      Instructional Expenses 0.22 0.19  -0.80 -0.61 
 
(0.20) (0.20)  (0.63) (0.72) 
   
 
  
Research Expenses 0.03 0.10  -0.80 -0.63 
 
(0.37) (0.40)  (1.28) (1.49) 
   
 
  
Auxiliary Expenses -0.23 -0.21  -0.74 -0.70 
 
(0.33) (0.33)  (0.62) (0.60) 
   
 
  
Academic Support 0.16 0.22  1.28 1.16 
 
(0.60) (0.59)  (0.74) (0.72) 
   
 
  
Institutional Support -0.38 -0.27  0.05 0.06 
 
(0.36) (0.37)  (0.54) (0.54) 
   
 
  
Public Service -0.47 -0.42  1.19 1.56 
 
(0.52) (0.54)  (1.93) (1.89) 
   
 
  
Student Services 0.59 0.38  1.42 0.89 
 
(0.61) (0.62)  (1.97) (2.02) 
   
 
  
Scholarship and Fellowships 
-0.67 -0.78  -0.07 -0.06 
(0.65) (0.61)  (0.72) (0.70) 
   
 
  
Other Expenses -0.06 -0.08  0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.11) (0.10)  (0.41) (0.45) 
   
 
  
Published In-State Tuition and 
  Fees 
 
1.18**  
 
-0.26 
 
(0.44)  
 
(1.12) 
   
 
  
Admissions Rate 
 
0.01  
 
0.04 
  
(0.01)  
 
(0.04) 
   
 
  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
   
 
  
Constant 44.69*** 36.78***  36.28*** 36.11*** 
 
(0.75) (2.79)  (2.60) (7.03) 
   
 
  
Within R-Squared 0.06 0.08  0.10 0.11 
Between R-Squared 0.03 0.20  0.24 0.42 
Total R-Squared 0.03 0.19  0.20 0.35 
F-Statistic 3.08 3.54  1.60 1.47 
Observations 1112 1112  214 214 
Groups 235 235  62 62 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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of which is quite small, spend more on research, they may be shifting their focus away 
from the instruction of students to more research based activities.  While research has a 
negative relationship with graduation, public service has a positive relationship.  An 
increase of $1000 per FTE on public service is associated with increases in graduation 
rates of 6.95 percentage points, holding all else constant including tuition and admissions.
 The results from these analyses are somewhat discouraging given the general lack 
of a relationship between expenses and outputs within institutions over time.  When 
looking cross-sectionally, there are strong relationships between expenses and outputs, 
however, the problem with a cross-sectional approach is that it compares between 
institutions rather than within institution.  In essence, a positive relationship between 
expenses and outcomes simply means that institutions that spend more on instruction are 
associated with more outputs.  However, even many of the cross-sectional relationships 
disappear once disaggregating by Carnegie classification.  Furthermore, the introduction 
of institutional and year fixed effects reveals that increasing or decreasing expenses 
within an institution typically does not affect outputs.  This is likely because of two 
reasons.  First, expenses do not tend to vary greatly from year to year.  While there is a 
lot of cross-institutional variation in expenses, variation within an institution from year to 
year is relatively small, especially once adjusting for inflation.  For example, in the year 
prior to academic year 2010, instruction at very high research institutions fell by 0.4%, 
research expenses rose by 2.2%, and public service rose by 2.0%.  During the full span 
between 2005 and 2010, there was a 17.7% increase on instruction within very high 
research institutions, a 21.9% increase in expense on research, and 25% increase in public 
service.  This illustrates the incremental nature of budgeting in that expenses only change 
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by small amounts each year.  The second reason for the potential lack of relationships is 
similar in that there is little annual variation in outputs within institutions, particularly 
retention and graduation rates.  For example, there was roughly a 4% increase in the 
number of BA degrees awarded at research institutions between AY2009 and AY2010 
but the increase in graduation rates was only 0.7%.  Again, these are quite small figures 
given that they produce nearly 5000 BA degrees per year on average and report 6-year 
graduation rates of 67%. 
These incremental changes suggest that institutions may be operating at a 
threshold.  In essence, there may be an optimal mix between expenses and outputs.  This 
would echo the findings of Powell, Gilleland, and Pearson (2012) that there is an optimal 
spending level and straying from this optimal point could harm efficiency despite 
marginal gains to output measures.  Rather than thinking of a direct linear relationship 
between expenses and output, increases in annual expenses may simply because of the 
increasing costs of operation (Ehrenberg, 2002a).  In particular, expenses on instruction 
and expenses on research increase because of previously identified forces such as cost 
disease, growth force, the academic ratchet, or the academic lattice (Massy, 1996; Massy 
& Wilger, 1992; Zemsky & Massy, 1990).  Rather than expenses producing additional 
outputs, they simply are a reflection of the cost of doing business.  As stated, spending 
more per year may not actually greatly impact outputs but could, instead, make an 
institution less efficient.  This hypothesis will be tested using the frontier models that 
follow in the later sections of this chapter.  However, the above models suggest that 
spending more on most institutional expenses is not likely to lead to improved student 
outputs. 
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School Level Expenses & Outputs 
 While no clear, consistent patterns emerged for institutions, the question remains 
as to whether schools or departments have a direct relationship between how they spend 
their money and the student outputs they are producing.  For example, focusing strictly 
on academic departments cuts out the overhead and other expenditures that might be 
negatively impacting institutional outputs.  At the school level, the faculty and staff 
directly involved in the instruction of their program might produce different results.  
 Cross-sectionally, schools with larger expenses on administrative salaries, wages, 
TA salaries, and miscellaneous expenses are associated with greater outputs on semester 
credit hours, majors, and degrees awarded.  Faculty salaries per FTE are not significant in 
any of the models with the exception of BA majors, where an increase in faculty salaries 
of $1000 per FTE was associated with a decrease of roughly 34 undergraduate majors.  
However, this association diminished once controlling for TA salaries, tuition, and 
admissions rates. 
 These cross-sectional results for academic year 2010 reveal that administrative 
salaries are positively associated with semester credit hours, majors, and degrees, but this 
association fades once including controls for TA salaries, tuition, and admissions rates.  
For wages, the relationships are slightly more robust, with significant results across both 
models for BA degrees, BA semester credit hours, and total semester credit hours.  In the 
other models for total degrees and majors, the significance again fades once including TA 
salary and controls for tuition and admissions rates.  In essence, a $1000 increase in 
wages is associated with an additional 140 total semester credit hours once controlling for 
other expenses and controls, most of which is due to the 135 increase in semester credit   
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Table 6.10 
 
School Level Outputs and Expenses (in Thousands) 
 
 BA Degrees  Total Degrees 
          Average Faculty Salary per FTE -3.36 -1.32 -0.45 -0.34  -1.97 -0.71 -0.33 -0.31 
(1.81) (2.20) (0.47) (0.50)  (2.17) (2.68) (0.69) (0.71) 
Average Classified Salary per FTE 2.56 -3.03 -2.15 -0.82  -4.50 -9.87 -2.19 -0.26 
(7.33) (8.59) (1.80) (1.50)  (8.77) (10.49) (2.01) (1.85) 
Travel Expenses 1.35 1.76 -1.14 -0.54  0.11 0.83 -1.12 -0.74 
(1.26) (1.69) (0.75) (0.99)  (1.50) (2.06) (0.88) (1.00) 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.11 0.07 -0.09 -0.09  0.20* 0.18* 0.01 0.00 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) 
Administration Salary 0.33** -0.02 -0.11 -0.08  0.55*** 0.25 -0.11 -0.07 
(0.11) (0.23) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.28) (0.10) (0.10) 
Wages 0.99** 0.83* -0.04 -0.01  0.80* 0.78 -0.07 -0.03 
(0.33) (0.36) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.39) (0.44) (0.06) (0.09) 
TA Salary  0.13  0.07*   0.09  0.08* 
 (0.07)  (0.03)   (0.08)  (0.03) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  54.88  24.34   73.54  53.45 
 (56.49)  (29.47)   (69.02)  (36.53) 
Admissions Rate  3.53  2.69   2.36  4.56 
 (3.68)  (2.20)   (4.50)  (2.87) 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Constant 298.41 -183.13 728.13*** 230.94  531.74 24.08 886.65*** 42.49 
(260.18) (603.45) (169.55) (233.02)  (311.16) (737.33) (197.62) (381.34) 
Within R-Squared   0.13 0.20    0.14 0.21 
Between R-Squared   0.35 0.15    0.40 0.38 
Total R-Squared 0.53 0.57 0.32 0.15  0.59 0.60 0.30 0.36 
F-Statistic 9.75 6.53 1.23 141.46  12.39 7.59 2.15 29.96 
Academic Years 2010 2010 2008-2010 2008-2010  2010 2010 2008-2010 2008-2010 
Observations 58 55 170 161  58 55 170 161 
Groups 58 55 59 56  58 55 59 56 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.10 (Continued) 
 
School Level Outputs and Expenses (in Thousands)  
 
 BA Majors  Total Majors 
          Average Faculty Salary per FTE -33.71* -10.84 -1.10 -1.19  -29.46 -6.58 -2.39 -2.69 
(16.42) (19.16) (6.26) (6.15)  (18.17) (21.79) (7.27) (7.00) 
Average Classified Salary per FTE -32.90 -64.77 -24.17 -9.07  -62.95 -103.34 -28.01 -7.25 
(66.43) (74.95) (16.05) (10.38)  (73.49) (85.22) (19.05) (12.38) 
Travel Expenses 12.28 15.63 -11.03 -3.21  6.44 10.99 -14.55 -3.90 
(11.38) (14.74) (7.81) (5.93)  (12.59) (16.76) (10.07) (6.73) 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.56 0.26 0.06 0.18  0.65 0.33 0.08 0.25 
(0.59) (0.62) (0.17) (0.19)  (0.66) (0.70) (0.17) (0.20) 
Administration Salary 3.68*** 0.60 -0.61 -0.42  5.41*** 2.09 -0.10 0.20 
(0.95) (1.99) (0.73) (0.66)  (1.05) (2.27) (0.83) (0.74) 
Wages 8.16** 5.30 0.39 0.72  7.59* 5.10 0.08 0.56 
(2.98) (3.16) (0.95) (0.97)  (3.29) (3.60) (1.06) (1.08) 
TA Salary  1.41*  0.78***   1.42*  1.11*** 
 (0.60)  (0.19)   (0.69)  (0.21) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  241.28  -122.85   367.94  27.54 
 (493.12)  (203.31)   (560.72)  (223.04) 
Admissions Rate  53.64  19.15   49.79  25.54 
 (32.12)  (13.52)   (36.52)  (15.51) 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Constant 5752.09* 766.08 6493.70*** 4632.93*  7117.77** 1819.30 8043.79*** 4076.66 
(2358.01) (5268.16) (1188.25) (1882.65)  (2608.48) (5990.32) (1415.77) (2260.87) 
Within R-Squared   0.17 0.21    0.20 0.26 
Between R-Squared   0.28 0.51    0.14 0.59 
Total R-Squared 0.54 0.61 0.20 0.50  0.60 0.64 0.07 0.58 
F-Statistic 10.12 7.77 2.84 11.10  12.92 8.85 4.00 13.78 
Academic Years 2010 2010 2008-2011 2008-2011  2010 2010 2008-2011 2008-2011 
Observations 58 55 228 215  58 55 228 215 
Groups 58 55 61 56  58 55 61 56 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.10 (Continued) 
 
School Level Outputs and Expenses (in Thousands) 
 
 BA SCH  Total SCH 
          Average Faculty Salary per FTE -0.83 -0.68 0.00 0.12  -0.87 -0.78 0.03 0.18 
(0.83) (0.83) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.81) (0.83) (0.11) (0.10) 
Average Classified Salary per FTE -15.31 -20.11 -1.78 -0.63  -16.57 -21.83* -1.99 -0.54 
(10.38) (10.82) (1.02) (0.64)  (10.16) (10.72) (1.13) (0.71) 
Travel Expenses 1.85 2.03 0.23 0.56  1.53 1.77 0.09 0.49 
(1.92) (2.47) (0.38) (0.33)  (1.87) (2.45) (0.50) (0.39) 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.01  0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) 
Administration Salary 0.50** -0.15 0.03 0.04  0.64*** 0.02 0.05 0.07 
(0.16) (0.29) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.15) (0.29) (0.06) (0.05) 
Wages 1.80*** 1.35* -0.07 -0.04  1.79*** 1.40** -0.08 -0.04 
(0.50) (0.52) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.49) (0.52) (0.07) (0.05) 
TA Salary  0.29**  0.05*   0.27**  0.07** 
 (0.08)  (0.03)   (0.08)  (0.02) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  64.57  -22.76   64.74  -13.87 
 (80.79)  (18.27)   (80.04)  (19.22) 
Admissions Rate  6.28  2.35   5.23  2.81* 
 (5.31)  (1.24)   (5.26)  (1.28) 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Constant 712.57 318.38 658.11*** 592.31**  792.91* 474.55 755.21*** 565.32** 
(382.16) (885.52) (58.10) (208.54)  (373.79) (877.35) (66.08) (200.87) 
Within R-Squared   0.21 0.30    0.28 0.37 
Between R-Squared   0.02 0.44    0.19 0.53 
Total R-Squared 0.54 0.63 0.01 0.43  0.61 0.68 0.10 0.53 
F-Statistic 10.00 8.03 1.86 2.49  13.63 9.93 3.12 3.50 
Academic Years 2010 2010 2008-2011 2008-2011  2010 2010 2008-2011 2008-2011 
Observations 59 53 231 209  59 53 231 209 
Groups 59 53 62 55  59 53 62 55 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
Note: Semester Credit Hours measured in 100s.  
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hours.  For BA degrees, the increase of $1000 in wages is associated with a 0.8 increase 
in degrees offered.  The magnitudes of these could be even larger given a range of 
expenditures on wages up to $3,621,658.  Again, these are only cross-sectional results 
and therefore only compare expenses and outputs between schools for a given year.  This 
means that a school that spends $1,000,000 more on wages would be associated with 
135,000 more undergraduate semester credit hours and 830 degrees, both of which are 
realistic given maximum values of these variables of 379,600 and 3,036 respectively. 
However, the cross-sectional model only compares across schools rather than 
looking at changes within schools.  Therefore, fixed effects are again the preferred model, 
though limited by the narrow time frames.  These data, from the UT-System and Texas 
Higher Education Coordinating Board, span 2008 to 2010 for degrees offered and also 
include 2011 data for majors and semester credit hours.  Again, the lack of variation 
between years and the shorter timespan threaten the identification of significant results.  
Indeed, the only significant results for the fixed effects regressions in Table 6.10 were 
those with TA salary, which were positive and significant in every model on the various 
outputs.  In addition, the admissions rate was significant in the full model on total 
semester credit hours offered.  Here, increasing the total amount paid to teaching 
assistants by $1000 is associated with roughly 0.08 more total degrees and 0.07 BA 
degrees.  Similarly, it is associated with 0.78 more undergraduate majors and an increase 
of 1.11 total majors.  Semester credit hours are also expected to increase by roughly 5 BA 
credit hours and 7 total semester credit hours.  Again, practical terms can be employed 
where TA salaries were seen to increase from year to year by over $1000 in 71 instances, 
over $10,000 in 47 instances, and over $100,000 in 25 instances.  Therefore, schools 
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which are able to increase their TA salaries by over $10,000, which are primarily schools 
of sciences and schools of engineering, are likely to see their outputs improve by roughly 
1 undergraduate degree, 8 undergraduate majors, and 50 undergraduate credit hours. 
 Yet, here again, the issue of simultaneity arises.  In institutional models, revenues 
are known before expenses can be allocated.  While revenues have historically been 
allocated based on enrollments and are increasingly becoming based on performance, 
institutions are able to internally budget their general funds as they desire.  At the school 
level, and later the departmental level, the regressors may not be the best mechanisms of 
production.  For example, while TA salaries were significantly related to degrees, majors, 
and semester credit hours, it could be argued that increasing TA salaries does not create 
these outputs.  Rather, an increase in student demand could explain why more money is 
needed for teaching assistants.  In essence, teaching assistants are able to teach classes, 
thereby increasing semester credit hours and helping students major and graduate in their 
field, but the students themselves could be driving this relationship, not the administrators 
of the department.  To examine this, I progressively move majors and semester credit 
hours to the right hand side of the equations.  First, an increased number of semester 
credit hours would be associated with more majors and, ultimately, more degrees offered.  
Once including these as regressors, the relationships for the expense variables change.  
This can be seen in Table 6.11. 
In these models, semester credit hours were not significant in any model once 
controlling for the number of majors.  Therefore, it was excluded from the model.  The 
number of majors is the primary variable of interest, with a coefficient equating to 
roughly 1.0 to 1.4 additional degrees for every 10 additional majors across every   
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Table 6.11 
 
School Level Outputs and Expenses (in Thousands) after Controlling for Majors 
 
 BA Degrees  Total Degrees 
          Average Faculty Salary per FTE -0.04 -0.18 -0.28 -0.15  1.07 0.02 -0.22 -0.15 
(0.86) (0.89) (0.37) (0.38)  (1.13) (1.17) (0.47) (0.50) 
Average Classified Salary per FTE 5.80 3.77 -0.18 -0.14  2.00 1.61 0.25 0.11 
(3.36) (3.51) (0.65) (0.61)  (4.47) (4.66) (1.03) (0.94) 
Travel Expenses 0.15 0.12 0.58* 0.90*  -0.56 -0.39 1.20* 0.86 
(0.58) (0.69) (0.25) (0.35)  (0.76) (0.91) (0.52) (0.53) 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02  0.14** 0.14*** 0.06 0.05 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Administration Salary -0.03 -0.08 -0.06* -0.06*  -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) 
Wages 0.19 0.28 -0.03 -0.03  0.02 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.21) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) 
Number of Majors 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11***  0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
TA Salary  -0.02  0.02   -0.07  -0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.01)   (0.04)  (0.02) 
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  29.56  17.38   32.70  34.04 
 (22.99)  (18.25)   (30.31)  (24.63) 
Admissions Rate  -2.09  -0.09   -3.16  0.57 
 (1.54)  (0.39)   (2.00)  (0.68) 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Constant -267.33* -263.50 -9.88 -173.12  -202.86 -177.86 -191.09 -448.13 
(125.85) (245.06) (75.30) (157.35)  (168.70) (322.61) (177.89) (273.46) 
Within R-Squared   0.85 0.86    0.78 0.79 
Between R-Squared   0.85 0.89    0.86 0.89 
Total R-Squared 0.90 0.93 0.86 0.89  0.90 0.93 0.86 0.89 
F-Statistic 67.52 58.53 27.24 95.15  62.68 54.89 25.63 114.43 
Academic Years 2010 2010 2008-2010 2008-2010  2010 2010 2008-2010 2008-2010 
Observations 58 55 170 161  58 55 170 161 
Groups 58 55 59 56  58 55 59 56 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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specification, both for undergraduate and total degrees completed and in the cross-
sectional and fixed effects results.  In addition, the cross-sectional results for the total 
number of degrees completed showed a positive relationship where $1000 more in 
miscellaneous expenses was associated with 0.14 more degrees.  In the fixed effects 
regressions, travel expenses were positively associated with undergraduate and total 
degrees while administrative salaries had a negative relationship with undergraduate 
degrees.  In general, however, the models at the school level suggest that expenses are 
only loosely associated with various school level outputs and that the number of majors at 
the various levels are the most robust predictor of eventual degree attainment.  This is 
consistent to the general findings at the institutional level despite using different data and 
a different level of analysis. 
 
Departmental Level Expenses & Outputs 
 The final analysis between expenditures and outputs occurs at the departmental 
level.  Again, this is looking for subunit relationships between the faculty and staff 
directly involved in the production of student degrees within their departments.  One 
advantage over the school level data is that there is greater power.  At the school level, 
only 53 to 62 schools are available in the analyses, depending on the model specification.  
However, there are 232 to 262 departments, which allows not only for greater power in 
the full departmental analysis but also for analyses to be conducted separately by 
different types of departments.  For example, I am able to compare a multitude of 
different science and mathematics departments against each other by running a separate 
regression from other departments like humanities.  These separate regressions assume 
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that there are differences across departments in the production of degrees.  Science and 
mathematics departments have descriptively been shown to have higher expenses on 
classified staff, which may be due to the need for lab assistants.  Humanities, however, do 
not have the same costs in their departments and degree production.  Therefore, analyses 
would only want to compare departments of a single type. 
 To begin, the full sample is again presented.  Given the knowledge of the 
relationships at the school level, the number of majors is included in each model of 
degree attainment.  In these regressions, expenses are only statistically significant in the 
cross sectional analysis for AY2010.  For the total number of degrees awarded, in 
particular, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the average 
faculty salary per FTE and the total number of degrees awarded.  This relationship, one 
of the few relationships significant for faculty and instruction, indicates that schools that 
spent more on faculty salaries produced more degrees.  This is likely due to the wage 
premium at research institutions like UT-Austin, the additional degrees produced in these 
schools for MA and doctoral students, and the nature of the department itself.  In these 
departments, average faculty salary is higher to attract more prestigious faculty and they 
also have the highest enrollment and degree production.  Even after controlling for 
majors, the coefficient indicates that $1000 more in faculty salary per FTE is associated 
with 0.58 more degrees awarded.  However, the fixed effects models only show patterns 
with the number of majors.  The same pattern holds as with the other analyses, with 10 
addition majors being associated with 1 to 1.2 additional degrees awarded.  When 
looking at the total number of degrees, published in-state tuition and fees is also 
statistically significant.  Raising tuition by $1000 is associated with an increase in total   
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Table 6.12 
 
Departmental Level Outputs and Expenses 
 
 BA Degrees 
Average Faculty Salary per FTE 0.17 -0.08 0.15 -0.08 0.22 -0.08 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) 
       
Average Classified Salary 
  per FTE 
0.47 0.01 0.72 0.00 -0.66 0.01 
(0.48) (0.03) (0.50) (0.03) (0.58) (0.03) 
       
Travel Expenses -0.24 0.33 -0.20 0.33 0.01 0.49 
(0.45) (0.63) (0.45) (0.63) (0.69) (0.71) 
       
Miscellaneous Other Expenses -0.37 0.12 -0.38* 0.12 -0.32 0.10 
(0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) 
       
Administration Salary -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
Wages -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 
(0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13) 
       
TA Salary   -0.05 0.02 -0.09** 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
       
Published In-State Tuition  
  & Fees 
    11.55** 7.55 
    (3.52) (4.58) 
       
Admissions Rate     -0.47 -0.03 
    (0.29) (0.17) 
       
Student-Faculty Ratio     0.45 0.94 
    (1.66) (1.40) 
       
Undergraduate Majors 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
       
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
       
Constant -31.17* 0.83 -35.23* 0.12 -59.76 -71.69 
(15.75) (14.68) (15.86) (15.08) (41.74) (44.15) 
       
Within R-Squared  0.80  0.80  0.81 
Between R-Squared  0.79  0.79  0.80 
Total R-Squared 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.80 
F-Statistic 181.99 17.83 160.92 16.78 122.36 14.21 
Academic Years 2010 2008-2010 2010 2008-2010 2010 2008-2010 
Observations 248 734 248 734 230 683 
Groups 248 251 248 251 230 232 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 6.12 (Continued) 
 
Departmental Level Outputs and Expenses 
 
 Total Degrees 
Average Faculty Salary per FTE 0.51** 0.03 0.48** 0.02 0.58** 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) 
       Average Classified Salary  
  per FTE 
-0.22 -0.00 0.06 -0.00 -2.13** 0.01 
(0.64) (0.04) (0.67) (0.04) (0.77) (0.05) 
       Travel Expenses -0.68 0.35 -0.64 0.36 -0.30 0.29 
 (0.60) (0.57) (0.60) (0.57) (0.91) (0.63) 
       Miscellaneous Other Expenses -0.47 0.24 -0.49 0.24 -0.42 0.25 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) 
       Administration Salary 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
       Wages 0.20 -0.11 0.20 -0.12 0.15 -0.09 
 (0.25) (0.12) (0.25) (0.13) (0.28) (0.16) 
       TA Salary 
  
-0.06 0.03 -0.12** 0.04 
 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
       Published In-State Tuition  
  & Fees 
    
18.09*** 12.39* 
    
(4.65) (5.98) 
       Admissions Rate 
    
-0.80* 0.11 
 
    
(0.38) (0.20) 
       Student-Faculty Ratio 
    
2.35 2.11 
 
    
(2.20) (1.95) 
       Total Number of Majors 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
       Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
       Constant -30.43 -17.95 -35.10 -18.87 -98.24 -158.32** 
 (20.95) (16.06) (21.14) (15.39) (55.07) (56.10) 
       Within R-Squared 
 
0.75 
 
0.75 
 
0.76 
Between R-Squared 
 
0.77 
 
0.77 
 
0.79 
Total R-Squared 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.78 
F-Statistic 157.86 30.11 139.05 42.06 108.25 50.96 
Academic Years 2010 2008-2010 2010 2008-2010 2010 2008-2010 
Observations 248 734 248 734 230 683 
Groups 248 251 248 251 230 232 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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degrees by 12.39.  This may be an indicator that students respond to rising tuition prices 
by graduating rather than paying the higher price for an addition semester or year. 
 The final analysis in the relationships between outputs and expenses, Table 6.13, 
takes advantage of the greater number of observations at the departmental level to look at 
differences between different types of departments, as described previously.  Much like 
the separation by Carnegie classification in the institutional analyses, this runs separate 
regressions for departmental type.  Again, faculty salaries are not significantly related to 
degree production for any departmental type.  Classified salaries are significant in 
schools of health and nursing, with a $1000 increase in salaries per FTE being associated 
with approximately 5 more degrees awarded.  Travel, administrative salaries, and wages, 
where significant, all had negative relationships with the number of degrees awarded.  
The expense item that was significant across the various models was on miscellaneous 
expenses.  In schools of health and nursing and schools of behavioral and social sciences, 
the relationships were negative.  However, there was a positive relationship with degree 
completions for arts and engineering degrees.  Business degrees, which were not 
significant once controlling for tuition and admissions rate, saw the highest coefficients 
in the simplified models with an additional $1000 in miscellaneous expenses being 
associated with approximately 78 more degrees awarded.  In general, the most robust 
relationship across the institutional types is again the number of majors in a department 
and their association with the number of degrees awarded.  As with the institutional and 
school level analyses, there was a general lack of a robust relationship between expenses 
and outputs at the departmental level. 
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Table 6.13 
 
Results of Departmental Fixed Effects, Outputs and Expenses by Departmental Type (AY2008-2010) 
 
 Science & Math  Humanities  Engineering 
         Average Faculty Salary per FTE -0.20 -0.21  -0.04 -0.01  -0.02 -0.12 
(0.19) (0.21)  (0.08) (0.09)  (0.25) (0.29) 
         
Average Classified Salary per FTE -0.01 0.00  -0.17 -0.08  0.05 0.68 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.19) (0.20)  (0.03) (0.73) 
         
Travel Expenses 0.41 -0.02  -0.19 0.18  -2.26* -1.62 
(0.21) (0.30)  (0.55) (1.03)  (1.02) (1.23) 
         
Miscellaneous Other Expenses -0.03 0.12  -0.09 -0.10  0.81*** 0.78*** 
(0.08) (0.13)  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.16) (0.18) 
         
Administration Salary 0.16 0.16  0.04 -0.01  -0.06 -0.07 
(0.20) (0.18)  (0.28) (0.26)  (0.05) (0.05) 
         
Wages -0.05 0.07  0.28 0.31  -0.31* -0.33* 
(0.05) (0.11)  (0.27) (0.26)  (0.14) (0.14) 
         
Total Number of Majors -0.00 -0.01*  0.11*** 0.11***  0.08*** 0.09*** 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) 
         
TA Salary 0.04 -0.00  -0.63 -0.38  0.02 0.01 
(0.02) (0.03)  (2.89) (2.65)  (0.04) (0.04) 
         
Published In-State Tuition and 
Fees 
 1.48   5.05   -2.48 
 (6.41)   (8.49)   (6.92) 
         
Admissions Rate  0.48**   0.23   -0.13 
 (0.16)   (0.21)   (0.18) 
         
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
         
Constant 115.75*** 84.24  32.09 -30.25  13.50 20.48 
(17.27) (65.14)  (69.74) (88.40)  (37.46) (66.11) 
         
Within R-Squared 0.21 0.32  0.32 0.33  0.41 0.42 
Between R-Squared 0.25 0.43  0.56 0.77  0.82 0.82 
Total R-Squared 0.22 0.39  0.55 0.76  0.81 0.81 
F-Statistic 4.94 35.99  10.11 10.74  19.46 19.64 
Observations 95 83  114 105  107 103 
Groups 32 28  38 35  37 35 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 6.13 (Continued) 
 
Results of Departmental Fixed Effects, Outputs and Expenses by Departmental Type (AY2008-2010) 
 
 Behavioral & Social Sciences  Business 
      Average Faculty Salary per FTE 0.03 0.15  0.01 0.04 
(0.40) (0.46)  (0.06) (0.05) 
      
Average Classified Salary per FTE 0.09 0.35  0.82 0.92 
(1.24) (1.26)  (1.16) (1.12) 
      
Travel Expenses 1.24 1.14  -0.54 -1.26 
(1.53) (1.47)  (1.47) (1.75) 
      
Miscellaneous Other Expenses -1.70** -1.77**  78.19* 48.30 
(0.58) (0.61)  (32.21) (49.51) 
      
Administration Salary -0.25* -0.25*  0.39 -0.10 
(0.10) (0.10)  (1.24) (1.00) 
      
Wages 0.35 0.37  1.25 1.49 
(0.30) (0.31)  (0.79) (0.76) 
      
Total Number of Majors 0.12*** 0.12***  0.22*** 0.22*** 
(0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) 
      
TA Salary -0.41 -0.11  -0.33 -0.42* 
(1.13) (1.04)  (0.22) (0.17) 
      
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  5.20   29.87 
 (5.65)   (24.78) 
      
Admissions Rate  0.22   0.59 
 (0.22)   (0.62) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
      
Constant 13.11 -61.47  -228.36** -451.73* 
(44.53) (78.26)  (80.52) (188.62) 
      
Within R-Squared 0.45 0.46  0.61 0.64 
Between R-Squared 0.73 0.80  0.13 0.34 
Total R-Squared 0.73 0.79  0.12 0.32 
F-Statistic 5.21 4.52  38.99 31.90 
Observations 126 117  68 68 
Groups 42 39  24 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 6.13 (Continued) 
 
Results of Departmental Fixed Effects, Outputs and Expenses by Departmental Type (AY2008-2010) 
 
 Arts  Health & Nursing 
      Average Faculty Salary per FTE -0.49 -0.77  0.01 -0.04 
(0.49) (0.46)  (0.15) (0.17) 
      
Average Classified Salary per FTE 1.32 1.72  5.37* 5.27* 
(1.98) (2.73)  (2.02) (2.00) 
      
Travel Expenses -0.43 -0.08  -2.39 -1.63 
(0.79) (0.82)  (5.43) (5.14) 
      
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.35** -4.37  -0.42* -0.41* 
(0.10) (14.91)  (0.17) (0.18) 
      
Administration Salary 0.26 0.43  -0.60 -0.62 
(0.45) (0.60)  (0.38) (0.36) 
      
Wages 0.55 0.60  0.47 0.56 
(0.38) (0.42)  (1.13) (1.12) 
      
Total Number of Majors 0.08 0.11  0.12*** 0.12*** 
(0.05) (0.07)  (0.02) (0.02) 
      
TA Salary -3.48 -4.32  0.44 0.36 
(2.23) (2.89)  (0.95) (0.94) 
      
Published In-State Tuition and Fees  -0.60   25.05 
 (9.47)   (17.79) 
      
Admissions Rate  -0.25   0.73 
 (0.29)   (0.61) 
      
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
      
Constant 322.87* 427.37  -159.20 -360.27 
(135.50) (225.53)  (92.98) (186.58) 
      
Within R-Squared 0.44 0.41  0.98 0.98 
Between R-Squared 0.53 0.52  0.84 0.84 
Total R-Squared 0.53 0.52  0.86 0.86 
F-Statistic 10202.52 6113634.68  12649.64 17280.48 
Observations 46 43  63 60 
Groups 16 15  21 20 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Institutional Level Revenues & Outputs 
In the first stage of the production function, significant relationships were seen 
between revenues and expenses at the institutional level.  In the second stage, the 
relationship between expenses and outputs were largely not significant, even across the 
various datasets, units of analysis, and subunit analyses.  The third relationship identified 
in the simplified production function (Figure 5.1) is the indirect relationship between 
revenues and outputs.  Given the previous results, if these analyses are significant, it 
could be posited that either institutions are inefficient in their operations, which can be 
tested in the frontier analyses, or that institutions as a whole are the mechanism of 
production and cannot be separated into its subunit components.  This later statement 
essentially defines institutions as a whole being greater than the sum of its parts. 
 Indeed, Table 6.14 reveals significant relationships between revenue sources and 
outputs as the result of fixed effects regressions.  State appropriations are negatively 
associated with the production of undergraduate degrees while tuition and fee revenues 
per FTE are associated with increases in degrees and graduation rates.  A $1000 increase 
in state appropriations per student decreases BA degrees by roughly 12 while a $1000 
increase in tuition and fee revenues per student is associated with approximately 50 more 
BA degrees, 29 more MA degrees, and improves both 4-year and 6-year graduation rates 
by 0.6 percentage points.  In addition, federal operating grants and contracts per FTE are 
associated with an increase in MA degrees awarded.  This may be due to additional 
funding that can be spent on teaching and research assistantships to help master’s 
students pay for their degrees.  However, it should be noted that these relationships do 
not fully persist when separate regressions are run by Carnegie classification.  The fixed   
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Table 6.14 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Outputs and Revenues per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
 BA Degrees  MA Degrees  FT Retention Rate 
         State Appropriations -12.02** -12.13*  -3.73 -5.49  -0.25 -0.20 
 (4.40) (4.87)  (2.89) (2.84)  (0.15) (0.15) 
Tuition and Fee Revenues 48.46** 51.53**  27.79** 29.57***  -0.57 -0.60 
(17.14) (19.31)  (8.86) (7.93)  (0.35) (0.37) 
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts 16.15 15.38  11.99* 13.23*  -0.57* -0.48* 
(8.47) (10.74)  (5.01) (5.12)  (0.22) (0.23) 
Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises -39.82* -39.91*  -7.83 -6.54  -0.31 -0.31 
(17.78) (19.36)  (8.85) (9.37)  (0.21) (0.22) 
Other Sources of Operating Revenues 2.42 2.84  -2.70 -2.99  -0.09 -0.06 
(4.86) (4.98)  (2.12) (2.17)  (0.11) (0.10) 
Other Sources of Nonoperating Revenues -5.07 -5.50  2.67 2.37  -0.08 -0.09 
(7.71) (8.90)  (4.18) (4.33)  (0.09) (0.10) 
Admissions Rate  -0.54   0.00   -0.04** 
  (0.46)   (0.23)   (0.01) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 1944.04*** 2089.66***  607.91*** 632.57***  73.01*** 76.97*** 
 (4.72) (32.50)  (3.77) (16.62)  (0.15) (0.96) 
Within R-Squared 0.23 0.24  0.14 0.15  0.07 0.07 
Between R-Squared 0.10 0.09  0.28 0.25  0.24 0.23 
Total R-Squared 0.08 0.08  0.25 0.23  0.18 0.17 
F-Statistic 20.88 18.38  15.47 13.86  10.13 11.95 
Years 2005-2010 2005-2010  2005-2010 2005-2010  2005-2010 2005-2010 
Observations 2769 2522  2769 2522  2736 2519 
Groups 504 464  504 464  497 461 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.14 (Continued) 
 
Results of Institutional Fixed Effects, Outputs and Revenues per FTE (in Thousands) 
 
 4-Year Graduation Rate  6-Year Graduation Rate 
      State Appropriations 0.10 0.10  -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.09)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Tuition and Fee Revenues 0.63*** 0.63***  0.61*** 0.61*** 
(0.16) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.17) 
Federal Operating Grants and Contracts 0.06 0.06  0.15 0.14 
(0.14) (0.14)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Sales and Services of Auxiliary Enterprises -0.03 -0.03  0.02 0.04 
(0.36) (0.36)  (0.35) (0.35) 
Other Sources of Operating Revenues -0.01 -0.01  -0.13 -0.13 
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Other Sources of Nonoperating Revenues -0.05 -0.05  -0.11 -0.10 
(0.10) (0.10)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Admissions Rate  0.01   0.02** 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 24.07*** 23.65***  47.78*** 46.09*** 
 (0.13) (0.71)  (0.12) (0.64) 
Within R-Squared 0.08 0.09  0.08 0.08 
Between R-Squared 0.32 0.31  0.28 0.24 
Total R-Squared 0.29 0.28  0.26 0.22 
F-Statistic 9.19 8.38  7.96 7.89 
Years 2006-2010 2006-2010  2006-2010 2006-2010 
Observations 2073 2073  2073 2073 
Groups 452 452  452 452 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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effects model looks at changes within an institution, but the effects are diminished when 
only compared to institutions of the same type.  
These findings are important because it reveals that the sources of revenues are 
indeed related to outputs.  This suggests that despite expenses not having a direct 
relationship with outputs, the source of funding can affect outputs.  Institutional 
budgeting and decision making may not be the best way of altering outputs.  Instead, the 
decision falls to students.  As tuition and fees increase, graduation rates and the number 
of degrees awarded both increase, meaning that students may be choosing to finish their 
degrees and do so more quickly because of the added expenses associated with additional 
studies.  Increases in state appropriations, however, may help subsidize the cost that 
would otherwise be transferred to students and therefore slows the degree attainment 
process.  Thus, students may be the ultimate producers of retention, degree completion, 
and time to degree, a finding consistent with that found by Titus (2006), who found that 
an individual’s probability of graduating was linked to an institution’s reliance on tuition 
and fee revenues.  Altering the mix of tuition, state support, and financial aid may 
therefore be more effective policy levers than asking institutions to adopt academic or 
student service programs.  However, additional research using student level data is 
needed in order to fully explore these relationships and the associated outcomes.  The 
analyses of the present study simply present results based on institutional processes. 
 
Stochastic Frontier Models 
 The relationships presented previously indicate that there are relationships 
between revenues and expenses and that there are relationships between revenues and 
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outputs, but no direct link between institutional, school, or departmental expenses and 
outputs.  As mentioned, this suggests that institutions as a whole are the production 
mechanism, but outputs may ultimately be determined by students.  In essence, students 
may be more motivated by their payment and financial aid policy options more so than 
whatever institutions are able to do through instruction, academic support, or student 
services.  Given the lack of findings between expenses and outputs, it then calls into 
question whether institutions are spending too much on their various programs.  
Institutions could spend ever increasing amounts on instruction, research, and public 
services with only marginal returns.  Therefore, there is likely an optimal mix in spending 
and the production of outputs (Powell, Gilleland, & Pearson, 2012).  Spending too much 
or too little would indicate there are inefficiencies in spending patterns in relation to 
outputs.  If outputs can only be marginally affected by institutional spending, institutions 
should be trying to cut expenses to a level that keeps outputs constant but reduces 
expenditures as much as possible.  Institutions may be overspending and might benefit by 
cutting expenses and reducing their reliance on state appropriations and tuition while 
keeping outputs roughly the same.  Alternatively, institutions may be underspending in 
certain areas as well.  If they are not operating at the optimal input to output mix, they 
could benefit by boosting their expenses in certain areas and produce greater outputs in a 
more efficient manner. 
 Following this line of reasoning, this section presents results from stochastic 
frontier analysis to look at the technical efficiency of institutions, department, and 
schools in their production of outputs.  Rather than addressing the relationship between 
inputs and outputs, what Powell, Gilleland, and Pearson (2012) call effectiveness, this 
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examines whether institutions are efficient in producing the outputs with an optimal mix 
of inputs given the performance of similar institutions.  As outlined in the previous 
chapter, stochastic frontier analysis is a parametric approach with a specified model.  The 
strengths of this approach is that it produces traditional measures of statistical 
significance and can use fixed effects to determine if institutions are moving closer to, or 
away from, the frontier.  Alternatively, data envelopment analysis, which will be 
presented in the next section, is a cross-sectional approach that is non-parametric.  This 
technique allows for the data itself to determine the frontier and institutions to be directly 
compared to each other.  In addition, it allows for the introduction of multiple inputs and 
multiple outputs, unlike stochastic frontier analysis. 
In these models, I am restricted by the number of variables that can be used in the 
regressions due to sample size (Avkrian, 2001) and computing constraints, and I therefore 
focus on state appropriations, tuition and fees, and federal operating grants and contracts 
for revenues.  For expenses, I include instruction, research, academic support, 
institutional support, public service, student services, and scholarships and fellowships.  
Finally, I again include controls for tuition and admissions rates, where applicable.  In the 
stochastic frontier analyses, the results for usigma and vsigma indicate the separation of 
the error term into measures of efficiency.  These are translated into the tables of 
technical efficiency.  The measures of technical efficiency range from 0 to 1 with values 
closest to 1 being the most efficient and closest to the frontier.  For data envelopment 
analysis, there is no parametric model and therefore the results only include a ranking 
based on technical efficiency. 
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In general, the relationships presented in these analyses are different from the 
previous models because I only control for state appropriations, tuition, and federal grants 
rather than including every revenue source.  This is because the stochastic frontier model 
and data envelopment models are restricted by the number of regressors that can be used 
in a model as a function of the sample size.  When breaking out the results by Carnegie 
classification or department type, a key control used in the previous results, the sample 
sizes shrink and therefore limit the number of regressors that can be included.  The 
second noticeable difference is the use of logged values instead of FTE values.  This is 
again because of the mathematical structure of the frontier models.  Therefore, I use a 
setup that is consistent across both stochastic frontier and data envelopment analyses. 
 
Institutional Level Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 To begin, stochastic frontier analyses are presented for institutions, schools, and 
departments both cross-sectionally in AY2010 and using fixed effects.  The stochastic 
frontier analyses present two outputs.  The first output is a table of coefficients based on 
the specified model.  This is similar to typical regressions using OLS or fixed effects.  
The coefficients are listed along with traditional levels of statistical significance.  These 
tables are presented in the appendix since they mirror the models previously presented.  
In those tables presented in A.3, similar results emerge as those seen previously in 
looking at the relationships between inputs, expenses, and outputs.  Indeed, tuition 
revenues are associated with every expense and output item.  A 1% increase in tuition is 
associated with a 1.1% increase in expenses on research, a 0.93% increase in public 
service, and a 0.81% increase in instruction after holding all else constant.  State 
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appropriations show similar positive relationships, though much weaker, for every item 
except graduation rates.  For student outputs, the results show that institutions that have a 
less selective admissions process are associated with greater numbers of undergraduate 
degrees while those that have a more selective admission process are associated with 
higher retention and graduation rates.  These findings are not surprising given that large 
comprehensive and open access institutions have lower admissions standards than 
selective institutions and yet produce large numbers of degrees.  Alternatively, more 
selective institutions have higher retention and graduation rates.  In addition, institutions 
that spend more on instruction are positively associated with every student output, 
especially in degrees awarded.  Similarly, expenses in academic support and student 
services help improve the number of undergraduate degrees awarded, though expenses on 
student services slows the time to degree attainment.  Alternatively, research expenses 
have no direct relationship with student outputs.  Again, these findings make sense given 
the previous findings and targeted nature of the expenses and institutions. 
The second output of stochastic frontier analysis is a listing of technical 
efficiencies, showing which institutions are most efficient and which institutions are 
furthest from the frontier.  These scores are displayed in Figure 6.5 for select models 
using the cross-sectional institutional comparison in AY2010.  This figure graphically 
represents the distribution of technical efficiency scores for the relationships between 
revenues and expenses on research and public service once controlling for admissions 
rates.  In addition, it presents the scores from two models on expenses to student 
outcomes on undergraduate degrees produced and 6-year graduation rates.  It should also  
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Figure 6.5 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis by Institution, Distributions of Technical Efficiency 
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be noted that in the analysis on revenues to instructional expenses, there was very little 
variation in the technical efficiencies once controlling for student inputs. 
 In the results on research expenditures, those schools focusing on science, mining, 
and forestry performed the best.  The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, 
SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, New Mexico State University, 
University of Wyoming, Montana Tech, and Colorado School of Mines all recorded 
technical efficiency scores over 0.70.  However, non-research institutions such as 
Winston-Salem State University, Metropolitan State University, University of Arkansas 
at Pine Bluff, and New College of Florida also fared well.  This suggests that while the 
research output at these institutions may be small, it is a big accomplishment given the 
limited resources provided to conduct research.  In essence, they are acting efficiently 
given the small amount of resources they have.  For public service, land grants, state 
flagships, and research institutions tended to have the highest efficiency scores.  These 
included the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, University of New Mexico, University 
of Utah, and University of Kentucky all recording efficiency scores over 0.80.  However, 
smaller schools, such as the Oregon Institute of Technology, again make an appearance 
in the top ranks of efficiency scores because of the output relative to their inputs. 
 Turning to the models on student outputs, the number of undergraduate degrees 
awarded showed high technical efficiency at larger schools with an instructional focus.  
The University of Central Florida, one of the largest institutions in the country, recorded 
a very high score of 0.94, indicating its ability to produce a large numbers of graduates 
with relatively low expenses.  Alternatively, the California Maritime Academy produced 
few graduates but, when looking at the 6-year graduation rates, did so in an extremely 
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timely fashion.  Indeed, while it had one of the lowest scores in degree completion at 
0.31, its graduates completed their degrees very quickly given the resources, with an 
efficiency score of 0.96.   
 When comparing the distribution of scores, output measures such as degree 
production and graduation rates were clustered toward the higher end of the scale with 
efficiency scores well above 0.60.  Efficiency scores for expenditures on research and 
public service, however, were clustered toward lower scores.  This might suggest that 
when comparing institutions of different types, the outputs relating to instruction place 
institutions on more equal footing.  When trying to compare different types of institutions 
on their focus on research and public service, which, unlike instruction, is not a uniform 
interest across the sector, the scores are more varied and less efficient. 
In general, whether looking at expenses or student outputs, BA and MA granting 
institutions were often at the bottom of the technical efficiency scores.  This could be for 
a number of reasons.  First, they may not have identified a good mix of inputs to outputs.  
In essence, they are either producing too few outputs or they are receiving too much or 
too little funding.  However, the second reason is because the comparisons are for all 
institutions rather than narrowing by institutional type.  Once separating these analyses 
by Carnegie classification, the wide range in efficiency scores narrows considerably.  For 
example, once restricting to institutions with a similar Carnegie classification, there is 
essentially no difference in technical efficiency scores for instruction, research, or degree 
production.  However, this is largely a function of the smaller sample sizes and 
comparisons once breaking out the results by Carnegie classification.  For MA granting 
institutions, which are the largest Carnegie classification, no differences in technical 
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efficiency appear for instruction, but there are differences for the other variables, albeit 
the range is smaller than when compared to the full sample.  For example, the range of 
values for undergraduate degree completions is from 0.54 to 0.96 while the full sample 
for undergraduate degrees saw technical efficiencies as low at 0.21.  In addition, while 
there may be some differences in the technical efficiency scores, the relative rankings are 
unaffected by the comparisons.  The highest ranked MA granting institution in the full 
sample will always be the highest ranked institution once restricting to all other MA 
granting institutions.  While the scores themselves may fluctuate based on their 
comparison peers, the relatively positioning will not. 
By comparison, the technical efficiency scores see in these analyses are relatively 
high, regardless of the specification.  Frontier analyses have been used frequently in the 
literature to assess inefficiencies in agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and 
hospital services.  For example, stochastic frontier analyses of dairy farms in Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay reveal pooled technical efficiencies averaging 0.826 (Moreira & 
Bravo-Ureta, 2010).  Similarly, efficiencies of hospitals in Germany revealed average 
efficiency scores around 0.86 but ranged from a low of 0.21 to a high of 0.99 (Herr, 
2008).  In the United States, similar results in health care have been found, with average 
efficiency scores for hospitals of roughly 0.82 with a wide range of variation based on the 
model specifications (Rosko & Mutter, 2011).  In my full sample of four-year 
institutions, the results might be comparable to these various levels of efficiency seen in 
other industries, but once controlling for Carnegie Classification, the institutional results 
are much stronger.  While efficiencies cannot be directly compared across industries to 
determine if one is more efficient than the other, it does show that after controlling for 
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Carnegie classification, institutions have relatively high average efficiencies with low 
variability.   
 Finally, I completed my analysis of institutions by using fixed effects to 
determine whether institutions were moving toward the frontier or away from the frontier 
over time.  Unlike the previous results, which are a cross-sectional look at the relative 
positioning of institutions, this seeks to identify institutions that are making the most 
improvements in efficiency over time.  In this analysis, presented in appendix table A.4, 
the models were only strong enough to find results for expenses on research, expenses on 
public service, and undergraduate degrees awarded. 
 For research, institutions were moving toward the frontier between 2005 and 
2007.  Since 2007, institutions have become less efficient, with average declines in 
technical efficiency of approximately -0.01 between 2007 and 2008, -0.13 between 2008 
and 2009, and -0.14 between 2009 and 2010.  Public service exhibits a similar pattern, 
with an improvement between 2005 and 2006 of 0.05, but this declined by less than 0.02 
each year after until 2010, when the difference between 2009 and 2010 was nearly -0.12.  
Again, the same can be said about the number of undergraduate degrees, with a large 
improvement of 0.21 between 2005 and 2006 followed by a much smaller increase of 
0.01.  However, since 2007, there have been steady, albeit small, declines.  This 
consistent pattern points to the effect of the Great Recession on higher education.  
Namely, the loss of funding has actually drawn institutions away from their optimal mix 
of inputs to outputs and is affecting their ability to act efficiently.  Rather than producing 
more with less, the lower resources are damaging institutions’ ability to produce outputs.   
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Once separating out by Carnegie classification, institutions with very high 
research activity were somewhat protected from the declines in efficiency post 2007.  For 
research, while there has been a steady move toward the frontier of approximately 0.01 
on average each year, yet this is offset by a decline of 0.03 between 2007 and 2008.  For 
public service, the increases between 2005 and 2007 were 0.03 each year, followed by a 
decline of 0.02 and 0.05.  However, between 2009 and 2010, the efficiencies of 
institutions again rose, though by only 0.01.  In looking at research institutions with high 
activity, again the pattern of declines after 2007 is present.  For the production of 
undergraduate degrees, 2005 to 2007 showed increases of 0.01 per year while slight 
decreases in technical efficiency were recorded from 2007 to 2010. 
In general, these various results suggest that the relationships between revenues, 
expenses, and outputs are robust across the various specifications.  When focusing on the 
efficiency of these relationships, there is a large amount of variation across the higher 
education sector, but this variation dissipates once controlling for Carnegie classification.  
Indeed, when comparing institutions of a similar type, there is much less variation in the 
institutional performance.  Furthermore, when looking at changes over time, the Great 
Recession appears to have hurt institutional efficiencies, with reduced revenues moving 
institutions away from their optimal input-output mix and negatively impacting the 
institutional ability to produce outputs. 
 
School Level Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 At the school level, results are presented for undergraduate degrees and the total 
number of degrees.  In addition to looking at the various expenses, I include controls for 
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the number of majors, semester credit hours, tuition, and admissions rates.  Again, the 
model coefficients are presented in the Appendix while the technical efficiency scores are 
graphically presented and listed below.  The cross-sectional models again show a strong 
relationship between the number of majors and the number of degrees awarded.  A 1% 
increase in majors is associated with a 0.65% to 0.77% increase in undergraduate 
degrees.  In terms of total degrees, the relationship ranges from 0.83% to 1.13%.  Travel 
expenses and miscellaneous expenses are significant in many of the models on the total 
number of degrees, though the magnitudes are quite small.  
 The distribution of technical efficiencies at the school level can be seen in Figure 
6.6.  In this figure, undergraduate degrees have a wider range in the efficiencies than the 
total number of degrees awarded once controlling for major, semester credit hours, and 
other institutional variables.  Indeed, the technical efficiency scores for the total number 
of degrees are very high, with an average and mode around 0.90.  This indicates that 
schools become more similar once including total degrees as an output rather than just 
focusing on undergraduate education.  Schools that focus heavily on graduate education 
are at a disadvantage in the model on undergraduate degree production but perform much 
better in models on total degree outputs.  Not including their focus on graduate education 
makes these schools look like they are performing poorly in comparison to their peers, 
when they are actually performing quite well once their graduate focus is included as an 
output. 
To further explore these relationships, I compared the efficiency scores by school 
type to see if there were differences based on instructional focus.  Table 6.15 shows that 
the least efficient schools in terms of undergraduate education tend to be schools of   
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Figure 6.6 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis by School, Distributions of Technical Efficiency 
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Table 6.15 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis by School, Rankings by Technical Efficiency 
 
BA Degrees 
1 Arlington School of Nursing    0.9464  
2 Austin College of Communication    0.9399  
3 UTSA College of Business    0.9257  
4 Austin School of Law    0.9172  
5 UTEP Collapsed Liberal Arts and UC    0.9006  
6 Austin Collapsed Liberal Arts and LBJ    0.8826  
7 Dallas School of Management    0.8825  
8 UTPA College of Education    0.8748  
9 UTSA College of Liberal and Fine Arts    0.8698  
10 Tyler College of Business and Technology    0.8659  
…    
48 UTSA College of Engineering    0.4612  
49 Austin College of Education    0.4200  
50 Dallas School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics    0.4115  
51 Arlington School of Education    0.3955  
52 UTEP College of Education    0.0041  
     
Total Degrees 
1 Arlington School of Education    0.9596  
2 UTSA College of Business    0.9585  
3 Austin College of Communication    0.9576  
4 Austin School of Information    0.9503  
5 Austin Red McCombs School of Business    0.9483  
6 UTPA College of Arts and Humanities    0.9433  
7 Arlington Collapsed Social Work and Public Affairs    0.9420  
8 Tyler College of Education and Psychology    0.9397  
9 Tyler College of Arts and Sciences    0.9372  
10 UTSA College of Liberal and Fine Arts    0.9368  
…    
48 Austin Cockrell School of Engineering    0.8557  
49 Arlington College of Engineering    0.8430  
50 UTSA College of Engineering    0.7787  
51 Austin Collapsed Sciences    0.7717  
52 Dallas School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics    0.7047  
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education while once including graduate degrees, the least efficient schools tend to be 
schools of engineering.  For example, the School of Education at UT Arlington is one of 
the least efficient schools in terms of undergraduate education, but one of the most 
efficient in total degree production.  This is because they offer 8 master’s degrees and a 
doctoral degree, illustrating their focus on graduate education.  Without including 
graduate education as an output, they appear inefficient, but they are very efficient in 
degree production once these types of degrees are included.  On the other hand, many 
schools of engineering, mathematics, and science offer few graduate degrees when  
compared to business and education programs.  Therefore, while these schools may be 
efficient in the production of undergraduate and pre-medical degrees, they perform worse 
once considering the high cost of graduate education despite the few degree outputs. 
Unfortunately, the small number of schools in the sample, coupled with having 
only 3 years of data, limits the power to conduct fixed effects analysis.  Indeed, the only 
fixed effects model that was significant was the basic model for undergraduate degrees 
before including controls for major, semester credit hours, tuition, or admissions rates.  In 
this model, none of the expense items were significant.  When looking at the average 
technical efficiency scores, schools became more efficient between 2008 and 2009 and 
less efficient between 2009 and 2010.  However, the movement away from the frontier in 
the period from 2009 to 2010 was much larger, -0.04, as compared to 0.01 in the year 
prior.     
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Departmental Level Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 Similar to the original OLS and fixed effects analyses, the benefits of the 
departmental level analyses over the school level analyses is the increased number of 
observations that can be used in the models.  This allows for greater power in the models 
and the ability to separate the results by departmental type.  The results of the cross-
sectional analysis, presented in Appendix A.6, show a strong relationship between majors 
and degrees.  In addition, average faculty salary and classified salaries are significant in 
the models for the total number of degrees awarded.  However, the sign on classified 
salaries reverses once controlling for majors, tuition, and admissions rates. 
When looking at the technical efficiency scores, the models for the total number 
of degrees show little variation once controlling for major.  However, undergraduate 
degree production alone varies greatly.  These scores can be seen in Table 6.16.  In 
general, the relative rankings show little difference by model.  For example, the UT-
Arlington College of Nursing is one of the top 10 departments in terms of efficiency for 
every model except for the model on total degrees controlling for expenses, majors, and 
institutional variables.  Even in this analysis, the technical efficiency score is only 
0.00004 away from the frontier. 
 Unlike the institutional or school models, the departmental model collects 
information at the most detailed unit of analysis.  Departments focusing on graduate 
education again perform better in the models on the total number of degrees, such as the 
Department of Educational Administration at UT-Arlington, but the differences are more 
subtle since they are not aggregated to the school or institutional levels.  Given these 
differences in degree production by school and department, I separated the analyses by   
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Table 6.16 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis by Department, Rankings by Technical Efficiency 
 
BA Degrees 
Controlling for Expenses  Controlling for Expenses, Major, Tuition, & Admissions Rate 
1 Arlington College of Nursing      0.8921   1 Austin Communication Studies    0.9371  
2 Austin Advertising      0.8044   2 Arlington College of Nursing    0.9059  
3 UTPA Criminal Justice      0.7861   3 UTSA Department of Management    0.8718  
4 UTSA Department of Management      0.7639   4 UTEP Marketing and Management    0.8546  
5 Tyler College of Nursing      0.7576   5 Tyler College of Nursing    0.8534  
6 UTSA Department of Psychology      0.7489   6 Arlington Finance and Real Estate    0.8371  
7 Austin Biological Sciences      0.7380   7 UTSA Department of Psychology    0.8268  
8 UTSA Department of Health and Kinesiology      0.7293   8 UTPA Master’s in Public Administration    0.8255  
9 UTSA Department of Criminal Justice      0.7279   9 UTSA Department of Biology    0.8252  
10 UTPA Rehabilitation      0.7271   10 UTSA Department of Communication    0.8152  
…     …    
246 Austin School of Information      0.0026   228 UTSA Department of Physics and Astronomy    0.1587  
247 Austin LBJ School of Public Affairs      0.0018   229 Arlington Curriculum and Instruction    0.0098  
248 Austin Law      0.0016   230 UTEP Teacher Education    0.0097  
          
Total Degrees 
Controlling for Expenses  Controlling for Expenses, Major, Tuition, & Admissions Rate 
1 Arlington College of Nursing      0.8387   1 Austin Communication Studies    0.9974  
2 Arlington Educational Administration      0.8079   2 Austin Management    0.9974  
3 Arlington Curriculum and Instruction      0.7957   3 Tyler School of Education    0.9973  
4 Arlington Management      0.7811   4 UTPA Curriculum and Instruction    0.9973  
5 Austin Advertising      0.7746   5 UTSA Department of Management    0.9973  
6 Tyler College of Nursing      0.7603   6 UTPA Social Work    0.9973  
7 UTPA Criminal Justice      0.7520   7 Arlington Educational Administration    0.9973  
8 Austin Management      0.7435   8 Arlington Economics    0.9973  
9 UTSA Department of Psychology      0.7382   9 UTPA Physician Assistant    0.9973  
10 UTSA Department of Management      0.7381   10 UTEP Marketing and Management    0.9973  
…     …    
246 UTB Chemistry and Environmental Science      0.0797   228 UTSA Department of Physics and Astronomy    0.9973  
247 Austin Center for Mexican American Studies      0.0479   229 UTPA Bachelor’s in Computer Engineering    0.9973  
248 UTSA Demography and Organization Studies      0.0276   230 UTSA Demography and Organization Studies    0.9973  
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departmental type.  This diminished the sample size, preventing the inclusion of 
institutional controls.  For BA degrees, controls for majors are included while the total 
number of degrees does not include a control for major. These results are seen in 
Appendix A.7.  Even more interesting are the relative rankings by departmental type.  For 
undergraduate degrees, departments of humanities and departments of health and nursing 
exhibit little variation in their efficiency scores.  Similarly, there is little variation in 
efficiency scores for the total number of degrees awarded in departments of science and 
math, arts, health and nursing, and business.  The lowest recorded efficiency score in 
these models is 0.96, suggesting that when comparing departments of a similar type, most 
departments fall relatively close to the frontier.  In essence, when there are fewer 
departments and these departments are all of the same type, the departments perform very 
similarly to one another.  
In addition to these cross sectional analyses, I also used fixed effects to look at the 
changes in efficiency over time.  In this analysis, which is limited to the full sample of 
departments, only the simplest model is significant for undergraduate degrees.  On 
average, the efficiency scores move toward the frontier between 2008 and 2009, but are 
essentially offset by the average movement away from the frontier from 2009 to 2010.  A 
similar pattern emerges when looking at the total number of degrees awarded.  However, 
once controlling for the number of majors and institutional variables, there were gains in 
efficiency spanning both years.  Between 2008 and 2009, technical efficiency improved, 
on average, by 0.004.  Between 2009 and 2010, the improvement was 0.0002.  This 
suggests that departments are becoming more efficient in their production of degrees over 
time.  While institutions exhibited a decrease in efficiency over time, the internal 
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departments themselves, at least in the U.T. System, showed the ability to become more 
efficient, suggesting that non-academic departments may be those institutional subunits 
contributing to institutional inefficiencies while academic departments continue to move 
toward the frontier for degree production. 
 
Data Envelopment Models 
 The stochastic frontier analyses used parametric models to individually examine 
each link in the higher education production function.  In data envelopment analysis, I am 
able to include multiple inputs and multiple outputs.  These non-parametric models allow 
the frontier to develop based on the performance of each unit in the analysis rather than 
based on a specified model.  However, while this approach benefits from the freedom of 
a defined model, it also comes with a few consequences.  First, the number of inputs and 
outputs included in the model are again restricted by the sample size.  Second, the 
rankings are based on the inputs and outputs included in the model.  The models say 
nothing about the ranking or the efficiency of institutions on measures that are not 
included in the model.  Finally, the model is defined by whether the focus is on inputs or 
outputs.  While my original intent was to focus on output maximization, the previous 
results suggest that an input orientation is likely the better approach.  If institutional 
expenses are only weakly associated with outputs, then focusing on minimizing inputs 
given fixed outputs may be preferred. 
 These specifications ultimately led me to adopt the model used by Abbott & 
Doucouliagos (2003).  This uses an input orientation with variable returns to scale (VRS).  
The variable returns to scale accounts for differences in the scale of operation and 
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efficiency, a key assumption given the importance of size and efficiency (Hoenack, 1982; 
Robst, 2001).  Under constant returns to scale (CRS), it is assumed that large institutions 
have the same ability to efficiently turn inputs into outputs as small institutions and vice 
versa.  Whether to use VRS or CRS has been tested previously (Avkiran, 2001) by 
looking at the correlations between the efficiency scores and institutional size.  If the 
correlations are high, variable returns to scale are the preferred technique.  Because of the 
differences in size between departments, schools, and institutions, the variable returns to 
scale is preferred.  Regardless of the model setup, the key area of interest is the measure 
of technical efficiency.  As with stochastic frontier analysis, this ranges from 0 to 1, 
where 1 is the point where the inputs are minimized given fixed outputs.  This is 
somewhat easier to understand in the outputs based approach, which maximizes outputs 
given fixed inputs.  Either way, it is representative of the proximity of a unit to the 
optimal ratio of inputs to outputs. 
 
Institutional Level Data Envelopment Analysis 
 The institutional level analysis uses data from IPEDS to look at models with 
various inputs and outputs.  These models follow the similar structure as previously, first 
presenting the efficiency scores for the relationship between revenues and expenses 
followed by expenses to outputs and, finally, revenues to outputs.  Revenues include state 
appropriations, tuition and fee revenues, and federal operating grants and contracts.  
Expenses include instruction, research, academic support, institutional support, public 
service, student services, and scholarships and fellowships.  Finally, outputs include 
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undergraduate degrees, master’s degrees, the full-time retention rate, 4-year graduation 
rate, and 6-year graduation rate.   
In addition, I include various controls in the analyses.  The controls for the inputs 
include those previously used in the other models as proxies for quality, published tuition 
and fees and admissions rates (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Breu & Raab, 1994; Zhang, 
2005).  The output based controls include the full-time equivalent enrollment, 
undergraduate and graduate credit hours, and research revenues.  The control for 
published tuition and fees is not used when tuition and fee revenues are included in the 
model due to collinearity.  Similarly, federal grants and contracts cannot be both a 
revenue input and a measure of outputs.  There is much debate over whether research 
revenues are an input or an output.  Some scholars (Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2003; 
Avkiran, 2001; Cave, Hanney, & Kogan, 1991; Tomkins & Green, 1993) believe that 
research revenues are actually a reflection of an institution’s research output, essentially 
putting a market value on the research conducted at that institution.  In line with this 
reasoning, I take a similar approach, using federal operating grant and contract revenues 
and research expenses as proxies for research output. 
The choice of variables and the model setup is especially important in data 
envelopment analysis since the data drives the frontier.  In addition, the number of 
variables that can be included is restricted by the sample size (Avkiran, 2001).  Once 
separating by institutional type, not all of the models are applicable.  For example, BA 
granting institutions and doctoral institutions have too few observations in many of the 
models because of the number of variables included.  There should be at least 3 times as 
many observations as variables, meaning there need to be at least 36 institutions with full 
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data in the largest models.  Furthermore, many outputs are not applicable for each type of 
institution.  For example, graduate degrees is not especially important at BA granting 
institutions. 
 The results of the analyses are presented in Table 6.17.  This table reports the 
percent of institutions of each type operating on the frontier as well as the mean and 
standard deviation in technical efficiency.  Similar results across the various models 
would suggest a robust efficiency of institutions in higher education. 
 In most of the models, the average efficiency score is above 0.90.  This indicates 
that most institutions are operating very efficiently when compared to like peers.  This is 
similar to the findings in the UK and Australia, where technical efficiency scores 
frequently average between 0.92 and 0.96 (Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2003; Avkiran, 
2001; Johnes, 2006).  In addition, this finding is even greater than the average technical 
efficiency of 0.76 found in the United States on the measure on value (Eff, Klein, & 
Kyle, 2012) and exceeds that seen in other industries such as hog farming in Hawaii 
(0.726) (Sharma, Leung, & Zaleski, 1997) or manufacturing in Italy (0.64) (Milana, 
Nascia, & Zeli, 2013).  The only models in my analysis with average efficiency scores 
below 0.80 are the models comparing various inputs to retention and graduation rates.  
Whether it be using revenues or expenses as the input, retention and graduation rates 
show the least amount of efficiency across the various institutional types.  This is 
somewhat concerning since these two measures are those most frequently used by 
policymakers in evaluating institutional performance (Rabovsky, 2013).  Not only are the 
mean scores much lower for these measures of output, but the number of institutions 
operating on the frontier is also quite low.  This suggests that there is inefficiency that   
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Table 6.17 
 
Results of Data Envelopment Analysis with an Input-Orientation at the Institutional Level 
 
Inputs Outputs  
RU/VH  
 RU/H   MA   
Revenues Expenses     
Revenues Expenses 75.81% 78.57% 43.72% On the Frontier 
0.97 0.99 0.91 Mean 
0.07 0.03 0.10 SD 
62 70 247 Observations 
      
Expenses Outputs     
Expenses BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
FT Retention Rate,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
73.58% 61.54% 40.45% On the Frontier 
0.94 0.93 0.86 Mean 
0.12 0.11 0.16 SD 
53 65 178 Observations 
      
Expenses with Controls Outputs with Controls     
Expenses FTE,  
BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
Research 
72.58% 75.71% 54.70% On the Frontier 
0.96 0.97 0.93 Mean 
0.08 0.06 0.10 SD 
62 70 234 Observations 
      
Expenses with Controls  
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FTE,  
BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
Research 
81.13% 82.26% 67.47% On the Frontier 
0.98 0.99 0.96 Mean 
0.06 0.04 0.07 SD 
53 62 166 Observations 
      
Expenses FTE,  
Undergraduate Credit 
Hours,  
Graduate Credit Hours,  
Research 
69.49% 74.29% 58.18% On the Frontier 
0.96 0.97 0.93 Mean 
0.08 0.07 0.11 SD 
59 70 220 Observations 
      
Expenses with Controls 
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FTE,  
Undergraduate Credit 
Hours,  
Graduate Credit Hours,  
Research 
81.63% 84.75% 67.68% On the Frontier 
0.98 0.99 0.96 Mean 
0.04 0.04 0.08 SD 
49 59 164 Observations 
      
Expenses FT Retention,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
47.54% 18.57% 10.15% On the Frontier 
0.84 0.64 0.53 Mean 
0.20 0.23 0.24 SD 
61 70 197 Observations 
      
Expenses with Controls 
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FT Retention,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
48.98% 31.37% 6.73% On the Frontier 
0.91 0.87 0.78 Mean 
0.12 0.13 0.12 SD 
49 51 104 Observations 
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Table 6.17 (Continued) 
 
Results of Data Envelopment Analysis with an Input-Orientation at the Institutional Level 
 
Inputs Outputs  
RU/VH  
 RU/H   MA   
Revenues Outputs     
Revenues BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
FT Retention Rate,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
44.26% 37.14% 24.70% On the Frontier 
0.87 0.86 0.77 Mean 
0.16 0.15 0.18 SD 
61 70 247 Observations 
      
Revenues with Controls Outputs with Controls     
Revenues FTE,  
BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
Research Expenses 
46.77% 47.14% 22.05% On the Frontier 
0.90 0.91 0.81 Mean 
0.12 0.11 0.15 SD 
62 70 254 Observations 
      
Revenues with Controls 
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FTE,  
BA Degrees, MA Degrees,  
Research Expenses 
55.74% 52.31% 31.90% On the Frontier 
0.94 0.95 0.89 Mean 
0.09 0.08 0.11 SD 
61 65 232 Observations 
      
Revenues FTE,  
Undergraduate Credit 
Hours,  
Graduate Credit Hours,  
Research Expenses 
48.39% 44.29% 22.83% On the Frontier 
0.91 0.91 0.79 Mean 
0.11 0.11 0.17 SD 
62 70 254 Observations 
      
Revenues with Controls 
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FTE,  
Undergraduate Credit 
Hours,  
Graduate Credit Hours,  
Research Expenses 
56.67% 52.31% 35.19% On the Frontier 
0.94 0.95 0.88 Mean 
0.08 0.07 0.12 SD 
60 65 233 Observations 
      
Revenues FT Retention,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
27.87% 15.71% 12.15% On the Frontier 
0.73 0.60 0.50 Mean 
0.23 0.25 0.27 SD 
61 70 247 Observations 
      
Revenues with Controls 
for Admission Rate and  
Published Tuition & Fees 
FT Retention,  
4-Year Graduation Rate,  
6-Year Graduation Rate 
36.07% 27.69% 20.87% On the Frontier 
0.87 0.85 0.83 Mean 
0.13 0.12 0.14 SD 
61 65 230 Observations 
Notes: Revenues include state appropriations, tuition & fee revenues and federal grants. 
Expenses include expenses on instruction, research, academic support, institutional support, public service, 
student services, and scholarships and fellowships. 
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exists in the production of retention rates and graduation rates when compared to peer 
institutions, but the research presented previously does not offer any clear linear link that 
might help improve performance on these measures.  Instead, the results of data 
envelopment analysis simply provide a list of peer institutions operating efficiently that 
interested institutions may want to emulate in order to improve their performance. 
Another result that stands out is the lower efficiency scores in models that 
compare MA granting institutions.  MA granting institutions are the largest comparison 
group, meaning the frontier can be set by a small number of institutions while all of the 
other institutions are compared to this frontier.  With smaller sample sizes, the proportion 
of institutions making the frontier is much larger, with fewer observations looking 
inefficient.  Indeed, the percent of institutions operating on the frontier is highest in the 
RU/VH comparison group, which has the fewest number of observations.  This is not 
necessarily true for average efficiency scores.  While the percent operating on the frontier 
is a function of sample size, average efficiency scores reflect the relative proximities to 
the frontier, meaning that the institutions are performing similarly.  For example, while 
the sample size at high research institutions often exceeds that at very high research 
institutions, the average efficiency scores are also frequently higher. 
Finally, the various models also identify changes that happen once controlling for 
tuition and admissions rates as input controls.  In each model that includes the control 
variables, the average efficiency scores improve.  Most of the models saw a slight 
increase, but the models on retention and graduation rates, which had the lowest 
efficiency scores, had very large gains once including these controls.  In the model with 
expenses as an input, the inclusion of the controls raised the average efficiency by 0.07 
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for institutions with very high research activity, 0.23 for high research institutions, and 
0.25 for MA granting institutions.  Similarly, in the model with revenues as an input, the 
efficiency scores raised by 0.14 for institutions with very high research activity, 0.25 for 
institutions with high research activity, and 0.33 for MA granting institutions.  While part 
of this is due to the associated changes in sample size from missing data, it also shows 
that once controlling for the quality of student inputs and institutional affordability, 
efficiency scores raise when compared to peers.  Indeed, the aforementioned 0.14 
increase for very high research institutions occurred while keeping the sample size fixed. 
In general, these various analyses at the institutional level suggest that institutions 
are performing well when compared to their peers.  Once controlling for Carnegie 
classification, and then controlling for student and financial inputs, there is little variation 
in efficiency scores.  Most institutions are performing on, or very near, the frontier.  
While this says nothing about the efficiency of the entire sector, it does highlight the 
efficiency of institutions operating within higher education in comparison to each other. 
 
School Level Data Envelopment Analysis 
 At the school level, the inputs include the various measures of salaries and 
operating expenses while the outputs include degrees, majors, and semester credit hours 
both at the undergraduate level and including all levels of enrollment.  In the first 
analysis, conducted with an output orientation, 43.48% of schools were operating on the 
frontier with variable returns to scale.  Of the 46 schools included, 20 received a perfect 
efficiency score of 1.  When looking at the input orientation, the percent operating on the 
frontier increased slightly to 46.15%, but only 26 schools were included in the analysis.  
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However, when using constant returns to scale, which does not account for size 
differences, 50 institutions were included in the analysis and 42% were operating on the 
frontier. 
These results, presented in Table 6.18, show the relative ranks in this model.  All 
of those schools operating on the frontier in the CRS model are also operating on the 
frontier in the VRS model.  In addition, once allowing for variable returns to scale, the 
variation in the efficiency scores is much smaller.  The mean efficiency score is 0.88 with 
a standard deviation of 0.14.  The lowest recorded efficiency score is 0.56.  This means 
that once introducing variable returns to scale, most schools were performing relatively 
efficiently. 
 In general, the technical efficiency scores reveal that schools of liberal arts 
performed at the top of the distribution while schools of business were around the 
midpoint of the efficiency scores and schools of engineering performed the worst.  These 
findings seem intuitive since schools of liberal arts have large enrollments and are 
relatively cheap to operate.  Their input-to-output mix, therefore, drives the definition of 
the frontier.  When schools of engineering try to compete at this level, they find 
themselves looking inefficient.  They have relatively small enrollments and are much 
more expensive to operate. 
 This natural grouping of efficiency scores suggests that subunit analyses may be 
important in future models.  At the school level, there is not enough power to conduct 
subunit analyses, but this can be used at the departmental level to compare departments 
of a similar type. 
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Table 6.18 
 
Results of Data Envelopment Analysis with an Input-Orientation at the School Level 
 
Institution College 
Rank 
(VRS) 
Theta 
(VRS) 
Rank 
(CRS) 
Theta 
(CRS) 
UTPA Business Administration 
  
1 1.00 
UTPA Education 1 1.00 1 1.00 
UTPA Health Sciences & Human Services 1 1.00 1 1.00 
UTPA Social & Behavioral Sciences 1 1.00 1 1.00 
UTB Applied Technology & General Studies 
  
1 1.00 
UTB Education 
  
1 1.00 
UTB Liberal Arts 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Arlington Liberal Arts 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Arlington Nursing 
  
1 1.00 
Austin Liberal Arts & LBJ 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Austin Sciences 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Austin Communication 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Dallas Management 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Dallas Natural Sciences & Mathematics 
  
1 1.00 
UTEP Health & Nursing 
  
1 1.00 
UTEP Liberal Arts & UC 
  
1 1.00 
Tyler Arts & Sciences 
  
1 1.00 
Tyler Nursing & Health Science 
  
1 1.00 
UTPB Arts & Sciences 1 1.00 1 1.00 
UTSA Education & Human Development 1 1.00 1 1.00 
UTSA Liberal & Fine Arts 1 1.00 1 1.00 
Tyler Education & Psychology 
  
22 0.98 
Arlington Education 
  
23 0.94 
Tyler Business & Technology 
  
24 0.94 
UTSA Sciences 
  
25 0.91 
UTEP Business 13 0.91 26 0.90 
Arlington Business 
  
27 0.83 
UTSA Business 
  
28 0.76 
Arlington Science 
  
29 0.75 
Austin Business 17 0.84 30 0.71 
Austin Engineering 21 0.78 31 0.69 
UTEP Engineering 19 0.78 32 0.65 
UTPA Engineering & Computer Science 16 0.85 33 0.65 
Dallas Engineering & Computer Science 18 0.81 34 0.62 
Austin Education 24 0.67 35 0.61 
UTEP Science 
  
36 0.60 
Dallas Arts & Humanities 
  
37 0.55 
UTPA Science & Mathematics 
  
38 0.54 
UTSA Public Policy 
  
39 0.51 
Dallas Economic, Political & Policy Sciences 
  
40 0.51 
UTEP Education 14 0.89 41 0.48 
Dallas Behavioral & Brain Sciences 15 0.87 42 0.48 
Arlington Engineering 22 0.73 43 0.47 
UTSA Architecture 25 0.64 44 0.47 
Arlington Social Work & Public Affairs 
  
45 0.36 
Tyler Engineering & Computer Science 
  
46 0.34 
UTSA Engineering 20 0.78 47 0.33 
Austin Fine Arts 23 0.72 48 0.32 
Austin Nursing & Pharmacy 26 0.56 49 0.30 
Austin Architecture 
  
50 0.15 
 247 
 
Departmental Level Data Envelopment Analysis  
 The model for the departmental analysis is the same as that in the school analysis.  
It again uses an input orientation with variable returns to scale.  It also uses the same 
inputs as in the school level analysis.  However, the outputs do not include semester 
credit hours since these are not available at the departmental level.  These results exhibit 
a similar pattern as that seen at the school level.  The model with constant returns to scale 
again has a much larger sample size than the model using variable returns to scale, 182 as 
opposed to 110, and a lower percentage of departments operating at the frontier, 5.49% 
compared to 13.64%.  However, it does not account for scale efficiency as a function of 
size and operations. 
As can be seen in Table 6.19, departments in this analysis are much further from the 
frontier than in any of the other analyses.  Like with the school analysis, this raised the 
question of whether this was because the model was trying to compare departments of 
multiple types.  Much like the approach at the institutional level, I next separated the 
results by departmental type.  When comparing similar departments, the percent 
operating on the frontier increased greatly, from 13.64% in the full analysis on all 
departments to a minimum of 37.84% departments operating on the frontier for 
departments of humanities.  In addition, the average efficiency score by department was 
quite high, from 0.79 in departments of science and mathematics to 0.98 for departments 
of engineering.  Indeed, 6 of the 7 departmental types had average efficiency scores of 
over 0.85. 
  
 248 
 
Table 6.19 
 
Results of Data Envelopment Analysis with an Input-Orientation at the Departmental Level 
 
 
Percent Operating  
On the Frontier 
Minimum  
Score Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Science & Math 43.33% 0.57 30 0.79 0.16 
Humanities 37.84% 0.54 37 0.86 0.15 
Arts 73.33% 0.79 15 0.87 0.14 
Engineering 46.67% 0.47 30 0.98 0.05 
Health & Nursing 66.67% 0.51 21 0.92 0.12 
Behavioral & Social Sciences 53.13% 0.66 32 0.95 0.12 
Business 68.18% 0.69 22 0.91 0.12 
Total 13.64% 0.39 110 0.95 0.09 
Note: These results all use variable returns to scale.  
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Overall, these results are relatively consistent with the other analyses.  
Departments, once comparing to departments of a similar type, are generally efficient.  In 
most cases, over half of departments of a given type operate on the frontier and the 
average efficiency scores are frequently over 0.85.  Stated otherwise, for those 
departments not operating on the frontier, their efficiency scores are relatively high once 
imposing a structure that controls for variable returns to scale.  Even the standard 
deviation in the efficiency scores is relatively small, under 0.16, indicating not only high 
scores, but the clustering of scores at the top of the distribution. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 These findings have empirically examined the relationships found in the higher 
education production function.  Using data from IPEDS, the University of Texas System, 
and Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, I have been able to conduct cross-
sectional and longitudinal analyses using ordinary least squares regression, fixed effects 
regressions, stochastic frontier analysis, and data envelopment analysis.  These models 
have looked at the relationship between revenues and expenses, expenses and outputs, 
revenues and outputs, and the measures of relative technical efficiency when compared to 
peers.  In addition, these models are conducted, where possible, on three levels of 
analysis: institutions, schools, and departments.  In the next chapter, I present the 
implications of these findings, looking at the patterns that are robust across the various 
analyses and comparing across the various models and levels of analysis.  I also discuss 
the importance of these findings to the research literature and to higher education policy.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
The findings from the previous chapter exhibited relationships that were 
consistent with the literature and the higher education production function.  As expected, 
institutional budgets are dominated by revenues from tuition, state appropriations, and 
federal operating grants and contracts.  These patterns vary based on an institution’s 
Carnegie classification and size, a finding that is consistent across the various models.  
Indeed, institutions with the same Carnegie classification but located in different states 
are more similar than institutions within a state who have different classifications.  A 
pattern that is seen throughout higher education is the increasing reliance on tuition and 
federal grants as primary sources of revenue, while state appropriations have fallen.  This 
trend could threaten the public nature of higher education as institutions become 
increasingly competitive for tuition dollars and research funds.  Rather than focusing on 
educating students in-state, institutions may compete for out-of-state students of a higher 
caliber and who are willing to pay higher tuition and fees.  This willingness to pay for 
higher education could further exacerbate the increases in tuition.  These two 
components, a nationwide search for talented students and increasing tuition, could result 
in further limitations for access to in-state, public higher education for many students.  In 
addition, as research becomes a more important as a source of revenue, particularly in the 
face of declining state appropriations, institutions may drift in their orientation, looking 
for alternative revenue streams and thereby changing their operations. 
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Similar to the revenue side of budgets which focus on tuition, state appropriations, 
and federal grants, institutional expenses focus on instruction and research.  These 
expenses, once looking within institutional budgets, are primarily designated for salaries 
and benefits.  In addition, expenses on scholarships and fellowships are a large expense 
item in the general and educational budget.  Other expenses, such as utilities, capital 
projects, and auxiliary enterprises, are large items, but budgeted in separate funds. 
When taking this information to examine the first research question addressing 
revenues and expenses, strong patterns emerged.  Expenses on instruction were 
associated with revenues from state appropriations and tuition.  Similarly, expenses on 
research were associated with funds from federal grants and contracts.  These findings 
were not surprising given the strong association between the funding source and the 
intended use of the funds.  This confirms previous research conducted by Leslie and 
colleagues (2012).  For example, students are paying tuition in order to receive 
instruction, a strong and logical association.  However, other links were less apparent.  
While federal grants showed a strong relationship with research, they also showed a 
relationship with instructional and public service expenses as well.  This could indicate 
the use of federal funds to help offset overhead and indirect expenses that go to support 
non-research enterprises.  In general, these findings showed strong links between 
revenues and expenses that operated in the expected fashion.  The accountability question 
of whether funds are being used for their intended purpose is therefore generally 
unfounded as illustrated by this analysis.  Money coming from funders interested in 
instruction does indeed show a strong relationship with expenses on instruction.  The 
same can be said for research.  These strong links between the source of funding and the 
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expected use of funding reveals high congruence in higher education spending, 
suggesting that institutions are tightly aligned to their principal funders (Ferris, 1991; 
Lane, 2007).  In addition, this finding holds even in the face of the Great Recession.  
Many of the relationships found previously (Leslie et al., 2012) are still significant, hold 
for many types of four-year institutions, and operating in the same direction as those 
found before the economic decline. 
Moving to the second research question, I looked at the links between expenses 
and outputs.  In these models, the relationships were very weak across all of the levels of 
analysis.  Whether it be at the institutional level, the school level, or the departmental 
level, expenses were not strongly associated with outputs.  Instead, many of the links 
were between revenues and outputs.  These results indicate that revenues have an indirect 
impact on outputs.  Rather than seeing strong relationships between individual expense 
items and outputs, the combined efforts of multiple spending and revenue sources at the 
institutional level are what manifest as being most important.  In essence, the institution 
operates as a whole rather than as separate, independently operating expense items.  
Increasing expenses on instruction, for example, is not likely to improve degree 
production, full-time retention rates, or graduation rates.  However, once combined with 
other expenses and aggregated to the original source of the funds, the relationships are 
significant.  For example, while instructional expenses were not significant with their 
relationship to outputs, tuition revenues were associated with higher graduation rates.  
This also revealed another interesting finding.  When coupled with the finding that 
expenses on scholarships and fellowships were associated with decreased four-year 
graduation rates, it could be suggested that students are the primary drivers of outputs 
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more so than institutions.  This is somewhat similar to the finding by Marvin Titus (2006) 
that an individual’s probability of graduation is a function of an institution’s reliance on 
tuition.  My findings differ from Titus’s in that I focus on the institution as the unit of 
analysis.  As institutional policies around tuition and scholarships change, there are 
changes in institutional outputs such as graduation rates.  This might suggest that students 
who have to pay higher tuition and fees may try to finish their degree faster.  However, 
increased aid from scholarships and fellowships slows the time to degree.  It should be 
noted that my study cannot speculate about the behavior of individual students and how 
they might respond to changes in tuition or aid.  Rather, it simply points out that 
institutions as producers of degrees do exhibit significant variations in aggregate 
measures of production as the out-of-pocket expense charged to students changes.  
Indeed, once controlling for student inputs and institutional type, students are most likely 
the ultimate producers of outputs, above and beyond anything to which institutions 
choose to spend their money.  More simply, the behavior of students in response to 
changing institutional policies may be driving the changes seen in institutional outputs 
more so than the behavior of institutions as a means of production. 
The findings also suggest that the expenses-to-outputs link in the production 
function is weak.  The outputs themselves are relatively stable, with little variation over 
time.  While there is variation in outputs between institutions, much of this is explained 
away once controlling for Carnegie classification.  These weak relationships call into 
question many of the current reforms for higher education.  Performance funding and the 
increased attention by the Obama administration on college scorecards may be misplaced.  
Descriptively, college outputs are clearly important to the higher education landscape.  
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Potential students and parents have an interest in knowing an institution’s retention and 
graduation rates.  However, this should not be interpreted as institutional performance.  
Whether a student graduates in 6 years is not a function of the institution, but of the 
individual student.  In the regressions that move beyond the descriptive statistics and 
control for student inputs and institutional type, the associations between institutional 
initiatives and outputs disappear.  Institutional expenditures are not likely to significantly 
change their performance. 
However, it should be noted this study focuses on aggregate expenditures.  
Institutions may be able to change their performance by altering what they spend their 
money on rather than the total amount of money.  This would echo Craven’s (1975) 
suggestion that higher education can be better improved through the effective allocation 
of resources rather than the total amount of resources.  Yet even this proposition by 
Craven assumes that institutional administrators are acting inefficiently.  The hypotheses 
surrounding resource dependency theory (Bowen, 1970, 1980; Froelich, 1999; Hopkins 
& Massy, 1981; Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992; Niskanen, 1971; Pfeffer, 1997; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1995) suggest that inefficiencies are built into the system 
in order to maximize revenues.  In essence, it suggests that administrators are 
intentionally acting inefficiently.  They know a way to maximize their performance but 
are not doing so in order to maximize future revenues.  In higher education, this is likely 
not the case.  The discussion of the efficiency measures, which follows later in the 
chapter, reveals that institutions are, in large part, acting relatively efficiently when 
compared to their peers.  That is not to say that the system as a whole cannot be 
improved, but simply that institutions are performing in relatively similar fashions.  
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Therefore, these high efficiency scores suggest that administrators have not intentionally 
built inefficiencies into their management of their institutions but are actually acting in 
the most efficient way they see possible.  Where inefficiencies do exist, it’s more likely 
that administrators do not know what to do, do not have a good model to emulate, or 
simply are providing a service to a special population that makes them look more 
inefficient than they actually are.  Instead of focusing on the total amount spent in 
relation to institutional outputs, policymakers and administrators might be challenged to 
evaluate how the money is spent programmatically.  If the links between expenses and 
outputs is so weak, as suggested, then the amount of money being spent may not be as 
important as how it is being spent.  Even more so, this has to take place at a very fine 
level of analysis, down to the program level, since aggregate categories such as 
instruction or academic support were not found to be predictors of output.  Thus, if 
institutions are to be truly evaluated on their performance, they might better learn from 
being evaluated on their internal allocations, policies, and programs.   
Another way institutions can improve their outputs is by improving the quality of 
their inputs.  Therefore, rewarding institutions on their performance essentially privileges 
institutions with better inputs.  Similar to the findings by Brooks (2005) and Ehrenberg 
(2002b) in looking at rankings lists, institutions can game the system by focusing on 
specified targets and benchmarks.  This could push institutions towards highly 
competitive admissions processes where only certain students with high probabilities of 
retention and graduation are admitted.  This setup has the potential to further stratify 
higher education, giving more resources to institutions that already have high quality 
inputs while those institutions needing additional resources suffer because of the types of 
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populations they serve.  Indeed, institutions that serve non-traditional, low-income, 
minority, or other underserved populations could suffer from this gamesmanship as they 
could be punished because of their low measures of performance which reflect the types 
of students served more than it does on actual institutional performance.  Similarly, 
publishing scorecards that grade institutions based on their descriptive measures could 
further push quality students to certain types of institutions, which help these institutions 
perform even better on these measures while other types of institutions fall in the ratings. 
This also has implications for performance funding.  Funding institutions based 
on their performance, which, as noted, is a function of their inputs rather than their actual 
performance, is not directly addressing institutional operations.  States should not be 
concerned about how institutions spend their money as the results of this analysis indicate 
that funding is indeed allocated to related expenditures.  However, if states want to 
reward institutions based on their institutional performance, there is little evidence that 
institutional expenditures can improve performance on measures such as degrees 
awarded, retention rates, and graduation rates.  Therefore, linking future inputs to current 
outputs may not be the best approach since there is little variation in outputs and 
institutional expenditures do not have strong links to output generation.  Instead, states 
may be more interested in looking at the efficiency of institutions in relation to their 
peers. 
These policy reforms in higher education, including scorecards, performance 
funding, vouchers, and public charters, have serious implications for states, institutions, 
and students.  The efficiency evaluation perspective of governors, legislators, and state 
boards of higher education has placed increased attention on the performance of 
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institutions.  This has involved giving institutions more autonomy in setting their own 
tuition, aid, and other policies in order to make them more competitive and market-
oriented.  Accompanying these structural policies has been a focus on higher education as 
a private good and students as consumers.  This is reflected by the voucher arrangement 
in Colorado and increasing out-of-pocket expenses elsewhere.  However, the drive for 
efficiency has the potential to threaten equity and the very public nature of higher 
education if simple measures of retention rates, graduation rates, and degree completions 
are the standard for efficiency (Dowd, 2003).  By focusing on this type of efficiency, the 
incentive structure essentially pushes institutions towards a model that maximizes these 
potential outputs, causing premier institutions to focus on improving their inputs by 
admitting only those students who are likely to increase their perceived institutional 
performance.  This would then result in higher future funding.  Other institutions, which 
serve more at-risk populations, would be threatened by such an arrangement as their 
performance would look poor when compared to these elite, public institutions.  
However, open access and minority service institutions serve a purpose other than pure 
efficiency on institutional outputs.  If they wanted to maximize their outputs, they would 
undertake a similar behavior, but they are charged with a mission to serve 
underrepresented populations, make higher education more accessible, and provide the 
resources necessary to help alleviate past educational and socioeconomic inequalities.  
The types of students at these institutions come from a background with fewer resources 
or opportunities.  Pure competition with the elite public institutions would push these 
types of institutions out of the market since their relative performance is much lower.  
Yet the purpose they serve promotes the equality of opportunity argument made by Okun 
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(1975).  These institutions are meant to provide an opportunity to students who might 
otherwise not receive a chance in a pure market and efficiency based system.  These 
considerations are necessary given the current state of reform.  In the example of the 
voucher program in Colorado, institutions compete heavily for students and the 
associated tuition and state voucher funds.  The 2009 WICHE report points out some of 
the negatives of this arrangement.  Namely, underrepresented and non-traditional students 
were less likely to enroll at institutions in Colorado as a result of this policy.  Not only 
does this threaten the financial stability of minority serving institutions that have to 
compete for students, but it illustrates the potential stratification of higher education that 
can occur if policies are designed to encourage a system based on market competition and 
financial incentives that are based on performance.  If issues of equity and access are not 
considered in performance or efficiency based systems, certain populations of students 
might be pushed into lower-tier or two-year institutions at the expense of an opportunity 
to study at a four-year institution devoted to serving those populations most at risk. 
Given these findings, and the weak link between expenses and outputs in the 
higher education production function, I turned to frontier analyses to look at the 
production function more holistically.  Rather than thinking of revenues, expenses, and 
outputs as having a linear relationship, I looked at them in terms of efficiencies in the 
input-output mix.  Indeed, previous research suggests that institutions need to focus on 
the point that maximizes the input-output ratio (Powell, Gilleland, & Pearson, 2012) and 
simultaneously produces instructional and research outputs without the expense of either 
(Massy, 1996; Nerlov, 1992).  Stochastic frontier analysis used a parametric approach to 
employ the same models as in my previous analyses to determine the relative efficiencies 
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of institutions, schools, and departments.  Data envelopment analysis used a non-
parametric approach to evaluate multiple inputs in relation to multiple outputs.  These 
models suggest that there is an optimal mix of inputs to outputs.  Institutions should try to 
move toward this point, where the ratio of outputs to inputs is maximized. 
In echoing back to the discussion on equity and access, one of the key findings 
from these models is that efficiency is largely a function of an institution’s mission.  
Much like the descriptive and multivariate regressions, Carnegie classification is a major 
predictor of efficiency.  When trying to compare all types of institutions, technical 
efficiency varies greatly in the different models.  However, once separating out the 
comparison groups to institutions of a similar type, most institutions perform relatively 
well compared to their peers.  The variation in efficiency scores for institutions of the 
same type is quite small.  This finding holds for the school and departmental analyses as 
well.  Again, once using a comparison group of similar peer units, most units were found 
to be relatively efficient.  This is consistent with the findings in the UK and Australia 
(Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2003; Athanassopoulos & Shalle, 1997; Avkiran, 2001; Izadi et 
al., 2002; Johnes & Johnes, 1993; Johnes & Johnes, 1995; Tomkins & Green, 1988) that 
institutions of higher education in these countries were largely efficient.  This finding is 
especially important because it emphasizes the need to compare institutions with a similar 
mission and orientation in order to produce realistic measures of efficiency.  The 
efficiency of a research institution should not be compared to a minority serving 
institution, even if they are in the same state.  Their missions are vastly different, the 
populations and background of their students are vastly different, and they should be 
compared to peers of a similar type rather than those in a similar region.  
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Once controlling for Carnegie classification, where inefficiency does exist, the 
school and departmental analyses suggest that the sources of the inefficiencies are likely 
non-academic in nature.  Had the academic models shown inefficiencies, these might be 
attributed to cost disease or the academic ratchet, which argue that faculty and research 
are driving up costs and producing inefficiencies.  However, the subunit analyses showed 
little variation in their technical efficiency once controlling for school or department type.  
Because the institutional academic subunits were efficient, the sources of inefficiency 
within an institution would likely have to be non-academic in nature.  This may be a 
function of the mission creep related to non-academic expenses and administration, a 
result of the rapid expansion in the number and professionalization of academic staff, 
known as the academic lattice (Levin, 1991; Massy, 1996; Massy & Wilger, 1992; 
Zemsky & Massy, 1990).  Non-academic expenses, which have been seen to increase 
rapidly (Getz & Siegfried, 1991b; Harter, Wade, & Watkins, 2005), may be causing the 
educational mission of institutions to suffer.  Knowing this, institutions might want to 
examine their non-academic units for potential areas of improvement. 
In addition to looking at institutions, schools, and departments, I also looked at 
efficiencies over time, introducing unit and year fixed effects to the analysis where 
possible.  This limited the power in models with too many regressors, but the models that 
were significant showed longitudinal changes in efficiency.  For institutional models, 
efficiencies were seen to decline since 2007.  Institutions became less efficient, likely a 
function of the Great Recession.  As the economy continued to decline and the funding 
models changed, institutions moved away from the optimal input-output mix.  Without 
the resources, particularly state appropriations, institutions became less efficient in their 
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production of outputs, namely in their production of degrees.  However, the same pattern 
did not manifest for schools or departments.  This finding suggests that institutions are 
becoming less efficient over time while its subunits are relatively stable, if not improving.  
It again highlights that academic subunits are performing well when compared to units of 
a similar type and that institutional inefficiencies, where they exist, could be a result of 
non-academic units.  The results reveal that despite academic units improving over time, 
institutions are becoming more inefficient, therefore non-academic units must be 
contributing to the decline. 
 
Summary of Implications 
The above findings suggest that the higher education production function is 
limited by its outputs.  While the link between revenues and expenses is strong, the link 
between expenses and outputs is weak.  However, when looking at the overall efficiency, 
institutions were performing roughly the same as their peers once controlling for 
Carnegie classification.  This suggests that the production of outputs may not be a linear 
function of the inputs or processes, with additional expenses leading to greater outputs.  
Rather, institutions should look to perform at the optimal mix of inputs and outputs, as 
established by the market and their peers.  When taking this viewpoint, institutions are 
indeed efficient in their production of outputs when compared to others.  This does not 
rule out the possibility that higher education as a sector is performing inefficiently, but 
just that institutions are performing, in general, on par with other institutions of the same 
type.  Therefore, measuring institutional performance based on their outputs alone, as is 
common with scorecards and performance funding, may not be the best option.  
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Maximizing outputs may not be feasible given the lack of variation in many output 
measures and the fact that most institutions are already performing at, or near, the frontier 
of production possibilities.  Instead, the focus may need to shift to inputs, which exhibit 
greater variation and are more easily controlled by policymakers and administrators.  If 
the actual production of outputs is only weakly related to expenses, then focusing on 
controlling the inputs may be the better option.  With this approach, the model focuses on 
keeping outputs constant while reducing inputs.  Rather than trying to increase graduation 
rates by an additional percentage point, which may be very expensive, this would cut 
inputs until the point where graduation rates were poised to decline.  However, the 
measures of efficiency using this approach show that most institutions are already 
operating at the frontier.  Changes in funding accompanying the cuts associated with the 
Great Recession have actually caused institutions to stray from their efficient point of 
operation.  Further cuts may hurt the ability of institutions to produce educational outputs 
even more.  If cuts must be made, they should focus on the non-academic aspects of 
institutions, the only area which is not directly related to student outputs and has the 
potential for improvements to efficiency.  While such an input based approach may be a 
money saving option, it could threaten the publicness of higher education, leading to 
increased competition that stratifies institutions, threatens affordability, and limits 
enrollment opportunities.  Therefore, the economic model of efficiency optimization and 
cost cutting may not be the socially responsible model.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONTRIBUTION, FUTURE RESEARCH, & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this final chapter, I conclude by describing the contribution to the field, the 
limitations of the study, and offer suggestions for future research.  Overall, this study has 
sought to take the vantage point used by policymakers in their dealings with higher 
education.  In particular, I use the efficiency evaluation perspective, which focuses on 
policies of governors, state legislators, and state boards of higher education to evaluate 
performance by measuring institutional outputs.  In order to set up this approach, I began 
with an overview of the higher education landscape and the ongoing debate between the 
public and private nature and outputs associated with higher education.  This is especially 
relevant given the current state of the economy and changing funding structures for 
institutions.  State appropriations are rapidly declining while tuition and fees are 
becoming increasingly important to institutional operations.  On the expense side, while 
instructional expenses have remained relatively stable, non-academic expenses have 
driven up the costs of higher education and, as identified in the later analyses, have 
contributed to the inefficiencies seen within institutions. 
By taking this efficiency perspective, I used literature in the fields of higher 
education, political science, organizational theory, and economics to develop a 
production function for higher education in the modern era.  This production function 
modified previous models to fit the non-profit nature of higher education and put 
additional focus on how higher education has changed since the Great Recession.  This 
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framework alone is a contribution to the literature, incorporating previous theory into a 
holistic model that accounts for modern day trends. 
In addition, I gathered data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System, University of Texas System, and Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to 
empirically test the relationships in this type of a framework.  This unique dataset 
combined information at the institutional, school, and departmental levels, allowing for 
the analysis to be conducted and compared across the different levels.  The longitudinal 
nature of the data also allowed for the comparisons to be conducted over time.  Again, the 
level of detail and the panel data provide a dataset that contributes to the understanding of 
how institutions work. 
The results of the various analyses were relatively robust across the different 
model specifications.  Whether it be using multivariate regression, fixed effects, 
stochastic frontier analysis, or data envelopment analysis, the results showed strong links 
between revenues and expenses.  This was consistent to similar studies conducted before 
the onset of the Great Recession.  However, the same strong relationships could not be 
found in the links between expenses and outputs.  In addition, the frontier models 
suggested that no matter the model choice and setup, higher education is relatively 
efficient once controlling for the unit type.  These findings are especially relevant to the 
literature because they take a holistic look at higher education, testing and re-testing the 
relationships in the higher education production function under different model 
specifications.  The multitude of analyses, across the different levels, with the different 
models, and the different time frames provide a consolidated source describing the ins-
and-outs of the higher education production function in the modern era. 
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Finally, the contribution extends beyond that of an academic nature.  The 
efficiency perspective that I identify also provides lessons to state officials and 
institutional administrators.  In particular, the chapter on implications extended the 
discussion of the higher education production function and how it applies to policy.  First, 
funders have little to worry about in terms of congruence between funding and spending.  
Revenues are strongly associated with their relevant expenditures.  However, given the 
lack of a strong relationship between institutional expenditures and outputs, it suggests 
that using performance funding may not be the best approach for managing higher 
education.  Instead, students are likely the ultimate drivers of outputs.  Rewarding 
institutions based on their outputs essentially funds them based on the quality of their 
inputs and their admissions.  Colorado was used to illustrate one example where states 
took a student centered approach.  However, the WICHE evaluation in Colorado 
suggested that there were unintended consequences which manifested through increased 
competition, a reduction in underrepresented and non-traditional students, and a potential 
stratification of the public higher education sector.  Using performance funding, student 
centered vouchers, and other market mechanisms could lead to rapidly increasing tuition, 
reduced access, and future threats to equitable opportunities for underrepresented 
populations.  Finally, the measures of efficiency suggested that higher education is 
operating efficiently when compared to peers.  While it says nothing about the sector as a 
whole, institutions, schools, and departments are all competing at a similar, high inputs-
to-outputs mix as their peers.  This indicates that institutions are likely performing better 
than indicated by scorecards and rankings once taking their mission orientation into 
account.  These policy relevant contributions can help inform future discussions around 
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performance funding, vouchers, scorecards, and other reforms seeking to evaluate the 
performance and efficiency of higher education. 
 
Limitations & Future Research 
 While this research has provided new insight into the higher education production 
and the relationships between inputs, processes, and outputs, there is still much work that 
can be done in this area.  To begin, there are a few limitations to this study that can be 
improved upon in future research.  As with many designs, the results are limited by the 
data.  In this study, IPEDS has longitudinal data dating back decades, but it is fraught 
with missing observations on certain variables.  Whether it be issues with the parent-child 
relationships, poor imputation by NCES, or simple nonresponse, missing data is 
problematic, particularly for smaller institutions.  However, IPEDS is the best source of 
national and longitudinal data and should not be dismissed.  In future research, a survey 
may need to be designed to help fill the gap in the knowledge of the higher education 
production function left by the inadequacy of IPEDS on certain items and directly ask 
questions regarding the inputs, processes, and outputs at an institution.   
 Moving to the other sources and levels of data, the data is limited to the 
University of Texas system.  This limits the interpretation of the results to a single system 
within a single state.  Gathering data at the institutional, school, and departmental level 
from institutions across the country would clearly be a better approach.  However, this 
would be an incredibly costly endeavor both in terms of money and the time required to 
create panel data for the nation’s hundreds of public, four-year institutions.  Furthermore, 
the U.T. System included budget data from academic years 2008 to 2012, but the data 
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from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, which included output 
information, was limited to 2008 to 2011 and even further restricted to 2008 to 2010 for 
graduation information.  This means the regressions with year fixed effects were limited 
to 3 years of data.  This is a real threat to the study since fixed effects are best applied to 
panels with a long history and many observations per unit of analysis.  This is the main 
reason that the cross-sectional results are also included.  While fixed effects are the 
preferred model, the data is limited and thus the cross-sectional approach provides at 
lease a simplified model for analysis.  Future research could benefit by replicating this 
study in other states, with a sample of institutions nationwide, and by collecting more 
data over time. 
In addition, future research may benefit from additional specifications and 
models.  For example, additional variables may be important as inputs or outputs.  This 
approach focused on degree completions, retention rates, graduation rates, majors, 
semester credit hours, and the like.  The literature identified these as being key variables 
of importance to policymakers (Rabovsky, 2013).  However, variables such as 
publications, impact scores, test scores, and other measures of quality might be preferred 
by other researchers.  Higher education offers a number of social services and benefits 
that are not fully captured by my variables alone; nor are they fully captured in any state 
funding model.  While the performance of an institution on these variables may look to 
be inefficient, their devotion to other services may be just as important and warrant 
further consideration in subsequent models.  Where possible, I tried to justify my choice 
in the model specification by using previous literature, but other specifications could 
easily be utilized.  For example, this could be especially important when looking at 
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differential outputs for non-traditional, low-income, and minority populations.  In 
addition, while I focused on OLS, fixed effects, and frontier based models to test 
independent relationships and measures of efficiency, the case could be made that a 
model such as structural equation modeling could be an alternate approach, particularly 
given the setup of the production function framework. 
Qualitative and mixed methods could also help contribute to the higher education 
production function.  While this study has examined the relationships between inputs, 
processes, and outputs, future research could interview state policymakers and 
institutional administrators to uncover how allocations decisions are made, why 
institutions create programs, how these programs perform in producing outputs, where 
stakeholders see areas for improvement, and how these various answers, among others, 
match up to the empirical findings.  Indeed, Craven’s (1975) suggestion to learn how best 
to spend money and programmatically allocate money may be even more important than 
the amount appropriated. 
 Finally, the conceptual framework and lessons from these results can be applied 
to the evaluation of higher education reform and policy.  Performance funding, 
accountability, vouchers, deregulation, scorecards, and other types of reform are still in 
their infancy.  As the state of the economy has changed and the landscape of higher 
education has been forced to adapt, the findings from this study can help to inform 
policymakers and set up the evaluation of these policies and programs.  In addition, these 
findings might be used to develop future policies that understand the key inputs and 
operations in the production of educational outputs while being cautious about the 
potential for unintended consequences and the lessons previously learned from reforms 
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undertaken elsewhere.  While many of these policies may look economically efficient, 
they could have detrimental social effects on certain student populations, exacerbating the 
threats to access and affordability rather than solving them through market reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
This study developed a new conceptual framework, tested this framework across 
multiple levels of analysis with a unique dataset and utilizing multiple models and 
specifications, linked the results to previous literature, and offered insight into the 
implications of these findings and how they are likely to affect current and future policy.  
In conclusion, not only has this study contributed to the academic literature, but it has 
situated itself within the broader field of higher education, paved a path for future 
research, and provided information to stakeholders interested in policy formulation and 
evaluation.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 
 
List of Public Universities Classified as Having Very High Research Activity (AY2013) 
 
Institution Name 
 Arizona State University University of Colorado-Boulder 
Colorado State University-Fort Collins University of Connecticut 
Florida State University University of Delaware 
Georgia Institute of Technology University of Florida 
Georgia State University University of Georgia 
Indiana University-Bloomington University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Iowa State University University of Houston 
Louisiana State University University of Illinois at Chicago 
Michigan State University University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Mississippi State University University of Iowa 
Montana State University University of Kansas 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh University of Kentucky 
North Dakota State University University of Louisville 
Ohio State University University of Maryland-College Park 
Oregon State University University of Massachusetts-Amherst 
Pennsylvania State University University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
Purdue University University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 
Rutgers University-New Brunswick University of Missouri-Columbia 
Stony Brook University University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
SUNY at Albany University of New Mexico 
Texas A & M University-College Station University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
University at Buffalo University of Oklahoma-Norman 
University of Alabama at Birmingham University of Oregon 
University of Alabama at Huntsville University of Pittsburgh 
University of Arizona University of South Carolina-Columbia 
University of Arkansas University of South Florida 
University of California-Berkeley University of Tennessee 
University of California-Davis University of Texas at Austin 
University of California-Irvine University of Utah 
University of California-Los Angeles University of Virginia 
University of California-Riverside University of Washington-Seattle 
University of California-San Diego University of Wisconsin-Madison 
University of California-Santa Barbara Virginia Commonwealth University 
University of California-Santa Cruz Virginia Tech 
University of Central Florida Washington State University 
University of Cincinnati Wayne State University 
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Table A.2 
 
Results of Fixed Effects by Functional Form, Expenses and Revenues per FTE (AY2008-2010) 
 
 Instruction  Research  Public Service 
         
State Appropriations 0.05 0.33**  -0.06 0.27***  0.01 0.00 
(0.06) (0.11)  (0.03) (0.07)  (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Tuition & Fee Revenues 0.18** 0.16*  0.17*** -0.36***  0.04 0.04 
(0.07) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.09)  (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Federal Operating Grants & 
Contracts 
0.03 0.03  0.43*** 0.36***  0.06 0.05 
(0.07) (0.07)  (0.10) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.04) 
         
Sales & Services of Auxiliary 
Enterprises 
0.07 0.10  -0.10 -0.24*  0.02 -0.05 
(0.13) (0.13)  (0.08) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.05) 
         
Other Sources of Operating 
Revenues 
-0.17*** -0.17***  -0.17** -0.19**  -0.04 -0.04 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) 
         
Other Sources of Nonoperating  
Revenues 
-0.04 -0.05  0.08* 0.15**  0.01 0.01 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Admissions Rate -0.21 -0.00  -0.56* -0.00*  -0.15 -0.00 
(0.41) (0.00)  (0.26) (0.00)  (0.11) (0.00) 
         
Student-Faculty Ratio -0.12*** -0.12***  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01* -0.01* 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
         
State Appropriations Squared  -0.01**   -0.01**    
 (0.00)   (0.00)    
         
Tuition & Fees Squared     0.03***    
    (0.01)    
         
Sales & Services of Auxiliary 
Enterprises Squared 
    0.02*   0.01* 
    (0.01)   (0.00) 
         
Other Nonoperating Revenue  
Squared 
    -0.01*    
    (0.01)    
         
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
         
Constant 2.38*** 3.25***  0.83** -0.18  0.37** 0.26 
(0.53) (0.62)  (0.26) (0.51)  (0.13) (0.15) 
         
Within R-Squared 0.43 0.44  0.35 0.43  0.05 0.05 
Between R-Squared 0.44 0.36  0.80 0.61  0.23 0.17 
Total R-Squared 0.42 0.36  0.80 0.61  0.21 0.16 
F-Statistic 44.75 41.72  14.19 16.75  4.54 4.40 
Observations 1295 1295  1295 1295  1295 1295 
Groups 457 457  457 457  457 457 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table A.3 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Institutional Models in AY2010 
 
 
Instruction Research Public Service Student Services 
Scholarships 
& Fellowships 
      Frontier      
State Appropriations 0.05*** 0.08* 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Tuition & Fee Revenues 0.81*** 1.10*** 0.93*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
      Federal Operating Grants & Contracts 0.01** 0.19*** 0.11*** -0.01** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
      Admissions Rate -0.24*** -0.64 0.19 -0.18** 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.35) (0.23) (0.06) (0.08) 
      Constant 3.78*** -3.45 -3.51* 5.66*** 4.40*** 
 (0.35) (2.60) (1.64) (0.50) (0.47) 
      Usigma Constant -11.71*** 2.78*** 2.35*** -3.74 1.74*** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.20) (4.80) (0.28) 
      Vsigma Constant -2.42*** -1.15* -1.32*** -2.00*** -3.90*** 
 (0.08) (0.50) (0.24) (0.31) (0.70) 
      Chi-Squared 3580.39 306.99 349.58 1381.91 1203.12 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 454 445 448 454 453 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A.3 (Continued) 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Institutional Models in AY2010 
 
 BA Degrees MA Degrees FT Retention Rate 4-Yr Graduation Rate 6-Yr Graduation Rate 
      Frontier 
     State Appropriations 0.04*** 0.03 0.00* 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
      Tuition & Fee Revenues 0.76*** 0.97*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
      Federal Operating Grants & Contracts -0.02*** -0.01 -0.00 0.02** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
      Admissions Rate -0.10 -0.48*** -0.11*** -0.32* -0.16** 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.02) (0.13) (0.06) 
      Constant -5.97*** -8.85*** 3.70*** 1.98* 2.30*** 
 (0.39) (1.00) (0.13) (0.85) (0.47) 
      Usigma Constant -1.97*** 1.07*** -4.19*** -0.47* -1.69*** 
 (0.29) (0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) 
      Vsigma Constant -2.79*** -2.60*** -5.53*** -2.07*** -3.67*** 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.17) (0.24) (0.26) 
      Chi-Squared 2342.37 490.29 314.99 95.07 165.12 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 454 454 451 448 443 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A.3 (Continued) 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Institutional Models in AY2010 
 
 BA Degrees MA Degrees FT Retention Rate 4-Yr Graduation Rate 6-Yr Graduation Rate 
      Frontier      
Admissions Rate 0.16** -0.15 -0.08*** -0.29*** -0.14** 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) 
      Published In-State Tuition & Fees -0.29*** -0.25 0.08*** 0.88*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) 
      Instructional Expenses 0.69*** 0.93*** 0.07*** 0.19* 0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) 
      Research Expenses -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
      Academic Support 0.08** 0.15* 0.01 0.05 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04) 
      Institutional Support 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) 
      Public Service -0.01 0.01 -0.01*** -0.02 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Student Services 0.22*** 0.04 -0.00 -0.17** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
      Scholarships & Fellowships 0.01 0.04* -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
      Constant -9.72*** -12.81*** 3.36*** 1.64* 1.94*** 
 (0.38) (1.36) (0.14) (0.67) (0.45) 
      Usigma Constant -1.67*** 1.06*** -4.18*** -0.47*** -1.70*** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) 
      Vsigma Constant -3.54*** -2.22*** -5.92*** -2.94*** -4.59*** 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.39) 
      Chi-Squared 3581.00 506.67 510.91 315.43 303.26 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 444 444 441 439 434 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table A.4 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Institutional Models with Fixed Effects 
 
 Research Public Service BA Degrees 
    Frontier    
State Appropriations 0.01 0.03  
 (0.03) (0.03)  
    Tuition & Fee Revenues 1.20 0.79  
 (2.23) (0.57)  
    Federal Operating Grants & Contracts -0.06 -0.03  
 (0.05) (0.04)  
    Admissions Rate 0.23 0.03  
 (1.01) (0.14)  
    Instructional Expenses   -0.03 
   (0.51) 
    Research Expenses   -0.05* 
   (0.02) 
    Academic Support   0.21** 
   (0.07) 
    Institutional Support   0.23 
   (0.29) 
    Public Service   -0.06 
   (0.15) 
    Student Services   0.26 
   (0.57) 
    Scholarships & Fellowships   -0.04 
   (0.15) 
    Usigma Constant 1.13*** 0.44 -2.62 
 (0.23) (0.27) (2.38) 
    Vsigma Constant -43.09*** -40.52*** -34.01*** 
 (0.08) (0.13) (6.61) 
    Chi-Squared 28.00 54.43 66.00 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 2623 2655 2927 
Groups 455 458 502 
    Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table A.5 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for School Level Models in AY2010 
 
 BA Degrees  Total Degrees 
        Frontier        
Average Faculty Salary per FTE 0.25 0.47* 0.23  0.34** 0.37 0.23 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.29)  (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) 
        
Average Classified Salary per FTE 0.14 0.07 -0.29  0.15 0.06 -0.46 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.45)  (0.28) (0.36) (0.26) 
        
Administration Salary -0.08 -0.09 -0.08  -0.08 -0.06 -0.08* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
        
TA Salary 0.04 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
        
Wages 0.02 0.01 0.05  -0.03 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
        
Travel Expenses -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  -0.07** -0.06* -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.04* 0.03* -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
        
Majors 0.77*** 0.65*** 0.71***  1.04*** 0.83* 1.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.36) (0.10) 
        
Semester Credit Hours  0.25** 0.13   0.23 -0.09 
  (0.09) (0.08)   (0.41) (0.10) 
        
Published In-State Tuition and Fees   0.82    0.57** 
   (0.47)    (0.22) 
        
Admissions Rate   -0.27    -0.54*** 
   (0.24)    (0.16) 
        
Constant -1.42 -2.62* -0.70  -3.90*** -3.58** -0.70 
 (1.13) (1.24) (1.52)  (0.91) (1.11) (1.24) 
        
Usigma Constant -1.11 -1.49 -1.58  -2.31*** -3.33 -4.53** 
 (0.59) (0.81) (0.97)  (0.58) (2.91) (1.38) 
        
Vsigma Constant -2.96*** -3.07*** -3.71**  -3.55*** -2.91 -3.48*** 
 (0.36) (0.58) (1.23)  (0.68) (1.62) (0.59) 
        
Chi-Squared 2176.08 1394.24 3858.39  1056.25 355.70 760.12 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 58 55 52  58 55 52 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A.6 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Departmental Level Models in AY2010 
 
 BA Degrees  Total Degrees 
        Frontier        
Average Faculty Salary  
per FTE 
0.10 0.11 0.22  0.38* 0.08 0.26* 
(0.24) (0.10) (0.13)  (0.19) (0.15) (0.13) 
        
Average Classified Salary  
per FTE 
0.79* 0.52 -0.10  0.63* 0.21 -0.47* 
(0.35) (0.28) (0.25)  (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) 
        
Administration Salary 0.09* 0.00 -0.03  0.06 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
TA Salary -0.01 -0.00 -0.03  0.04 0.00 -0.03* 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Wages 0.11 -0.03 -0.05  0.10* -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Travel Expenses -0.14 0.00 0.09  -0.10 -0.05 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) 
        
Miscellaneous  
Other Expenses 
0.09 -0.05 -0.01  0.05 -0.05 0.01 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) 
        
Majors  0.69*** 0.69***   0.91*** 0.95*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.04) (0.03) 
        
Published In-State 
Tuition & Fees 
  1.35**    1.58*** 
   (0.41)    (0.30) 
        
Admissions Rate   -0.09    -0.20 
   (0.15)    (0.11) 
        
Constant 2.09 -1.85* -2.57  1.19 -2.70*** -3.72*** 
 (1.50) (0.90) (1.47)  (1.19) (0.72) (1.10) 
        
Usigma Constant 1.90*** -0.02 -0.33  0.46 -9.92*** -11.38*** 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.37)  (0.26) (0.30) (0.12) 
        
Vsigma Constant -1.56** -2.35*** -2.28***  -0.84** -1.42*** -1.70*** 
 (0.49) (0.45) (0.40)  (0.30) (0.18) (0.19) 
        
Chi-Squared 41.63 6635.01 5756.65  77.90 1276.66 1565.78 
Significancce 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 248 248 230  248 248 230 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A.7 
 
Results of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Logged Values for Departmental Level Models in AY2010 by Department Type 
 
 BA Degrees  Total Degrees 
 
Humanities 
Health & 
Nursing 
Behavioral & 
Social Sciences  Science & Math Humanities Arts 
Health & 
Nursing Business 
          Frontier 
   
 
     Average Faculty Salary per FTE -0.14 -1.66*** 0.05  1.82 0.35 0.36 -2.56** 0.87 
 (0.12) (0.43) (0.21)  (1.12) (0.39) (1.91) (0.88) (0.80) 
Average Classified Salary per FTE 0.44 1.48*** 0.58  -0.61 0.04 -1.38 3.16*** 2.56** 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.35)  (1.19) (0.65) (0.87) (0.78) (0.87) 
Administration Salary 0.13* 0.03 0.02  0.09 0.13 0.56*** 0.16* 0.47* 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.13) (0.22) (0.07) (0.06) (0.19) 
TA Salary -0.02 0.15* -0.01  0.12 0.07 0.02 0.19 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) 
Wages 0.01 -0.11 -0.03  0.27* 0.16 0.09 0.37* -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)  (0.12) (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) (0.17) 
Travel Expenses 0.09 0.12 -0.00  -0.21 0.32 0.20*** 0.05 0.12 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)  (0.27) (0.35) (0.06) (0.23) (0.14) 
Miscellaneous Other Expenses 0.10 -0.15 0.04  0.28 -0.23 0.05 0.25 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.21) (0.27) (0.10) (0.17) (0.13) 
Majors 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.72***  
      (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)  
     Constant -2.08 1.58 -2.24*  -2.93 2.54 5.83 4.03 -8.22* 
 (1.41) (1.37) (1.13)  (4.47) (2.48) (6.81) (2.94) (3.76) 
Usigma Constant -10.39*** -9.13*** -2.08**  -6.35*** 0.21 -11.20*** -6.08*** -7.52*** 
 (0.38) (1.16) (0.75)  (0.57) (0.83) (0.32) (1.49) (1.49) 
Vsigma Constant -2.51*** -2.34*** -3.16***  0.15 -1.19 -2.41*** -0.74** -1.21*** 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.53)  (0.16) (1.01) (0.37) (0.23) (0.23) 
Chi-Squared 944.78 785.12 3364.75  23.40 17.04 733.50 95.52 49.42 
Significancce 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 38 21 42  32 38 15 21 24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
